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ABSTRACT 
Financing of small firms in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore is one of the main 
strategies of promoting them in achieving the country's national development priorities. In 
Malaysia and Indonesia, pronouncements in national development plans have led to the 
passage of specific laws and regulations favourable to small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). Singapore however, stresses the need to create an overall economic climate 
conducive to enterprise, and believes that the market can provide many services for SMEs 
more effectively than the Government. 
Policies and programmes established to redress the financial constraint are classified 
into those which improve the business environment or those which create or develop small 
firms directly. 
Singapore appears to be successful in creating an overall conducive economic 
climate to enterprises. Regarding the objective of creating SMEs to be viable exporters of 
manufactured goods to world markets, there is yet an overall assessment to show its 
conclusive success. Malaysia and Indonesia had the additional problem of both poverty and 
lack of entrepreneurship concentrated in the indigenous people. Both these countries 
responded by various policies which appear complicated. In Malaysia, the incentives 
offered and the number of organisations involved indicate that the government is 
favourably disposed towards entrepreneurship and investments by SMEs. Some of the 
specific incentives have shown to be very effective; others slightly effective; a few have 
unintended effects. Institutional finance to facilitate the creation of entrepreneurs seems to 
be available but there seems to be an information gap, advice gap and education gap to 
meet the desired objective. Overall, financial institutions as a source of finance in Indonesia 
are still not readily accessible to the majority of small firms. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The thesis is concerned with financing of small firms in Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore. The choice of the topic arises from several considerations. The recent 
interest in the potential role of small firms in solving economic, social and political 
problems. Secondly, financing of small firms is crucial to business start-ups, and their 
subsequent survival and growth. The reason for the selection of these three countries 
for the study is that not only these three countries are neighbours in ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian Nations) but also they are in different stages of 
development and pursuing different development priorities. 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Although there has been a great deal of research directed at entrepreneurship 
(Low and MacMillan, 1988) and the management problems of small firms (Mohamed, 
1988), most existing research is done in developed countries. In recent years there has 
been great interest on small firms in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Most of the 
studies are concerned with entrepreneurship development (Popenoe, 1970; Mohamed, 
1988) and management of small business (Ch'ng, 1986; Ghosh et al., 1991). Relatively 
little is known, however, about the financing of small firms in developing countries 
such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Also very little is known about the 
strategies, challenges and success of the governments and financial institutions of these 
three countries in meeting the financing needs of small firms within the context of their 
national development priorities. 
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Finance gap 
The concern to identify the sources and size of financial constraints on small 
scale enterprises and to design policies to lessen them has been an issue for debate since 
the 1930s. The identification of a gap in the availability of relatively small quantities of 
finance was first identified by the Macmillan committee in the Macmillan Report of 
1931 in the United Kingdom (UK), and the gap has come to be known as the 
"Macmillan Gap". 
"it has been presented to us that great difficulty is experienced by the smaller and 
medium sized business in raising the capital which they from time to time require even 
when the security offered is perfectly sound. To provide adequate machinery for raising 
long-dated capital in amounts not sufficiently large for a public issue always presents 
difficulties" (Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, HMSO, Cmnd.3897). 
The Macmillan Gap was the lack of provision of financial facilities for small and 
medium enterprises seeking external finance and was a shortage in the flow of long-
term capital to small scale enterprises. 
New firms which often seem small are seen as reservoirs of innovation, 
entrepreneurship and employment and so are seen as important for the growth and 
development of an economy. Any deficiencies in the supply of funds are therefore a 
cause of concern both to the firms' owners and the economy. Thus, the issue of the 
existence of a finance gap has caused much government involvement in financing small 
firms. 
In the UK the identification of the Macmillan Gap resulted in the establishment 
of the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) in 1946. The 
corporation was set up by the Bank of England and the English and Scottish clearing 
banks and was intended to supplement the existing financial institutions to provide 
either loan or equity finance or a combination of both, for small organisations. 
In the United States (US) the American Small Business Administration (SBA) 
was established by Act of Congress in 1953 to "assist, counsel and champion the 
millions of American small businessmen which are the essence and backbone of this 
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country's competitive free enterprise economy." The SBA provided funds both in the 
form of loans and loan guarantees and in the form of equity. The SBA also provides 
counselling services and training for small businesses' owners. 
The issue of a finance gap came back when it was reported in the US Federal 
Reserve Board Report of 1958 that: 
"there was an unfilled margin, perhaps a rather thin one, between the volume of funds 
available to small concerns in general and to new firms in particular, and the volume 
that could be put to use without prohibitive risk" (Federal Reserve System, Financing 
Small Business, Select Committee, United States Congress, 1958). 
Kaplan and Banner (1958) and Garvin (1968) claimed to have evidence on the 
small scale enterprise (SSE) capital gap with respect to intermediate and long term 
loans. However, Stoll and Curley (1970) in their paper concluded that there is no small 
business equity gap. 
In the UK, the Radcliffe Committee Report 1959 commented that the financial 
facilities for small firms lack some of the facilities open to large companies for 
obtaining capital: 
"There is, moreover, no recognised and readily accessible channel corresponding to 
the new issue market for large firms, through which the small industrialist can raise 
long-term funds" (Report of the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, 
London, HMSO, Cmnd.827). 
Bates (1961) viewed that a financial problem for SSE exists and it is partly 
economic in that many firms are not credit-worthy by normal standards, and partly 
institutional in that the existing institutions are inadequate. However, the Bolton 
Committee Report (1971) concluded that there was no gap in terms of institutional 
provision but there was a gap in terms of information about sources of finance. The 
Bolton Committee Report (1971) stated: 
"no institutional deficiency in the finance market; that while there are some deficiencies 
on the basis on which small and large firms can raise money, these are mostly functions 
of inherent costs and scale differences there is a need for an information and 
referral service intended to advise businessmen on the sources of advice available and 
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to offer guidance as to which is the most appropriate for a particular purpose" (Report 
of the Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms, HMSO, Cmnd. 4811). 
To remedy the disadvantage of the information gap, the Bolton Committee 
recommended the establishment of small firms' advisory bureaux. As a result the 
British government set up small firms information centres which provided a range of 
advice and counselling services. 
Binks (1979) summarised the financing problems of small firms as: 
"the smaller the firm, the larger the proportionate increase in the capital base required 
to respond to an increase in demand, but the lower its ability to command loan and 
equity finance" (Lloyds Bank Review, October 1979). 
In 1979, an interim report was produced by the Wilson Committee, concerning 
the functions of financial institutions in UK. The Committee identified that a finance 
gap still existed in the arrangements for financing small firms, whatever the availability 
of finance to the rest of industry as a whole: 
"bankers believe that lending to small firms is more risky than lending to large and that 
loss ratios are therefore likely to be higher. Moreover, banks are notably reluctant in 
supporting innovative developments" (Interim Report of the Committee, HMSO, 
Cmnd.7503, March 1979). 
The Wilson Committee considered that institutional changes might counteract such a 
situation. Some of the institutional changes that were brought about included the 
introduction of the Unlisted Security Market (USM) at the end of 1980 to provide 
venture capital for small firms, and the establishment of a Loan Guarantee Scheme 
(LGS) which would help to remove the constraints imposed by security requirements 
that restrict bank lending to small firms. 
The Wilson Committee also identified the alleged information gap and 
communication gap between small firms and financial institutions, saying that small 
firms may not know enough about the source and range of financial facilities and 
advice available to them. Even after small firms have identified an appropriate source 
of finance, they may lack the skills and experience to prepare a persuasive case. 
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Ray and Hutchinson (1986) claimed that a finance gap can exist in two ways: 
"firstly, a finance gap would exist if the marginal return on the investment 
available to small business exceeds their marginal cost of capital; due to discontinuities 
in the provision of finance, such funds were not available for otherwise profitable 
investment. Secondly, a gap would exist if the cost of money to small concerns, defined 
as the riskless rate of interest plus allowances for differentials in risk and loan 
administration costs, exceeded the cost of money to large concerns. Thus due to 
excessive cost, small enterprises would be unable to invest" (p.26). 
In the investigations of institutional short-termism, the Confederation of British 
Industry concluded that there is a communication and educational gap between 
management, owners of companies and those providing funds. This gap is attitudinal 
and educational rather than financial (CBI, 1987). Does the finance gap physically exist 
today or is it attitudinal and educational? It seems that the existence of such a gap and 
its interpretations has proved to be inconclusive. With what seems to be an apparent 
abundance of financiers in the market, empirical research findings show that obtaining 
external finance is one of the major problems of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
In Malaysia, it is reported that banks suggested that there is abundance of 
capital to invest but there is inadequate demand for loans from small firms and also 
very few viable business propositions at the smaller end of the financing scale to invest 
in. On the other hand, findings of empirical research showed that one of the major 
problems of small firms is obtaining finance, claiming that costs are too high and 
packages are still inflexible to meet their needs. 
With apparent abundance of financiers in the market, what can one deduce 
about the existence, magnitude and position of the finance gap at present? Perhaps it 
can be viewed that generally the finance gap may exist in either one or more of the 
following: 
(a) a shortage of long term finance 
(b) relatively high cost of finance 
(c) discontinuities in the provision of finance 
(d) inadequate capital base 
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Additionally, perhaps it can also be said that the existence and magnitude of a 
finance gap may take different forms, at different times, in different countries or within 
the same country, depending on the relative size of the firms, government involvement 
in the financing of small firms, the financial structure and system of the country, 
awareness by small-business managers/owners of the existing range and benefits of 
credit facilities, social contacts and success/failure of government policy. 
The fact that the Malaysian Government continues to have thought it necessary 
to intervene with the development of the capital market by instituting government 
lending schemes, government grants, regional and national incentives and so on, 
suggests that all may not be well in the sector. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is two-fold: 
Firstly, an attempt is made to understand the national development priorities of 
the three countries that has led to their support for the promotion of small firms. The 
role of government and non-governmental institutions in promoting small firms 
particularly in the provision of finance, either directly or indirectly, are discussed and 
analysed. From the analysis, it is hoped to answer whether there exists a finance gap or 
other related gaps relevant to financing of small firms in these three countries and to 
point out the issues arise from such gaps. 
Secondly, to have an insight into the attempts of financial institutions in meeting 
the financing needs of small firms a case study on some of Malaysia's major 
government and non government financial institutions and their present strategies in 
meeting the needs of small firms financing is done. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
It is hoped that the study can answer some of the questions that economists and 
policy makers have concerning the finance gap and the issues that need to be dealt with 
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to overcome the problems of financing small firms in these three countries. Of equal 
concern, the study is intended to make some comparison on how the government of 
;three neighbouring countries with three different strategies of development priorities, at 
three different stages of development and with different social structure background, 
support the promotion of small firms. 
The questions hoped to be answered are: 
a) Why and how do governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore support the 
promotion of small firms? 
b) How far have these governments been successful and why? 
c) What is the extent of the non governmental financial institutions involved in the 
financing of small business? 
d) Is there a finance gap? 
e) What are the important issues relevant to the financing of small firms that need to be 
dealt with to overcome the growing problems of financing small firms? 
DEFINITIONS OF SMALL FIRMS 
One of the problems that is faced in the study of small firms is the problem of 
definition. Curran and Stanworth (1986) have already indicated "this is no easy task". 
John Bolton (1971) and his committee of enquiry on small firms in the UK 
systematically examined a number of ways of defining "small". Even within a country, 
different financial institutions provide different definitions of small firms. The 
advantages of having a single definition which covers all industries and possibly all 
countries are very great (Dewhurst and Burns, 1983). 
Against this background on the problems of arriving at a single definition of 
small firms, the investigation of this thesis views that it is not possible to have a single 
definition which is applicable to all three countries and sectors. Recognising the above 
problems, the following definitions are adopted in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. 
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Malaysia: 
Although different institutions offers different definitions of small firms, there 
seems to be some broad agreement on the definition of small firms based on either total 
net assets or shareholders' funds. 
The Central Bank of Malaysia or Bank Negara Malaysia defines small firms as those 
firms (including petty traders) with net assets of up to M$500,000 for non corporations 
and with shareholders' fund up to $500,000 for corporations. The Central Bank and 
Bank Pembangunan Malaysia classifies small loans as loans of less than M$500,000 
each. 
Indonesia: 
In Indonesia, small firms are classified according to the number of workers. A 
large firm in the manufacturing sector is one with 100 or more employees which means 
that those firms with 99 or less employees are small or medium scale firms. A medium 
scale firm is defined as one with 20 to 99 employees. Those firms with 5 to 19 
employees are defined as small scale firms and those with 1 to 4 employees are defined 
as cottage industries (National Development Information Office, Indonesia, 1991). 
Singapore: 
There is no official legislative definition of small firms in Singapore. 
Apparently, a small firm is defined in many ways, following the classical view that 
definitions make good servants but bad masters. 
Although the Economic Development Board (EDB) of Singapore, a government 
institution, has defined Small-Medium Enterprises as firms employing less than 50 
workers and having fixed capital assets of less than S$250,000 in 1963, the ceiling of 
fixed assets was raised to S$l,000,000 in 1976 and S$2,000,000 in 1979. The most 
recent definition of small firm offered by EDB was in the Small-Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) Master Plan 1990 where SME is defined as a firm with at least 30 per cent 
local equity with no more than S$8 million net fixed assets investment in the 
manufacturing sector, or one with less than 50 employees in commerce or services. 
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In addition, there are other definitions of small firms in Singapore. For 
example, Soon (1986) defines small firms as those with: 
i) less than 50 employees for commerce and service industries; and 
ii) less than 100 employees for manufacturing industry. 
Chew (1988) defines small firms as those with 5 to 99 employees. 
OVERVIEW ON THE SOCIO ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF MALAYSIA, 
INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE 
Malaysia; 
Malaysia was formed in 1963 as a merger of the Federation of Malaya 
(Peninsula Malaysia), Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore. In 1965, Singapore left Malaysia 
and became an independent country. The land area of Malaysia is estimated to be 
329,758 sq km. In 1990, the total population was estimated to be about 18.01 million 
of which 61.9 per cent would consist of Malays and other indigenous groups (referred 
to as Bumiputeras), 29.3 per cent Chinese, 8.1 per cent Indians and 0.06 per cent 
Others (Malaysia, 1991). 
For the same year 1990, the total GDP was US$42.5 billion after a growth rate 
of 10 per cent. GDP per capita was US$2,388 (Financial Times, August 29, 1991). 
Contribution from the agricultural sector was about 20.1 per cent of GDP in 1985 and 
was about 18.9 per cent in 1990. 
Poverty is still a problem in Malaysia with a recorded incidence of poverty at 
17.1 per cent in 1990 (Malaysia, 1991). Poverty has been a problem in Malaysia with 
the incidence of poverty among the Malays and other indigenous people being 
disproportionately high. In 1970 the incidence of poverty in Malaysia was 49.3 per cent 
with 73 per cent of poor households being Malays (Aris, 1984). Not only a high 
proportion of the Malays (64.8 per cent of all Malays) were poor but illiteracy rate was 
also high among them. For example in 1957, less than a quarter of all Malays had 
more than primary education as against a third of the Chinese (Burki, 1990). In terms 
of occupation, historically, Malays were mainly involved in the agricultural sector and 
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owned only "padi" (rice) land and small holdings of rubber and coconut; the Chinese 
were mainly engaged in mining, small scale manufacturing, and wholesale and 
retailing, while the Indians were employed in the estates and technical services. The 
socio economic problems had generated political tensions and induced the Government 
to launch the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the early 1970s which aimed to eradicate 
poverty and the restructuring of society to eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function. Towards this goal, the Malaysian Government recognised the 
potential role small firms can play. 
Indonesia: 
Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1945. The 
Republic of Indonesia comprises 13,677 islands with total land area of 1,926 million sq 
km and territorial water nearly four times the land size (National Development 
Information, Republic Indonesia 1991). The population in 1990 was approximately 180 
million making it the world's fif th most populous nation after China, India, the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Indonesians are basically of Malay origin, classified into 
approximately 300 different ethnic groups. In addition to the indigenous people or the 
Pribumis, are the Chinese, Arab, Eurasian, Indians and Pakistanis. As race is a 
sensitive issue in Indonesia, the Government did not make an ethnic distinction. 
However, it was reported that the Chinese which made up only 4 per cent of 
Indonesia's population accounted two thirds of the private economic activity, owned 
most of Indonesia's largest conglomerates and almost all of the biggest private banks. 
Total GDP in 1990 was estimated to be US$96.3 billion with estimated growth rate of 
6.7 per cent. Its GDP per capita for the same year was estimated to be US$527 
(Financial Times March 22, 1991). Agricultural share in GDP in 1985 was 23.9 per 
cent (Mizoguchi, 1990). 
Poverty (which may be the resultant of development process affecting the 
distribution of income earning assets across households or the rate of return on these 
assets) was also a problem in Indonesia with nearly 60 per cent of its population being 
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impoverished in 1970 as compared to 22 per cent in 1987 (Burki, 1990). Additionally 
most of the Indonesians lived in rural areas engaged in agricultural activities. 
Recognising the potential of small firms in generating employment and therefore 
income, the promotion of small firms in Indonesia was seen as a means for 
redistributing income to overcome poverty problem. 
Singapore: 
Singapore is a small multiracial island state with land area of only 626 sq km 
and having a population of 2.71 million mainly ethnic Chinese. Total GDP in 1990 was 
US$34.6 billion after a growth rate of 8.3 per cent. Its GNP per capita was reported to 
be US$12,765 in 1990 (Financial Times April 30, 1991). Agricultural share in GDP in 
1985 was only 0.8 per cent (Mizoguchi, 1990). 
Singapore became an independent state when it separated from Malaysia in 
1965. With the separation, Singapore diversified its entrepot economy towards 
industrialisation for import substitution and later towards industrialisation for export. 
Foreign investments were encouraged to bring in the much needed capital and 
technology. Currently, there were more than 600 multinational manufacturing 
companies in Singapore (Soon, 1990). However, the multinationals were mainly 
involved in large enterprises and they provided much of Singapore's export drive while 
the local enterprises were mainly small or of medium size contributing only about 30 
per cent of the country's annual export (Phuong and Jiuan, 1990). The Economic 
Survey of Singapore (1990) reported that small and medium enterprises in Singapore 
accounted for 77 per cent or 2,822 establishments in the manufacturing sector. Due to 
shortages of labour (full employment was realised and domestic labour shortages began 
to emerge in the early 1970s) small firms have to compete with other firms in the 
market for labour. To solve the labour shortage and also to produce products for 
exports, the promotion of small firms in Singapore is towards promoting high 
technology activities producing high value added products. 
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Currencies And Exchange Rates: 
Although the three countries, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are members 
of ASEAN, they adopt different currencies. Malaysia's currency is the Ringgit, and 
Indonesia's currency being the Rupiah while Singapore uses the Singapore Dollar. 
Table 1.1: Currencies and Exchange Rates 
Country Currency Symbol Per US$ in 1990 
(average) 
Malaysia Ringgit M$ M$2.70 
Indonesia Rupiah Rp Rp 1,843 
Singapore Dollar S$ S$1.81 
Source: Financial Times March 22, April 30, and August 29, 1991 issues. 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 1 sets the scene to the following chapters. The chapter has outlined the 
area of study, the purpose and significance of the research. To overcome the definition 
problems, different definitions are adopted for different countries and where applicable 
they are defined according to sectors. 
Chapter 2 examines the general distinction between the policies for improving 
the business environment and those which directly create or develop small firms to 
provide an understanding of the purpose of various policies and their potential effects 
on small firms. 
To address the financing of small firms in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore 
will necessarily require an understanding of the financial system and structure of the 
three different countries and how are they affected by the government policies. This is 
dealt with in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 relates the financing theory to understand the financing requirements 
of small firms. Reliance on external finance and the problems faced by small firms with 
respect to their choice of finance is discussed. 
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Chapter 5 examines closely the influences and effects of government policies 
and the activities of the non governmental institutions on the financing issues of small 
firms in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore against the background of each country's 
national development priorities. 
To gain a further insight on how government and non government financial 
institutions and agencies attempt to meet the financing needs of small firms in 
Malaysia, a case study is done. The results of the case study is discussed in Chapter 6. 
The case study is based on in-depth interviews on senior officers of five major 
institutions which provide finance to small firms in Malaysia. 
On the basis of the analysis and findings discussed in the preceding chapters, 
Chapter 7 seeks to generalise the wider implications of the findings in this study and 
offer some major recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POLICIES FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
INTRODUCTION 
Small and medium enterprises are found to be operating in all forms of political 
environment and guide-lines or policies are laid down for the development of specific 
programmes. These policies are aimed at, among others, controlling and standardizing 
the various assistance programmes. However, for most part, the existing policies and 
incentives favour large enterprises rather than small enterprises. Governments have 
claimed to remove the obvious existing inequalities but the notable absence of effective 
and efficient small enterprise membership organisations may account for the absence of 
relevant policies for small enterprises in many countries. They lack a political lobby. 
For many years, policies on small and medium enterprises have meant safeguarding the 
small and medium-sized enterprises against the economic power of large scale 
companies. 
Policies can be explicit and are stated in formal documents or are inferred from 
statements justifying specific initiatives. In Malaysia and Indonesia, pronouncements in 
national development plans have led to the passage of specific laws and regulations 
favourable to small enterprises. Singapore, however, stresses the need to create an 
overall economic climate conducive to enterprise and efficiency through appropriate 
policies and believes that the market can provide many services for small enterprises 
more effectively than government (Neck, 1987). 
CLASSIFICATION OF POLICY 
Policies relevant to businesses can generally be classified into two classes, the 
first is those policies for improving the business environment and the second is those 
policies for direct government intervention in creating and developing small businesses. 
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POLICIES FOR IMPROVING BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
The business environment appears to be a major factor influencing the 
performance of business both large and small. Schmenner (1980) and Aldrich (1979) 
suggested that business environment involves the willingness of government to work 
with business and also the activities that government legitimizes. The United States of 
America, for example, has been said to have a more conducive business environment 
that makes enterprises more competitive than that of the European. Kotter (1978) 
pointed out the difference of task environment which he defines as: 
"all possible suppliers (of labour, information, money materials and so on), markets, 
competitors, regulators and associations that are relevant in the light of the 
organisation's current products and services". 
In addition, Kotter (1978) also suggested the meaning of the wider environment as: 
"residual environment which can be defined by such indicators as public attitudes, state 
of technological development, the economy, the occupational system, the political 
system, the demographic characteristics of people and organisations, the society's 
social structure, current price levels, loans and so on". 
A number of writers have noted that environmental contexts are changing at an 
increasing rate and towards increasing complexity. Adaptation of the organisation is 
therefore a function of the ability to learn and adapt to changes to environment 
(Terreberry, 1967). 
Entrepreneurs are said to have a special tolerance of ambiguity in the 
environment but what seems a belief that success flows from personal efforts sets the 
demand for informations about the environment, particularly about the future. 
Responses to environmental change in markets, raw materials, and processes leads to 
changes in the organisation's strategy concerning lines of business in which to engage 
in (portfolio strategy) and, within each line of business, the specific market segment to 
be pursued (business strategy). Lacking information about environmental factors 
including the impact on the organisation and inability to allot or assign some 
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probabilities to events may create uncertainty. The degree of environmental uncertainty 
affects business performance. While uncertainty offers opportunities for profit (Kirzner, 
1979), too much uncertainty may block or hinder performance. The degree of 
uncertainty faced by the entrepreneur not only depends on his knowledge of the 
productive process but also upon the degree of control being exercised. Brockhaus 
(1982) notes that perceived probability of failure may be altered i f the individual: 
"acquires additional information about the competition, the amount of capitalization 
required, the managerial skills and technical knowledge required" (p.48). 
Therefore it can be assumed that Government policy may be able to help entrepreneurs 
when uncertainty is due to gaps in their knowledge or skills, or to information 
shortages due to limited resources or time to gather it. 
Policy may influence technology and structure relations through its impact on 
the scale of operation and on the sophistication of the fi t between the organisation and 
its environment. For example, scale may be influenced by the availability of cheap 
money for equipment and building. Policy may also make use of enough private money 
to permit a more sophisticated organisation to be created. From the psychological point 
of view, government policy may appear to indicate that government does care (Mokry, 
1988). 
The law and regulations which govern the conduct of businesses usually 
determine the condition of the business environment to be favourable or otherwise. 
Although these regulations are well intended and their benefits are assumed without 
question, their costs may be high. These government regulations may incur additional 
cost to businesses and ultimately the consumers may have to bear the cost of such 
regulations in the form of higher prices. 
Not only government regulations add costs to businesses, government 
regulations have also been blamed for hindering competition. Many regulations appear 
to require the same compliance for small businesses as for large enterprises. However, 
the burden of regulations is naturally heavier for the small businesses as they lack the 
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broad financial bases and the larger volume of output of the large enterprises. Big 
enterprises are often well represented and have strong lobby groups. They may have 
effective membership organisations through which they can influence the regulations 
that concern their interest. On the contrary, Levitsky (1990), suggested that in practise 
some regulation worked against large industry, as small firms found it easier to avoid 
compliance. Nevertheless, in many cases, improvement to the business environment is 
needed to ensure that it is not hostile for small business and does not stifle SSEs. To 
achieve this, approaches that can be taken include those using policy tools such as 
regulation and deregulations, tax policy change, administrative reform in new ways and 
defining new roles for key actors, changing inspection procedures to be less 
burdensome, infrastructure improvements and setting up of special governing body to 
care for the interest of small firms. In short, probably it can be said that business 
environment is a "business climate" that government sets to show that the area is a 
good place to do business. 
DIRECT INTERVENTION POLICIES 
Direct intervention policy for the creation and development of small firms 
includes among others, the provision of incentives such as fiscal incentives through tax 
deductions and exemptions; financial incentives through subsidised interest rates; 
physical incentives through the provision of operating sites with infrastructure, water 
and electricity supply, provision of training and education, provision of finance, 
provision of information, provision of counselling and consultancy, and other support 
initiatives. However, the extent of these direct intervention policies are greatly 
determined by the political system of the country and also the general attitudes of 
policy makers towards small firms. 
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A CASE OF MALAYSIA 
Government involvement in small firms in Malaysia began mainly after the 
adoption of the two-pronged New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 incorporated with 
the First Outline Perspective Plan (OPP1) for the period 1971-1990. The first prong of 
the NEP is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty by increasing income level and 
employment opportunity for all Malaysian irrespective of race. The second prong of the 
NEP is to restructure Malaysian society to correct the economic imbalance so as to 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function and geographical location 
(Malaysia, 1971 :p . l ) . 
"The targets are that by 1990 the employment pattern will reflect at all levels the ethnic 
composition of the population and that Malaysians will own and control 70 per cent of 
the equity capital, with Bumiputera (Malays and other indigenous people) at least 30 
per cent and foreign interests, 30 per cent. The NEP also seeks to create a viable 
Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community through its participation in modern 
commercial and industrial ventures" (Malaysia, 1986). 
The NEP was formulated following the racial conflict in May 1969. In a plural society 
like Malaysia, there are various diversities and differences - race, economic, political, 
social, religious, cultural and language. Each of which can be a source of conflict and 
instability. The economic imbalances appeared to be the basis for the feeling of 
deprivation and social injustice that generated the riot in 1969. Benefits of growth of 
the economy were not felt by all the people. The growth of GDP in the 1970s was 7.6 
per cent per annum but poverty and uneven distribution of income remain serious 
across the major ethnic groups with the incidence of poverty among the Malays and 
other indigenous people being disproportionately high. The incidence of poverty in 
Peninsular Malaysia was 49.3 per cent in 1970 (Malaysia, 1986:p.8). Poverty 
incidence in the rural areas where the population is mostly Bumiputeras, was 58.7 per 
cent while the incidence of Urban poverty was 21.3 per cent in that same year 
(Malaysia, 1986:p.85). Real Bumiputera mean income as a proportion of the national 
average monthly household income was 65 per cent in 1970 or M$172, increased to 78 
per cent in 1984 or M$384. The Chinese mean income remained above the national 
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average at M$678 in 1984 while the Indians mean income at M$494, was close to the 
national average (Malaysia, 1986:p.8). Aris (1984) indicated that: 
"The problem of the poor for the country as a whole is mainly a Malay one with 73 per 
cent of poor households being Malays 64.8 per cent of Malays were poor compared to 
26 per cent Chinese and 39.2 per cent Indians .... the Malays formed 79.6 per cent of 
the poor in rural areas." 
The experience learned from the incident of May 1969 revealed that any development 
efforts that did not deal adequately with the problems of socio economic imbalances 
among ethnic groups would lead to growth without equity and result in a fragmented 
and less secure nation (Malaysia, 1986). 
The problems of socio economic imbalances due to differentiated economic 
function was somehow said to be a consequence brought about by colonial rule. 
Mohamed (1988) and Fong (1990) suggested that as a result of the British colonial 
practices, the economic function in multiracial Malaysia (Malaya then) was 
differentiated by ethnicity. The activities in the agricultural sector, especially traditional 
agriculture, were preserved for the Malays. The Chinese were engaged in mining, 
small scale manufacturing as well as service activities like wholesale and retailing. The 
Indians were employed in the estates and plantations, and technical services. 
The historical development structured the population of Malaysia into Malays 
mainly living in the rural areas, the Chinese in the urban areas and the Indians in the 
estates. The Europeans controlled the plantations, mines, banks and imports and export 
trades. After independence, the economy was in the hands of foreign agencies. 
Puthucheary (1960) in his study concluded that: 
"The agency houses control about 75 per cent of the nearly two million acres under 
plantation The control of commerce is in fact in the hands of the exporter -
importer; and the import and export firms are very largely European Malays 
generally own only padi-land and small holdings of rubber and coconut. Very few 
Malays are engaged in trade and probably none in mining and manufacturing." 
Other countries in South East Asia also experienced being ruled by colonial power. 
Indonesia, for example, was ruled by the colonial power and was free from Dutch 
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colonialism in mid 1940s. In history, it was the Dutch colonisers who established the 
Chinese as the merchant class pushing indigenous Indonesians into administrative 
positions (Schwarz, 1991). 
After gaining independence, most South East Asian governments took initiatives 
to correct these imbalances and to encourage the formation of indigenous 
entrepreneurs. Popenoe's (1970) study revealed some of the initiatives. 
"Burma expelled most of the Europeans and Indians and put an end to most private 
enterprise. Thailand and Philippines banned aliens meaning primarily Chinese 
.... .from many fields and showed government favouritism to indigenous entrepreneurs. 
Indonesia expropriated European properties and drove Chinese businessmen out of the 
rural areas. Malaysia has done the least to discriminate against the Chinese and 
European businesses, although it has established certain economic preferences for the 
Malays." 
So in short, it can be said that Malaysia is not the only country that tries to encourage 
the formation of indigenous entrepreneurs. 
The first agency to help the indigenous enterprises in Malaysia was RIDA 
(Rural Industries Development Authority) formed in 1951 with the objective of 
improving rural life through productive welfare programmes; and later its objective was 
redefined to include the promotion of non agricultural activities in the rural areas to 
help Malay participation in commerce and industry. RIDA was reorganised in 1965 and 
renamed MARA (Council of Trust for the Indigenous People). 
Industrialisation was the prime objective of the government when Malaysia 
regained independence in 1957 (Mohamed, 1988). To create a conducive environment 
for industrial growth, incentives were offered by the government but over the period 
1957 to 1970, most of these incentives offered, were often biased towards large 
enterprises (Chee, 1986; Fong, 1990). The incentives offered under the 1958 Pioneer 
Promotional Act for manufacturing activities were granted mainly to capital intensive 
and large scale industries. The 1968 Investment Incentives Act provided incentives in 
accordance to size of capital investment. 
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To help ease the problem of capital shortage of the Bumiputera entrepreneurs, 
the government sponsored the establishment of a commercial bank, Bank Bumiputera 
Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) in 1966. However the bank was not guided to help the 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs but allowed to operate as a private enterprise resulting in the 
bulk of the loans given to the more credit-worthy non-Bumiputera entrepreneurs; the 
climax being the US$1 billion loan failure to Chinese property speculators in Hong 
Kong (Mohamed, 1988). 
The government also established a procurement policy to help Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs through which Bumiputera contractors were allocated firstly at five per 
cent and later increased to thirty per cent of the total government contracts. However, 
the problem of "Ali Baba" appeared where prominent Malay politician or high ranking 
officers nicknamed generally as "Ali" who through their influence managed to secure 
the government contracts, end up giving it to Chinese entrepreneurs, nicknamed 
generally as "Baba", to carry out the work for a percentage of the contract as 
commission. This arrangement undoubtedly satisfied both parties concerned, but it 
appeared to have defeated the aim for such preference given to Malay contractors. 
For corporate ownership, a policy was formulated at the early stage, to allocate 
a percentage of all new shares issued, at a discount, to Bumiputeras. The result seems 
to be unsatisfactory as these units of shares were sold off as soon as possible for a 
profit. 
Under the restructuring strategy of the NEP, restructuring the equity ownership 
was to be a key element whereby by the end of 1990, Malaysians would own and 
control 70 per cent of the equity capital with Bumiputera share would be increased to at 
least 30 per cent and that of other Malaysians increased to 40 per cent. The NEP also 
seeks to create a viable Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community through its 
participation in modern commercial and industrial ventures. In the light of these 
objectives of the NEP and also its objective to eradicate poverty, the Malaysian 
government recognised the potential significance of SMEs. 
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Consequently, a number of institutions were established during the Second 
Malaysia Plan period to encourage the development of small industry. These 
institutions included the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) and Malaysian Industrial 
Development Finance (MIDF) Industrial Consultants Limited. An advisory Council on 
Consultancy and Advisory Services for Small-Scale Industries was established in 1973 
to ensure coordination of the services provided by the different agencies (Malaysia, 
1973:p.l44). 
The significant role of small industries was confirmed in the Third Malaysia 
Plan 1976-1980 which stated that the government is to develop small industries "as an 
integral part of Malaysia's industrial development" (Malaysia, 1976:p.315). It was also 
mentioned in the plan that the Advisory Council on Consultancy and Advisory Services 
for Small-Scale Industries and Businesses would be strengthened to become the 
Coordinating Council for the Development of Small-Scale Industries. The main policy 
during this period was on training of small entrepreneurs. In the Mid-Term Review of 
the Third Malaysia Plan, it was noted that agencies such as the National productivity 
Centre (NPC), MARA, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, in association with 
other relevant agencies such as the Malaysian Entrepreneur Development Centre 
(MEDEC) in the Mara Institute of Technology (ITM) and National Entrepreneur 
Research Development Association (NERDA), conducted a number of entrepreneurial 
training and development programmes. 
The important role of small industries "in the development of entrepreneurship, 
creation of employment, mobilisation of individual savings for investment, broadening 
the industrial base ofBumiputra and providing inputs and supportive services for larger 
scale industries" was emphasised in the Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985 (Malaysia, 
1981:p.247). The Plan reaffirmed the government policy of providing assistance to 
small industries, particularly Bumiputera small industries. 
In the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan, it was noted that small 
enterprises mainly concentrate in three sectors - manufacturing, wholesale and retail 
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trade, and construction. About 74 per cent of the value added of small enterprises were 
in these sectors (Malaysia, 1984:p.27). The Review also noted that small enterprises 
were responsible for almost a third of all non-agricultural jobs and therefore, played an 
important part in the generation of employment and in the eradication of poverty and 
restructuring of society. The Review acknowledged that the existing tax incentives 
tended to favour large-scale enterprises because they were linked mainly to size of 
investment and employment, and that the industrial estates did not cater to the needs of 
small-scale industries. 
The government policy towards small industries during the Fourth Malaysia 
Plan (1981-1985) period was stated as : 
"Priority is given to those small enterprises that complement the activities of the bigger 
enterprises. The choice of industries must also conform with the need to achieve the 
NEP objectives, particularly in Bumiputra encouraging participation, especially in 
metal-based industries such as welding and foundry. 
Efforts to promote small enterprises will be reviewed as an integral part of the 
strategies to develop the manufacturing sector. Among the measures to be undertaken 
include improvements to the production capacities of small enterprises, and the 
provision of support services incorporating marketing, credit, consultancy and 
technology development. Other measures include efforts to provide access to market 
and income through sub-contracts and franchises. The move towards integration of 
small enterprises with medium and large scale industries will be undertaken in the 
context of overall industrial estate planning. This is to be implemented through the 
development of self contained mini industrial estates or through location of small-scale 
industries within the existing industrial estates to facilitate common sharing of 
industrial support facilities." 
In recognising the role and contribution of small-scale industries towards the 
development of a sound industrial structure for long term sustained growth and their 
potential to create vast interindustry linkages, the government, in its Fifth Malaysia 
Plan 1986-1990,: 
"will continue to undertake several measures to actively encourage small-scale 
industries to expand, upgrade and modernize their activities. In this regard, the 
Government, with the co-operation of the World Bank, has designed a special 
programme for the development of small scale industries which became operational 
since early 1985 and will continue until 1988. A number of government agencies 
identified for active participation in the programme includes Bank Pembangunan 
Malaysia Berhad (BPMB) the Development Bank of Malaysia, Forest Research Institute 
of Malaysia (FRIM), Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute 
(MARDI), National Productivity Centre (NPC), Standards Industrial Research Institute 
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of Malaysia (SIRIM), and the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance (MIDF). The 
Small-scale Industries Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry has been entrusted 
with the co-ordination of the activities of each of the agencies under the programme. 
The programme which involves a total financial assistance of about M$234 million, will 
benefit small-scale entrepreneurs in various sectors except agriculture. Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs in particular will be given credit facilities and technical assistance 
through BPMB Several measures will also be undertaken to assist small-scale 
industries in export promotion. Links with research agencies such as Standards and 
Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) is to ensure the highest standard in 
product design and quality. Links with Malaysia Export Trade Centre (MEXPO) will 
ensure up to date information on potential external markets" (Malaysia, 1986:pp.357-
358). 
The most recent development on the government's view towards small firms 
was that their importance to the economic development of Malaysia was further 
emphasised in The New Development Policy (Malaysia, 1991). The New Development 
Policy, or in short NDP, was formulated for the Second Outline Perspective Plan 
period 1991-2000; it aims at accelerating the process of eradicating poverty and 
restructuring society so as to correct the social and economic imbalances (Malaysia, 
1991). 
In the strategies and programme trusts of NDP: 
"The small and medium scale industries (SMIs) will be further promoted and upgraded, 
with the objective of making them an important and viable vehicle for industrial 
expansion and the creation of inter-industry linkages and support. The SMIs are 
expected to contribute significantly in terms of value added and labour absorption in 
the manufacturing sector to the level of 40 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively, 
within the decade from the current position of 20 per cent and 30 per cent" (Malaysia, 
1991:p.l33). 
Small businesses are also recognised as a training ground for the creation of a 
successful Bumiputera business community (Malaysia, 1991 :p. 18). 
In summary the policy in Malaysia is seen as: 
(a) to provide a conducive environment for business 
(b) to increase the Malaysian share in equity ownership in the corporate sector 
particularly to increase the share of Bumiputera equity ownership 
(c) to increase Bumiputera participation in business ventures, and 
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(d) one of promoting SMEs in recognising the significant role of SMEs, particularly in 
achieving the goals of NEP and NDP and the contributions of SMEs in the country's 
general economic development towards growth with equity. 
Having given a broad account of the government's policy in Malaysia, we wil l 
now examine specific aspects of Government's policy for improving the business 
environment and Government's direct intervention policy for the creation and 
development of SMEs. 
POLICY FOR BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Malaysian Government's policy in creating a favourable business environment 
includes among others, the setting up of law and regulations. Regulations are set 
usually to, among others, govern the conduct of enterprises and also for a smooth 
running of planned programmes. It seems to appear that usually, these law and 
regulations which govern the conduct of businesses can determine the condition of 
business environment to be favourable or otherwise. 
The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) which was introduced in 1975 and later 
amended in 1985 and 1986, is to ensure an orderly development and growth in the 
manufacturing sector. The Act requires people who are engaged in any manufacturing 
activity to obtain a licence in respect of the manufacturing activity. Only manufacturing 
enterprises with shareholders' funds of M$2.5 million and above, or employing a ful l 
time work force of more than 75 workers, need to apply for manufacturing licences in 
order to commence or continue operation under the ICA (Malaysia, 1991). This limit 
for which companies have to obtain licences was raised from M$250,000 to M $ l 
million in terms of shareholders'funds in 1985 and was further increased to M$2.5 
million in 1986 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1989). 
The Malaysian government welcomes foreign investment in the manufacturing 
sector (Malaysia 1991). Recognising the role which direct foreign investment can play 
in terms of generating capital inflows, employment, technology transfer, and market 
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creation, the guide-lines for foreign equity participation in manufacturing sector were 
regulated. However, to ensure an increase in Malaysian participation in the 
manufacturing activities, the government has a policy to encourage projects to be 
undertaken on a joint venture basis. 
In participation in manufacturing activities, foreign investors were permitted to 
hold whatever level of equity of up to 100 per cent on condition that the company 
exports 80 per cent or more of its production. Foreign investors who applied to invest 
in Malaysia up to end 1991 could be granted 100 per cent ownership and would not be 
required to restructure at any time thereafter i f the company exported 50 per cent or 
more of its production or employed 350 ful l time Malaysian workers, and on condition 
that the products did not compete with products manufactured locally for domestic 
market. For other export oriented projects exporting 51 per cent to 79 per cent of their 
production, foreign equity ownership up to 51 per cent will be allowed, depending on 
factors such as level of technology, size of investment, location, value-added and 
utilisation of local raw materials and components. For projects exporting between 20 
per cent to 50 per cent of their production, foreign equity ownership of between 30 per 
cent to 51 per cent will be allowed depending upon similar factors as mentioned above; 
and for projects exporting less than 20 per cent of their production, foreign ownership 
up to 30 per cent is allowed (Malaysia 1991). 
Where foreign equity is less than 100 per cent, projects that have 70 per cent or 
more foreign equity, the balance of the equity will be reserved for Bumiputeras with 
the exception of projects initiated by non-Bumiputeras on a joint venture basis with 
foreigners, where the balance of the equity will be allocated to the non-Bumiputeras 
concerned. For projects that have less than 70 per cent foreign equity, 30 per cent of 
the equity will be reserved for Bumiputeras and the remaining equity for non-
Bumiputeras except for projects that are initiated by Bumiputeras on a joint venture 
basis with foreigners, where the balance of the equity will be reserved for Bumiputeras. 
However i f Bumiputeras are unable to take the entire balance of equity, allocation of 
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the balance to non Bumiputeras will be at the discretion of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (Malaysia, 1991). 
To provide the necessary support and environment for the healthy growth of the 
economy, the private sector had been identified to provide the leading role and 
dynamism in the economy for the Fifth Malaysia Plan period from 1986-1990. The 
Government introduced a number of policy changes aimed at enabling the private sector 
to expand its activities. However, the public sector is expected to continue to play a 
supportive role in ensuring that the basic infrastructure and other amenities are 
sufficient to provide a conducive environment for enterprise to flourish. At present 
there are 140 industrial estates throughout the country which provide basic 
infrastructure such as roads, water, power and telecommunication facilities. Realising 
the industrial needs for competitively priced power and water supply, the government 
reviews these rates from time to time. 
Regarding communication system in Malaysia, it has been described by the 
World Bank as being the "A" category that is comparable to developed countries 
(Malaysia 1991). At present, Malaysia has 16,000 miles of the finest roads in Asia and 
an efficient rail and air system. The international sea and air ports assure efficient 
handling and transport of cargo whether in liquid, bulk or containerized (Malaysia, 
1991). 
To ensure a favourable economic environment, the Government also set labour 
policy to promote cordial employer-employee relations, social justice, equity and 
conscience to bring about a generally contented and productive labour force which 
thereby ensure a favourable climate for investment. Labour laws were set to provide 
guidance on the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees as well as a 
legal framework for orderly conduct of industrial relations. 
The Employment Act 1955 sets the regulations and condition of employment. 
Among the conditions regulated are the provision of paid holidays for employees and 
payment of maternity allowances for female employees on maternity leave for 60 days 
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at ordinary rate of pay subject to a minimum rate of M$6.00 per day. The Employees 
Provident Fund Act, 1951 provides a compulsory contributory provident, fund which is 
payable to employees in ful l on reaching the age of 55 years. Al l employers and 
employees are required to contribute to the Fund at the rates of 11 per cent and 9 per 
cent respectively of the employees' monthly wages. Expatriates employees, domestic 
servants and self employed are precluded from the compulsory contributions. However, 
they can opt to contribute to the Fund. 
The Employees' Social Security Act, 1969 requires all industries with five or 
more employees whose wages do not exceed M$ 1,000 a month, to insure their 
employees under the Employment Insurance scheme and the Invalidity Pension scheme, 
of the Social Security Organisation. Those employers who are not required to 
contribute under the Social Security Act, are required to insure with a locally registered 
insurance company in respect of any liability which they may incur under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1952. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1952 covers all manual workers 
irrespective of their wages and non manual workers whose earnings do not exceed 
M$500 a month. The Act requires compensation payable to employees or their 
dependents for injury or death suffered in the course of employment. 
Beside the law and regulations, the monetary policy has a role in creating a 
favourable business environment. In Malaysia, its monetary policy was geared towards 
facilitating growth and to promote price stability (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 1990). 
Deregulatory and reregulatory measures were taken to promote a greater market 
oriented system of interest rate determination, and to evolve an efficient and a more 
sophisticated financial system to meet the challenges of an industrialising economy and 
a more competitive international environment. 
When credit demand expanded rapidly, monetary policy is required to maintain 
a balance between the need to ensure capital availability for productive investment at 
reasonable cost and the need to ensure that the liquidity available does not translate 
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itself into higher price pressures. As an anti inflationary measure to reduce excess 
liquidity in the economy from large inflows of investments and a strong export 
earnings, the Government increased the statutory reserve requirements of financial 
institutions from 4.5 per cent of their eligible liabilities in May 1989 to 5.5 per cent in 
October 1989 and it was further to 6.5 per cent in January 1990 (Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia, 1990). 
A deregulationary measure taken by the Government was the freeing of the Base 
Lending Rate (BLR) from the administrative control of the Central Bank on February 
1, 1991. Under the deregulated regime, individual banking institutions are free to fix 
their own base lending rate on the basis of free market forces (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
1991). 
To ensure an adequate flow of credit to priority sectors, new set of lending guide-lines 
and two new funds, the Special Fund for Tourism and the Abandoned Housing Projects 
Fund were established. Other monetary measures taken were the introduction of 
reforms to strengthen the financial system. These include allowing certain finance 
companies to issue negotiable certificates, the establishment of a credit rating agency 
and an international off-shore financial centre in banking and insurance. 
To improve the business environment, the Government also introduced a new 
range of tax incentives, introduced export promotion schemes and provide special funds 
administered by the Central Bank. The above Government policy in addition to a stable 
political system in the country, the financial system and structure, the administration of 
law and regulations, the richness in natural resources, and the educated labour force, 
help creates the business environment that Malaysia has at the moment. 
DIRECT INTERVENTION POLICIES 
Direct intervention policy that the Government introduced for the creation and 
development of SMEs includes among others the provision of: fiscal incentives; 
physical incentives; training and education; finance; information; counselling and 
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consultancy, and other support initiatives. The implementation of NEP brought about 
the sprouting of numerous government agencies and development institutions to provide 
assistance in one form or another to SMEs. For the creation of Bumiputera Commercial 
and Industrial Community (BCIC), the Government not only support through the 
allocation of contracts, quotas and licences to Bumiputera businesses and joint ventures, 
Government agencies such as MARA, PERNAS (National Trading Corporations) and 
SEDCs (State Economic Development Corporations) were actively involved in setting 
up commercial enterprises to assist the Bumiputeras. 
A total of 13 Ministries and more than 30 government and other agencies are 
involved (Appendix I) in one way or another with small and medium enterprises 
programmes in Malaysia (Chee, 1986). In view of the large number of organisations 
involved the Committee to Coordinate the Development of Small Industry headed by 
the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry was established in October 1981 to take 
over the functions of the Coordinating Council for Development of Small-scale 
Industries which was under the charge of MIDA (Malaysian Industrial Development 
Authority). 
PROVISION OF FISCAL INCENTIVES 
The fiscal incentives are designed to grant relief from taxes in various forms 
through tax exemptions, tax deductions and the provision of tax allowances. The tax 
incentives system in Malaysia was improved by the decision to reduce corporate tax 
rate. With effect from the year of assessment 1989, the company tax rate was reduced 
from 40 per cent to 35 per cent. The existing development tax rate of 5 per cent wil l be 
abolished on a "staggered" basis and starting from the year of assessment 1990, the rate 
was reduced to 4 per cent. Companies which were given pioneer status incentive are 
exempted from these taxes. In the case of the other incentives, the benefits are in the 
form of allowances given. 
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The principal incentives for investments in manufacturing, agricultural and 
tourism sectors are contained in the Promotion of Investments Act 1986, and the 
Income Tax Act 1967. Basically investment tax incentives in Malaysia are in the form 
of: 
(a) Pioneer Status 
(b) Investment Tax Allowance 
(c) Abatement of Adjusted Income 
(d) Export Allowance 
(e) Double Deduction for Promotion of Exports, 
(a) Pioneer Status; 
The period of tax relief under this incentive is five years commencing from the 
production date as determined by the Minister of Trade and Industry. The tax relief 
period may be extended for a further five years period for a company that meets certain 
criteria (see Appendix II) as determined by the Minister of Trade and Industry. Al l 
companies which intend to participate in "promoted activities" or to produce "promoted 
products" (see Appendix III) are eligible to apply for the pioneer status incentives. A 
company granted pioneer status must request for a pioneer certificate, specifying among 
others, the date of production from which the tax relief will be granted for a period of 
five years, irrespective of the level of capital investments. In addition, small scale 
companies (with shareholders' fund of M$500,000 and less) are also eligible for the 
Pioneer Status i f one of the following conditions is fulfilled: 
(i) The company produces components or inputs for supply to the manufacturing 
companies with shareholders' funds of M$2.5 million or more 
(ii) The company's products are substituting imports and where the local content of the 
materials used are 50 per cent or more in terms of value 
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(iii) The company exports 50 per cent or more of the total products produced. The 
exports may include sales to companies located in Free Trade Zones or Licensed 
Manufacturing Warehouses. 
(iv) The project contributes to the socio economic development of the rural population. 
(b) Investment Tax Allowance (ITA); 
Companies producing "promoted products" or engaged in "promoted activities" 
are eligible to apply for the ITA. Allowance up to a maximum of 100 per cent may be 
granted to a company in respect of qualifying capital expenditure incurred within five 
years from the date of approval of the project. 
The grant of either Pioneer Status or Investment Tax Allowance wil l be 
determined according to priorities as determined by the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
(c) Abatement off Adjusted Income; 
This incentive is to encourage the exports of locally manufactured products, the 
development of "promoted industrial areas", the promotion of small scale industries, 
the compliance with the Government's policy on equity participation and employment 
and the promotion of linkages between the large and small-scale enterprises. 
(i) Abatement of Adjusted Income for Exports: 
An Abatement of adjusted Income for export is granted to a resident manufacturing 
company exporting directly or through an agent, products which are manufactured in 
Malaysia. The adjusted income to be abated shall be at a rate which is equivalent to 50 
per cent of export sales in relation to total sales; and 5 per cent of the value of 
"indigenous Malaysian materials" used in the product exported. 
(ii) Abatement off Adjusted Income for location: 
An abatement of 5 per cent of the adjusted income for a minimum of five years is 
granted to resident manufacturing companies located in "promoted industrial areas" as 
gazetted by the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
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(iii) Abatement of Adjusted Income for Small-Scale Industries; 
An abatement of 5 per cent of the adjusted income is granted to resident small scale 
manufacturing companies for a period of five consecutive years starting from the year 
business commences. 
(iv) Abatement of Adjusted Income for Compliance with. Government Policy; 
An abatement of 5 per cent of the adjusted income is granted to large manufacturing 
companies which purchase components from small scale manufacturing companies. The 
abatement wil l be 5 per cent of the adjusted income of the large company or 5 per cent 
of value of components purchased by the company, whichever is the lower. 
To be eligible for the abatement, both the participating large and small scale 
companies must register with the "Subcontracting Exchange" in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. Dividends paid out of tax exempt income to shareholders under the 
abatement of adjusted income are also exempted from tax. 
(d) Export Allowance; 
An export allowance of 5 per cent of the f.o.b. value of export sales will be 
granted to exporters of agricultural produce and to trading companies exporting 
manufactured goods purchased from manufacturers in Malaysia. 
(e) Double Deduction of Expenses on Promotion of Export Overseas; 
Certain expenses incurred for the purpose of seeking opportunities for exports 
of Malaysian manufactured products and agricultural produce are eligible for double 
deduction. This incentive is available to all resident companies and in the case of 
pioneer companies, the deductions are accumulated and allowed against their post 
pioneer income. 
The expenses that qualify include overseas advertising, supply of free samples 
abroad, export market research, preparations of tenders for the supply of goods 
overseas, public relations work related to exports, exhibits and/or participation in trade 
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fairs or industrial exhibitions approved by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, fares in 
respect of business travel overseas and the cost of maintaining sales office overseas for 
promotion of exports. 
Local companies which participated in approved international trade fairs held 
locally would also be given double deduction on selective expenses incurred in order to 
assist domestic products, particularly from the small and medium scale companies to 
enter the international market. 
(f) Exemption f rom customs duty on direct raw materials/components: 
The level of exemption from customs duty granted on raw materials/components 
wil l depend on the market for the finished goods whether it is domestic market or for 
export. I f the finished products are for export, imported direct raw materials are 
normally granted ful l exemption from import duty provided such direct raw 
materials/components are not manufactured locally, or where they are manufactured 
locally, are not of acceptable quality and price. 
I f the finished products are for the domestic market, an application for ful l 
exemption from a manufacturing company is eligible for consideration i f it complies 
with equity condition as stipulated in the manufacturing licence in terms of equity 
participation, management and employment structure. In addition, the raw materials are 
not manufactured locally. Partial exemption may be considered for other cases. 
Application for this incentive should be submitted to MIDA in the prescribed forms. 
(g) Tar i f f protection: 
The Government provides tariff protection to deserving industries which are 
able to supply a major portion of the domestic market provided that the product is of 
acceptable quality and the price of the product is reasonable to customers. In granting 
the tariff protection, consideration would be given to the degree of utilisation of 
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domestic raw materials, and the value added to be achieved, and the level of 
technology of the industry. 
In addition to the incentives mentioned above a number of other incentives are 
provided for the establishment, expansion, diversification and modernisation of 
projects. They include: 
(a) Reinvestment Allowance (RA); 
The RA is granted to a manufacturing company which incurs qualifying capital 
expenditure on plant, machinery and building for the purpose of approved expansion or 
reinvestment which includes modernisation and diversification, before 31 December 
1995 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). The existing rate is 50 per cent for capital 
expenditure incurred by small scale companies and 40 per cent for capital expenditure 
incurred by large companies, for expansion purposes. 
Capital allowance on motor-cars used for business purposes was increased from 
M$25,000 to M$50,000 effective from the year of assessment of 1991. 
(b) Industrial Building Allowance (IBA): 
A company which has incurred expenditure on approved buildings that are used 
as warehouses and bulk storage installations for storing goods for export, used for 
approved industrial training and approved research is eligible for IBA which consist of 
an initial allowance of 10 per cent and annual allowance of 2 per cent. 
(c) Double deduction on expenses incurred on training: 
An incentive in the form of double tax deduction on expenses incurred on 
approved training is given to companies in the manufacturing, construction and tourism 
sectors. Automatic approval on deduction for expenses incurred is given i f employees 
are trained at approved training institutions such as at the Standards and Industrial 
Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM), National Productivity Centre (NPC), Mara 
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Institute of Technology (ITM) and the Malaysian Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute (MARDI). 
(d) Incentives for Research and Development (R&D): 
To encourage R&D, the incentives provided included a five year tax exemption 
to approved research companies or institutions and to new technology based firms; and 
double deduction would be provided for cash contribution made to approved research 
institutions . 
(e) Double Deduction of Export Credit Insurance Premiums: 
To encourage exporters to penetrate into non traditional markets, premium 
payments in respect of export credit insured with a company approved by the Minister 
of Finance are eligible for double deduction with effect from the year of assessment 
1986. 
PROVISION OF FINANCE AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
Among the outstanding means and processes in the provision of assistance to 
upgrade and to promote SMEs were the provision of financial incentives and the 
provision of finance through grants; loan schemes sponsored by the Government and 
the World Bank, the ASEAN-Japan Development Fund; commercial bank loans to 
viable SMEs under guarantee of the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC); MARA 
loans to Bumiputera businessmen; and facilities offered by the Small and Medium 
Industries Unit of the Ministry of Trade and Industries and the Ministry of National and 
Rural Development. 
(a) Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC): 
The Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) was incorporated in July 1972 with 
equity participation of the Central Bank and the commercial banks. Its main objective 
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was to provide guarantee cover to commercial bank loans for loans extended to small 
scale enterprises, which had been redefined as registered businesses with net assets of 
up to M$500,000 each or for a limited company having shareholders' funds of not 
more than M$500,000 each and a loan limit not exceeding M$500,000 each (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
The first scheme started in 1973 was known as the General Guarantee Scheme 
(GGS) and the next scheme known as the Special Loan Scheme (SLS) was introduced 
in 1981. At the end of 1985, outstanding loans guaranteed by the corporation totalled 
$852 million compared with $341 million at the end of 1980 (Malaysia, 1986:p.365). 
For the period 1986-1988, the commercial banks extended M$269.7 million to small 
scale enterprises under the Special Loan Scheme of the CGC, of which M$24.3 million 
or 9 per cent were extended to finance manufacturing activities (Malaysia, 
1990:p.l93). 
The SLS and GGS were replaced by the Principal Guarantee Scheme (PGS) 
from April 1989. As at December 31, 1990, after more than a year of its 
implementation, a total of 7,279 applicants with loan limits of M$391.8 million had 
been approved, with a total guarantee cover of M$ 144.9 million (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1991). 
The Special Loans Scheme for Hawkers and Petty Traders was set up with an 
allocation of M$30 million from the New Investment Fund (NIF) in 1986. The scheme 
was to assist the growing number of unemployed to become self employed by engaging 
in petty trading activities. The allocation was subsequently increased by another M$20 
million in 1989. In 1990, the Government increased its loan allocation by M$70 
million to M$120 million . Of the M$70 million, M$50 million was allocated to the 
Loan Fund for Hawkers and Petty Traders (LFHPT) which was introduced in April 
1990. Beside hawkers and petty traders, those engaged in service businesses such as 
tailors, barbers, photo studios, motor repairs and tourist related activities are also 
eligible for loans to be guaranteed under LFHPT (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 
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1990). The balance M$20 million was allocated to the Association Special Loan 
Scheme (ASLS) which was introduced in July 1990 (Malaysia 1990). 
Maximum loan available under LFHPT was raised from M$5,000 to M$ 10,000 
and carried an interest rate of 4 per cent per annum (Ministry of Finance, 1990). As at 
December 31, 1990, total loans approved under LFHPT amounted to M$6 million, of 
which M$5.2 million (87 per cent) was extended to 1,479 Bumiputeras borrowers. The 
Government, in 1990, agreed to increased the M$50 million fund to M$100 million 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
The objective of the ASLS was to enable the hawkers and petty traders 
associations to play a more direct and effective role in helping their members to secure 
loans and also to expose these associations to the workings of basic lending functions. 
Maximum loan under ASLS is M$2,000 in the form of term loan for acquiring capital 
assets or working capital. Loans were repayable monthly but the repayment period 
would not exceed 24 months. It is interest free with only a nominal service charge with 
no requirement for security or guarantor. The CGC acted as the guarantor for the loans 
issued through eight participating banks. As at December 31, 1990, total loans 
approved under ASLS amounted to M$4.2 million of which M$4.1 million (97 per 
cent) was extended to 2,043 Bumiputera borrowers (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
Currently the three main schemes administered by CGC are the PGS, the 
LFHPT and the ASLS. Although the GGS (1973), the SLS (1981) and the Hawkers 
and Petty Traders Loan Scheme (1986) had ceased to operate, the CGC continued to 
monitor those loans which were still subject to its guarantee. 
Total loans guaranteed by CGC under all its schemes as at December 31, 1990 
totalled 172,394 applications with approved loan limits of M$3258.1 million compared 
to 162,609 applications with approved loan limits of M$2933.6 million as at December 
31, 1989 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
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(b) Lending Guide-limes; 
To ensure that certain priority sectors or special groups have ready access to 
bank credit at reasonable cost, a maximum lending rate of 10 per cent per annum was 
placed in October 1976 on loans to Bumiputeras and loans to small scale enterprises. 
The ceiling rate was reduced to 9 per cent in June 1977. However, in 1978, the ceiling 
lending rates for small loans under the SLS was fixed at 7.5 per cent per annum. To 
ensure that the priority sector would continue to have ready access to funds at 
reasonable cost, the Central Bank introduced a new set of lending Guide-lines with 
effect from April 1, 1990. These Guide-lines had been regulated to include only 
lending to the Bumiputera Community and for loans made under the Principal 
Guarantee Scheme (PGS) of the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC). Under the 
Guide-lines, commercial banks were required to extend a minimum of 20 per cent of 
their loans outstanding as at Dec. 31, 1988 (base) year to the Bumiputera community. 
On lending under the PGS of the CGC, the commercial bank were required to extend 
loans to small scale enterprises with guarantee cover by CGC of at least M$200 million 
of which at least M$100 million must be the guarantee cover of loans extended to 
Bumiputera borrowers. The compliance date for these new requirement was set for 
March 31, 1991. Lending Guide-lines to SSE were no longer considered necessary and 
hence removed. 
In the case for new loans extended to SSEs which were under the PGS of the 
CGC, the rate of interest applicable for small loans was set at 1.5 per cent points above 
the average Base Lending Rate of the two lead banks. The ceiling interest rate 
applicable to this group of borrowers was 8.25 per cent per annum until September 9, 
1990 and rose to 8.75 per cent after that date. 
Finance companies were subject to only one lending guide-line that is, lending 
to Bumiputera community. Like the commercial banks, the finance companies were 
required to extend at least 20 per cent of their total loans outstanding as at 31 
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December 1988 (base year) to Bumiputera community. The date for compliance was 31 
March 1991. 
With effect from 1 February 1991, each commercial bank and finance company 
was free to declare its own base lending rate (BLR) on the basis of its own costs of 
funds. The maximum spread between the actual lending rate and the declared BLR was 
maintained at 4 percentage points. However, the Central Bank would continue to fix 
ceiling rates for loans to the priority sectors. 
(c) MARA Loans 
MARA, the Council of Trust for the Indigenous People, was set up in 1966. It 
is financed by the Federal Government in the form of grants as well as loans (Chee 
1986). MARA's Entrepreneurial Development Division (EDD) provides loans, 
advisory as well as consultancy services to Bumiputera small and medium enterprises . 
The types of loans provided are: 
(i) Ordinary loans which offer up to a maximum of M$50,000 
(ii) New Entrepreneurs Loans which offer a maximum of M$ 150,000 for setting up 
manufacturing enterprises. 
(iii) Special Loans which provides loans of M$2,000 without collaterals or guarantor 
for petty traders and hawkers particularly to those starting up a business. 
More than 90 per cent of MARA's loans were of M$5,000 or less and about 4 per cent 
of MARA 's loans were those not exceeding M$ 10,000 each. Nearly 60 per cent of 
MARA's loans were given without any security (Chee 1986). 
(d) Financing by Malaysia Industrial Development Finance (MIDF): 
MIDF was established in 1960 to provide medium and long term capital for 
manufacturing sector. It provides financing in the form of: 
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(i) medium and long term loans (for periods of 5 to 15 years) where MIDF normally 
provides as much as half of the total fixed capital requirements of a new venture or for 
the modernisation and expansion of an existing enterprise. 
(ii) factory mortgage finance scheme where MIDF would assist in the purchase of 
factory buildings and land through a mortgage credit scheme. Up to 80 per cent of the 
cost may be granted under such loans and the repayment periods may extend over 3-5 
years. 
(iii) and machinery finance scheme to assist in the financing of machinery and 
equipment. This is a hire purchase arrangement where the borrower would be required 
to provide at least 25 per cent of the cost of the plant or machinery, and MIDF would 
advance the balance and arrange for the borrower to repay over a period of not more 
than 4 years. 
(e) The World Bank Special Loan Scheme: 
The World Bank Special Loan Scheme of M$210 million sponsored by the 
Government and the World Bank was launched in 1985 to provide financial assistance 
to small scale enterprises. This scheme is being administered by MIDF and BPMB 
(Development Bank of Malaysia). Up to 1988 a total of 1,022 loan applications were 
approved amounting to M$202.4 million or 96.3 per cent of the total allocation, 
benefiting 85.2 per cent of the 1200 targeted entrepreneurs. The scheme which was 
originally made eligible to Bumiputera entrepreneurs only was extended to non 
Bumiputeras beginning from October 1986. Total loan approved at end of July 1990 
amounted to M$178 million. Total loan outstanding by end of July 1990 under the 
scheme amounted to M$41 million (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 1990). 
(f) Rural Industries Programme: 
Financing facilities provided by the Ministry of Trade and Industries under its 
Rural Industries programme were in the form of grants. For individual entrepreneurs, a 
42 
grant of not more than M$10,000; for group projects run by 3-14 people, a grant of not 
more than M$50,000 for the value of machines plus M$20,000 for the value of 
workshop; and for cooperatives of 15 or more people, a grant of not more than 
M$ 100,000 for the value of machines and M$20,000 for the value of workshop would 
be provided. 
(g) Financing programmes of Bank Pembanguman Malaysia (BPMB) or the 
Development Bank off Malaysia; 
In 1981, BPMB initiated 2 financing programmes to strengthen and expand its 
assistance to Bumiputera entrepreneurs. They were: 
(i) Entrepreneurial Development Programme (EDP) to develop new entrepreneurs 
particularly in the small and medium sector. Under this programme, potential 
entrepreneurs would be identified and would provide the necessary inputs assistance to 
encourage them to become owner/manager of their own enterprise. The financing 
facility under this scheme included project financing, equity financing, working capital 
loans and the rental of facility units. 
(ii) Leasing and Hire Scheme where the programme was divided into two categories 
namely the Financial Lease and Operational Lease. Machinery with the operators and 
technical assistance would be provided at special rates. 
Based on the Bank's classification of small and medium borrowers as "loans of 
less than M$1.5 million each", this sector accounted for almost 93 per cent (or 3,418 
borrowers) as at May 1990. Of these, small loans that is loans of less than M$500,000 
each accounted for 82 per cent while 11 per cent are for medium borrowers. In terms 
of value, SME as a group accounted for about 42 per cent or M$708 million compared 
to the bigger corporate borrowers (Abdullah, 1990). Interest charged to small and 
medium projects are as low as 5 per cent. 
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(h) New Investment Fund (NIF)? 
As part of the Government's effort to increase domestic productive capacity and 
to promote exports, a New Investment Fund (NIF) was introduced in September 1985 
to finance new fixed investment in the manufacturing, agriculture and tourism sectors 
at moderate rates of interest not exceeding 1.25 per cent above the prevailing base 
lending rate of commercial banks. Under this scheme, the Central Bank would channel 
Government deposits, of which the current amount is M $ l billion, to the commercial 
banks at the NIF funding rate for on-lending for new eligible investment projects. The 
minimum amount of financing is M$250,000 per project, up to 75 per cent of the 
investment expenditure, excluding land, for a period of up to five years. However 
working capital requirements (except for special cases for export industries) and loan to 
finance the acquisition of shares, land or existing assets wil l not be funded. 
(i) ASEAN-Japan Development Fund: 
The Asean-Japan Development Fund (AJDF) with M$890 million provided by 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the Export-Import Bank of 
Japan (EXIM) was launched by the Government in 1989. The fund was channelled to 
four financial institutions (namely, BPMB, IBMB, BPM and MIDF) to provide 
financial assistance to small and medium businesses by providing loans at concessionary 
interest rates. 
The maximum loan size under the scheme will be M$20 million per project 
subject to the lending policies of the financial institutions. Interest rate charged would 
be 6.5 per cent per annum for the OECF portion while the average interest rate charged 
for the EXIM portion would be 7.8 per cent. As at July 1990, a total of M$602 million 
of the allocation has been approved for 565 projects. Of this amount, M$403 million 
came from OECF and M$199 million came from EXIM Bank (Ministry of Finance, 
1990). 
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(jj) New Entrepreneurs Funds 
The M$250 million New Entrepreneurs Fund (NEF) was launched by the 
Central Bank in December 1989 to provide Bumiputera entrepreneurs with funds for 
new ventures, especially in the field of manufacturing, agriculture, tourism and export-
oriented industries. The maximum loan per eligible applicant was M$500,000 and the 
maximum interest rate charged was fixed at 5 per cent per annum. The maximum loan 
period was set for five years. 
From August 1990, the NEF was also made available to existing Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs who had been in business for less than five years, but wanted to expand 
existing capacity. 
(k) Industrial Technical Assistance Fund: 
The Industrial Technical Assistance Fund (ITAF) was set up by the Government 
in early 1990 with an initial allocation of $50 million to provide grants for eligible 
Small and Medium scale industries which participate in any of the following schemes: 
Feasibility Study scheme, Product Development and Design scheme, Quality and 
Productivity Improvement scheme and Market Development scheme. 
Al l small and medium industries in the manufacturing sector that fu l f i l the 
following conditions are eligible to apply: incorporated under the Companies Act 1965; 
have shareholders' fund not exceeding M$2.5 million; and has at least 70 per cent of 
the equity held by Malaysian citizen. 
(1) Special Fund for Tourism: 
A M$120 million Special Fund for Tourism was set up by the Central Bank on 
March 1990 to finance tourism related projects. Al l small and medium companies 
including non resident controlled companies were eligible as long as the fixed 
investment was situated in Malaysia and the cost of each project did not exceed M$3 
million. Under special circumstances projects costing up to M$5 million would be 
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considered. The minimum loan is M$250,000 per project (excluding cost of land and 
working capital), while the maximum is up to 75 per cent of the project cost. The 
Central Bank would channel funds at 5 per cent per annum to commercial and merchant 
banks participating in this scheme but the maximum lending rate chargeable under this 
fund was 7.75 per cent per annum for a maximum time period of five years, 
(m) Abandoned Housing Projects Fund: 
This fund was set up in June 1990 to assist deserving housing developers to 
complete viable housing schemes abandoned during the recession period. The fund had 
an initial allocation of M$300 million which was subsequently increased by another 
M$300 million in February 1991. The rate of interest charged was 2 per cent per 
annum. 
(n) Enterprise Rehabilitation Fund: 
To help Bumiputera entrepreneurs who faced financial difficulties following 
recession, the Enterprise Rehabilitation Fund was established in early 1988 with an 
allocation of M$500 million. It is a revolving fund managed by MIDF on behalf of the 
Central Bank was formed to provide financial assistance to those ailing but viable 
enterprises under dedicated management and having a good prospect for recovery. Only 
members of the Malay Chamber of Commerce are eligible to apply. However, to 
qualify for the loan, the applicant needs to have a viable plan for rehabilitation. 
As at end of July 1990, total loans valued at M$450.7 million for 649 loan 
applicants were approved but only M$309.3 million were disbursed. The balance of the 
amount approved would be disbursed when the pre disbursement conditions were met 
(Ministry of Finance, 1990). 
(o) Export Credit Refinancing Scheme: 
To promote the growth of exports of manufactured goods and to promote 
backward linkages in industrial development, the Central bank has implemented an 
46 
Export Credit Refinancing Scheme which provides Malaysian exporters with credit at 
preferential rates of interest. The credit is extended by commercial banks, and the 
current interest rate for exporters under this facility is 5 per cent per annum. The 
period for refinancing both preshipment and postshipment is a maximum of three 
months. However, for the export of certain primary products, the refinancing period is 
180 days for postshipment and 120 days for preshipment. The minimum amount for 
refinancing (value of each substitution bill) is M$20,000 expressed to the nearest 
thousand ringgit (M$). The maximum amount of refinancing for each firm is M$5 
million but a higher limit may be given on case by case basis upon application to Bank 
Negara, the Central Bank, 
(p) Joint Venture Trust 
In April 1990, IBMB has set up a Joint Venture Trust with Walden Group, a 
United States based company to provide venture capital for new ventures. Agreements 
for fund subscription and fund management had been signed but real investment has yet 
to be carried out (Ministry of Finance, 1990). 
(q) Export Credit Insurance and Guarantee Schemes: 
Malaysian Export Credit Insurance Berhad (MECIB) provides a variety of 
insurance and guarantee schemes to facilitate access to export financing especially for 
the small and medium manufacturers and input suppliers. The MECIB's Banker's 
Export Finance Insurance Policy (BEFIP) would compensate a bank on account of non 
payment of short term credits extended to direct or indirect exporters. 
THE PROVISION OF PHYSICAL INCENTIVES 
During the period 1981-1985, 2,100 units of business premises which comprises 
of shopping and office complexes, arcades, bazaars and stalls, for small traders were 
constructed by the SEDCs, MARA and the Urban Development Authority (UDA). 
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SEDCs were active in the construction of business premises in the rural areas while 
UDA concentrated its activities in the urban areas (Malaysia, 1986:p.365). 
Up to 1988, UDA had provided 678 units of business spaces for Bumiputera 
traders in selected major towns (Malaysia, 1989). BPMB, in its Nursery Factory 
Scheme, provides suitable industrial premises in the form of clusters of factory units 
complete with infrastructure facilities and machinery for rent (Abdullah, 1990). 
THE PROVISION OF TRAINING 
The government recognised the need to develop and upgrade the entrepreneurial 
skills to ensure the growth of small enterprises. Training activities in various aspects 
related to business finance and management were offered at the Malaysian 
Entrepreneurial Development Centre, facilitated by ITM; NPC; and BPMB. MARA 
also provides consultancy services on product identification, preparation, and financing 
(Malaysia, 1989). 
For skills in management, financial and marketing at degree and diploma levels, 
programmes at Universiti Pertanian Malaysia or the Universiti of Agriculture of 
Malaysia were restructured since 1985 to provide greater emphasis on agribusiness, 
commercial and financial management and marketing skills among graduates. It would 
provide graduates with opportunities for career development in agricultural production, 
aquaculture and also in processing, marketing of agricultural products. 
MARA Vocational Institutes and other Industrial Training Institutes introduced 
new courses in electronics and foundry and pattern making. Business and management 
courses were also introduced into secondary vocational school curriculum while other 
training agencies which had incorporated such courses, the teaching of such skills were 
improved. 
To give Bumiputera entrepreneurs the international exposure, a Special 
Overseas Training Scheme were introduced in the 1980s. 
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Recognising the problem of unemployed graduates (91 per cent were 
Bumiputeras) who were mainly with engineering, sciences and social sciences degrees, 
a package scheme was introduced which included entrepreneurial training and 
attachments to public and private sector agencies (Malaysia, 1989). Total number of 
unemployed graduates registered were 4560 in August 1990 compared to 6900 in 
August 1989 a decrease of 34 per cent (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 1990). 
OTHER SUPPORTING INCENTIVES 
(a) A Sub-contract Exchange was introduced and implemented in 1986 to 
provide linkages between the SMI and the large heavy industries in the manufacturing 
sectors. The subsectors identified for the Sub-contract Exchange were the automotive 
components, electrical and electronics, light engineering, rubber, and plastics 
industries. 
(b) BPM, through its subsidiary Besta Distributors, provide marketing assistance 
locally and overseas. Besta Distributors which acts as a supplier of manufactured food 
products for agencies would subcontract to BPM's small and medium scale clients. 
(c) Assistance in marketing of rural industries were given by agencies like the 
Malaysian Handicraft Development Corporation, Batik Malaysia, Village Industry 
Development and Marketing Company, Karyaneka and KEMAS. 
(d) The implementation of the privatisation policy gave opportunities for 
Bumiputera to new areas of economic activity or increase further their participation in 
the commercial and industrial sectors. To ensure a wider participation, the Government 
required the National Equity Corporation (PNB), be given the option of taking at least 
30 per cent and 51 per cent shares in all future privatised projects which was initiated 
by the private sector and the Government respectively (Malaysia, 1989). 
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OTHER INCENTIVES 
(a) To reduce the tax burden on primary commodities sectors, export duties on 
rubber, pepper and selective minerals were abolished and at the same time import 
duties on rubber and pepper were abolished to promote the processing and 
manufacturing of agricultural based products. 
(b) BPM has published guidebooks which identify specific manufacturing 
projects that can be undertaken on small and medium scale. The publication provides 
information on aspects of production, marketing and finance. To date, BPM has 
published 54 such guidebooks (Abdullah, 1990). 
A CASE OF INDONESIA 
Concern over the small scale industries in Indonesia came about openly in the 
early 1970s. Prior to that small scale industries were only referred to indirectly 
(Rahardjo and Al i , 1986 ). Suhartono (1988) reported that in Indonesia the treatment of 
small industries and other industries are distinct in one essential aspect that, the small 
industries are under the guidance of a special Directorate General for Small Industry 
whereas other industries are subject to policies implemented by the respective 
directorates general for basic and multifarious industries. Policies are said to have been 
implemented in support of the development of small industries but there is no specific 
policy directed towards medium scale industries as these are subject to more general 
sectoral policies. 
It is only since the First Five Year Development Plan (PELITA 1) period from 
1969/70-1973/74, under President Suharto's New Order government that the 
government of Indonesia has given a high priority to small industries in particular and 
small enterprises in general. Financial provision has been made available to facilitate 
the development of small enterprises and during the Third Five Year Development Plan 
period from 1979/80-1983/84, the Directorate of Small Industry was created in the 
Ministry of Industry. 
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The growing attention to small industries is said to be the Government's 
response to criticism on earlier strategy that stressed economic development and 
industrialisation at the expense of equitable income. Therefore, the development of the 
small industry sector was considered as a means for redistributing income (Rahardjo 
and A l i , 1986). 
To facilitate small indigenous enterprises, that had insufficient collateral for 
bank loans a concession credit programme was introduced in December 1973 providing 
small investment credit (KIK) and small working capital credit (KMKP) at subsidised 
rates. To upgrade bank lending procedures and training of loan officers, Bank 
Indonesia launched the Small Enterprise Development Project in 1977. 
It also said that in 1980 the ceilings for both KIK and KMKP loans were 
increased from Rp 5 million to Rp 15 million but the average loan size in 1986 was in 
the range of Rp 3.6-4.2 million for KIK and Rp 0.9-1.5 million for KMKP.. 
Outstanding credits through KIK and KMKP at the end of financial year 1986/87 was 
Rp 1,189 billion but Bank credits to economic sectors at the end of financial year 
1986/87 amounted to Rp 27,852 billion, out of which Rp 9,508 billion went to the 
manufacturing sector. 
The share of small industry in KIK and KMKP loans in 1986 was only 9.4 per 
cent and not more than 5 per cent of the total bank credits to the manufacturing sector 
(Suhartono 1988). While KIK and KMKP programmes had been suggested to be the 
most important sources of subsidized credit to small industries, the above figure implies 
that there may still be constraints in small industries getting loans or that the 
programmes have not reach a portion of the targeted establishments. 
To reach those who do not qualify for KIK and KMKP the government 
established Kredit Mini (small credit) in 1978, Kredit Midi (medium credit) in 1981 
and Kredit Usaha Pedesaan (KUPEDAS) in 1984. 
Since 1979, the regional government of Jakarta has provided a special credit 
called Kredit Lebaran for small entrepreneurs. The objective is to ease provision for 
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basic materials used for the festive market season. The festive season includes the "Eid" 
celebration ending the fasting month of Ramadan, the Chinese New Year and 
Christmas. The conditions for receiving this credit was reported to be easier whereby 
the applicant need only a recommendation from a co-operative or relevant government 
body. However, repayment was reported to be a problem with repayment arrears and 
defaults by nearly half of all borrowers (Rahardjo and A l i , 1986). 
At province and regency levels, there are also some departments that give 
credits at low interest rate to small scale establishments in their respective regions, such 
as the Department of Social Affairs, the Department of Industry, and the National 
Family Planning Coordinating Board gives credit in the form of money especially to 
participants of Keluarga Berencana Lestari (Lestari Family Planning). Badan Kredit 
Kecamatan (BKK or Subdistrict Credit Body) was formed in 1981 to help in providing 
loans up to a maximum of Rp 100,000 at a rate of 1.6 per cent per month, to artisans 
and traders. 
In the provision of guidance to alleviate production and marketing constraints 
faced by small industries the most significant step taken by the government is said to be 
the creation of an umbrella organisation, Proyek Bimbingan dan Pengembangan 
Industri Kecil (BIPIK, a project for developing and upgrading small scale industries) in 
1974-75. The activities of BIPIK include among others establishing Pusat 
Pengembangan Industri Kecil (Centres for Developing Small Scale Industries) in 
several cities like Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Jakarta, establishing centres for technical 
aids to help technical industrial problem in introduction of machines and new 
equipment, organising training and education for entrepreneurs on marketing and 
management, giving aids in the form of machines and equipment, and the promotion of 
craftwork. 
There is also the Lingkungan Industri Kecil (LIK) programme for developing 
industrial estates for small scale industries. Essentially LIK is a grouping of small scale 
industries, where facilities such as marketing, training, education and developing small 
52 
scale industries are provided. From this programme, it is hoped that the entrepreneurs 
will form cooperatives. Unfortunately this programme has been reported to be a failure 
and thus has been discontinued since middle of 1984. 
In 1980-81, activities for small industries under the Directorate General of small 
scale industries are categorised into four main programmes which were to be executed 
simultaneously and in an integrated way. The four programmes are: creating a 
favourable environment for establishments/industries, aid and services, support, and 
finally, technical upgrading all of which were to be executed simultaneously and in an 
integrated way. 
In these programmes, three essential activities to be carried out were identified 
as protection; rationalizing regulations and procedures; and the improvement of 
cooperation between small and medium operations, the "bapak angkat" (foster parent 
relationship). In the concept of bapak angkat, larger firms "adopt" small firms, 
providing assistance which may take the form of business management, supply of 
inputs, financing, technology transfer, and subcontracting arrangement (Rahardjo and 
Al i , 1986). 
A special program has been developed to create greater linkages with state 
enterprises so that small industries through vendor development, subcontracting or 
procurement programmes can produce certain commodities for these enterprises; to 
assist in production and promotion of certain products; and to enable small industries to 
obtain higher earnings from exports through production and marketing assistance. To 
ensure effective implementation of the linkage programme, especially for products 
requiring higher quality and precision, assistance is needed in obtaining the right 
materials and equipment as well as training and increasing the technical capabilities of 
small industries. Programmes in technical assistance, skills training as well as 
consulting services have been undertaken in cooperation with state and private 
institutes, universities and consultants, and are also provided by the Ministry of 
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Manpower through its training centres. For standard quality materials, efforts have 
been made through linkage programmes and in cooperations with government agencies. 
To strengthen the marketing ability, procurement of materials, access to credit 
and the undertaking of related activities, the enterprises formed cooperatives in 
"sentra". These cooperatives were to receive guidance from the Ministry of Industry, 
Cooperatives and Manpower. 
While several credit programmes which were designed to help the Pribumi or 
indigenous businessmen helped many small businesses, much of the money was said to 
be misused (Schwarz, 1991). It was also mentioned that for further protection of 
indigenous businessmen, the government required all foreign investors to form joint 
ventures with Pribumis and state banks to offer Pribumis special credit. In addition to 
that, several Presidential Instructions reserved certain categories of government 
procurement contracts for small, usually indigenous businessmen. In January 1990 
Bank Indonesia the central Bank, instructed all banks to channel 20 per cent of their 
loan portfolios to small businesses. 
Besides other incentives in the promotion of small industries, UPAKARTI, a 
special presidential award is given annually since 1985, to those who have helped foster 
the development of small industries (Suhartono, 1988). 
A CASE OF SINGAPORE 
The economic system in Singapore is one governed by market forces and 
indicative planning (Ch'ng, 1985). On gaining self government in 1959, the 
government of Singapore aimed to diversify its entrepot economy towards import 
substitution industrialisation through labour intensive programmes. The Economic 
Development Board (EDB) was established in 1961 to centralise the supervision and 
implementation of the industrialisation program. 
With Singapore's separation from Malaysia in 1965, the government's 
development strategy shifted to export manufacturing and internationalization of its 
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economy (Chia, 1983; Lim and Pang, 1982). The import substitution industrialisation 
strategy was abandoned as the city-state has a very small domestic market. With this 
change in strategy, Singapore launched a deliberate policy to encourage foreign 
investment into the resource scare economy. Tax holidays and other investment 
incentives were offered generously to manufacturing companies to operate and set up 
off shore plants in Singapore. Several manufacturing industries including local SMEs 
that engage in activities such as producing footwear, garments, textiles and T.V. 
assembly, continued to benefit from tariff protections. However they were encouraged 
to develop export markets. 
The early phase of economic development is said to be a matter of survival and 
the multinationals (MNCs) brought much needed capital, modern technology and 
managerial skills as well as massive employment opportunity for the workforce and 
access to world market through their world wide distribution network (Soon, 1986). 
The strategy of labour intensive manufacturing with increasing emphasis on 
export orientation continued through the period 1966 - 73. Full employment was 
realised and domestic labour shortages began to emerge during this period. As 
Singapore could no longer compete with other developing countries which were able to 
offer much lower labour cost, economic development strategy was shifted away from 
labour intensive to capital intensive industries. In 1979, a major policy intervention by 
the government launched the second industrial revolution to restructure the economy 
into one manufacturing high value products, high technology and capital intensive 
activities. The restructuring policy involves the continuing attempt to be a viable 
exporter of manufactured goods to world markets and to compete with the most 
efficient and best exporter globally through the phasing out of low value, labour 
intensive manufacturing activities; and upgrading of technology and skills to export 
more high value manufactured goods. Singapore is said to be pushing hard to broaden 
its industrial base with the rapid establishment of diverse high value priority industries 
(Ch'ng, 1985). 
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To promote industrial development, fiscal and financial assistance would be 
provided by the government. 
FISCAL INCENTIVES 
A variety of fiscal incentives or inducements are provided by the government to 
encourage the establishment of new enterprises or expansion of existing ventures. 
(a) Corporate tax incentive 
Remissions of corporate income tax was first introduced in 1959 under the 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance with "pioneer status" new firms in "essential" industries 
serving domestic market or export market could enjoy 40 per cent corporate tax relief 
for five years. The Industrial Expansion Ordinance also introduced that year, gave tax 
relief to existing firms expanding capacity of approved products. In 1967, the incentive 
provisions in these two ordinance were consolidated and amended under the Economic 
Expansion Incentive Act. 
A new industrial strategy came into being in August 1975 with the introduction 
of an amendment to the Economic Expansion Incentives Act. The incentives were 
revised as follows: 
(i) the period of pioneer status was extended from 5 to 10 years in response to the 
larger gestation period of technology and skill intensive industries. 
(ii) the minimum requirement of S$l million of capital was abolished in order to 
nurture local supporting industries which are modern and small in size but are involved 
in sophisticated technology and skill intensive development. 
In 1979, the objective was to restructure the economy into one based on high 
value added. Other investment allowance incentives were introduced as an alternative to 
existing pioneer and export tax concessions, and various tax benefits were provided to 
motivate manufacturers to conduct research and development. 
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(b) Tariffs and Quotas 
Given Singapore's successful outward looking development strategy with the 
necessary reliance on unrestricted overseas markets for its manufactures, there are 
hardly any protective tariffs and quotas of much significance at present. 
(c) Investment Allowance Benefits 
The investment allowance incentive provides the following benefits: 
(i) It is an investment tax credit against taxable income. A tax deduction ranges from 
10 to 15 per cent of new fixed investment in plant, machinery, factory buildings which 
has to be implemented within a qualifying period up to 5 years. 
(ii) There is no time limit for the use of the tax credit. 
(iii) The investment allowance is granted in addition to the normal capital allowance. A 
firm can simultaneously claim 3 years accelerated depreciation to offset against its 
taxable income. 
(d) Trade Development Board's "Export Expansion Scheme" 
The Trade Development Board was created in January 1983, as a response to an 
increasingly protectionist environment in other countries and rapid changes in the 
pattern of world trade. 
Double tax deduction is granted to manufacturing companies incorporated in 
Singapore participating in the following schemes: 
(i) approved overseas trade fairs and trade missions 
(ii) marketing campaign in foreign countries through market surveys, advertising and 
other promotional activities 
(iii) production of high quality promotional publications effective for overseas publicity 
of Singapore products 
(iv) establishing trade offices overseas. 
57 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE SCHEMES 
The government's medium of financial assistance is primarily the EDB which 
also administers certain SME financing schemes in conjunction with selected financial 
institutions. The financial assistance schemes available are: 
(a) Small Industries Finance Scheme (SDFS) 
The SIFS was launched in November 1976 to replace the Light Industries Loan 
Services (LIS) set up in 1963. SIFS provides finance for deserving manufacturing firms 
or firms providing supporting services related to manufacturing with fixed productive 
assets not exceed S$3 million. The SIFS is also aimed at encouraging the further 
development and technical upgrading of small local industries which serve a vital role 
in providing the base of supportive services for large companies. To date, the SIFS is 
being promoted by a number of participating financial institutions such as DBS Bank, 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, Hong Leong Finance, Chartered Bank, Tat 
Lee Bank, United Overseas Bank, Overseas Union Bank, United Overseas Finance, 
Forward Overseas Credit, DBS Finance, Shing Loong Finance and International Bank 
of Singapore. 
Loans applied for under the scheme must be for one or more of the following 
purposes (EDB, 1984,p. 43): 
(i) establishment of new viable businesses 
(ii) expansion of existing manufacturing capacity 
(iii) modernisation of plant and machines 
(iv) diversification of plant and machines 
(v) augmenting working capital resources 
(vi) factoring 
In addition, DBS Finance and Shing Loong Finance offer factoring services up to 90 
per cent of invoice value. 
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(b) Extended Small Industries Finance Scheme (ESIFS) 
The scheme is basically an extension of SIFS and is aimed at providing financial 
assistance to industries with fixed productive asset exceeding S$3 million but less than 
S$8 million. Interest rate is at 10 per cent per annum and has a cumulative loan limit of 
S$3 million. 
(c) Interest Grant for Mechanisation Scheme (IGMS) 
IGMS is one of the three schemes operated by the Skills Development Fund 
(SDF) established by EDB in October 1979 to provide financial assistance to employers 
for the training of skills relevant to Singapore's economic restructuring effort. The two 
other schemes offered by SDF are Training Grant Scheme (TGS) and the Initiatives in 
New Technology Scheme (INTEC). 
(d) Small Industries Technical Assistance Scheme (SITAS) 
SITAS, introduced in October 1982, is designed to provide incremental 
technical expertise to local industries with less than S$8 million in fixed assets. More 
specifically, SITAS provides free services in matching a firm's technical needs with the 
suitable consultant. In cases when firms are unable to identify the problems and 
requirements themselves, SITAS too fills in such a gap. In addition SITAS is prepared 
to fund up to 90 per cent of the consultancy cost incurred in engaging the expert. 
The programmes currently eligible for SITAS grants, both to individual 
companies as well as to groups of companies in similar industries are: quick surveys, in 
depth studies, group study experts and short term specialists. The scope of SITAS 
grants ranges from simple advice to helping improve the general standard of activities 
common to a particular industry, for example the standard of food packaging. 
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(e) Trainee Release Scheme (TRS) 
Local companies are given some priority in the allocation of trainees from EDB 
training centres which conduct two-year in-centre apprenticeship courses. For the 
SMBs the release fee of S$3,000 per trainee is being waived. 
(f) Product Development Assistance Scheme (PDAS) 
PDAS was established in 1978 to develop local applied research and product 
development capability and to build up indigenous technology. As such only local 
companies meeting conditions related to the stated above objectives are eligible. The 
scheme provides a dollar to dollar grant, that is, the government and the company will 
bear equally the direct cost of the project. The maximum grant per project is 
S$200,000 which will be disbursed in two stages, subject to satisfactory progress of the 
project. 
(g) Trainee Grant Scheme (TGS) 
Set up in late 1979, the TGS seeks to encourage employers to embark on 
training programmes to upgrade the skills of their employees. The grant subsidised up 
to 90 per cent of the allowable costs incurred for the training programme. Eight areas 
for training identified for priority development are technical skills, computer related 
skills, management/supervisory skills, craft skills professional education/specialized 
skills training, product design, R&D skills, company wide productivity improvement 
programmes and Basic Education for Skills Training (BEST) programmes. 
(h) Initiatives in New Technology Scheme (INTECS) 
INTECS, introduced in 1984, by SDF, provides financial assistance for start 
ups in industries of cutting-edge technologies, which have been identified to include the 
following priority areas: automation and robotics, micro electronics, information 
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technology, biotechnology, optical and laser technology, engineering science and 
material science. 
INTECS has the aim of developing a pool of highly trained professionals and 
scientists who wil l form the nucleus and catalyst for building up knowledge and 
competence in new technologies in Singapore. As such, only Singapore citizens or 
permanent residents of Singapore in the Singapore-registered companies are eligible. 
(i) Monetary Authority off Singapore (MAS) Rediscou rating Scheme 
MAS is established with the main objective of making Singapore's 
manufactured exports more competitive by lowering the cost of credit to exporters. The 
Rediscounting Scheme consists of two major categories of financing: 
(i) Pre-export financing is for those applicants with a firm order; funds can be obtained 
to finance production of goods for export. 
(ii) Export financing is for the exporter who receives immediate payment from MAS 
when goods are shipped. 
OTHER SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE 
In the activity to turn out innovators and people who are responsive to changing 
environment and management practices, a course on "Small Business Management" is 
offered to final year students at the University of Singapore. Part of the requirement of 
the course is a student counselling project whereby a student wil l be attached to a local 
enterprise for a period of up to three months. On completion of the project, the 
students should have identified the strength and weakness of the firm and offered 
recommendations and solutions to the weakness and also plan for the future of the firm. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE 
INTRODUCTION 
A financial system basically serves to assist in the allocation of resources in an 
economy from the surplus units (individuals and enterprises with excess income over 
expenditure) to the deficit units (individuals and investors who have the capacity to 
spend more than their income and resources). In order that the scarce resources would 
be used to their optimum for the development of a country, an efficient recycling 
mechanism is essential. To link the process of borrowing and lending, financial 
intermediaries play an important role in pooling the resources of lenders and reducing 
the risk to them of defaults by borrowers; at the same time supplying funds to 
borrowers in amounts and requirements that meet their financing needs. In other words, 
the financial intermediaries take a role of mobilizer and allocator of the country's 
scarce pool of savings. As the financial system reaches maturity, there would 
eventually be a complex of financial intermediaries offering a variety of financial 
instruments as savings media for the surplus units as well as a wide range of credit and 
investment facilities to meet the financing requirements of the deficit units. Not only 
would the financial intermediaries transact their own instruments directly with 
economic units in an economy, but they would also transact their instruments among 
themselves in the financial market. The market may be broadly classified as the money 
and foreign exchange market and the capital market. The money and foreign exchange 
market usually transact in short term liquid financial assets which normally mature 
within one year, whereas the capital market usually deals in long term financial assets 
of maturity exceeding one year (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1989). Through the process of 
economic growth and economic development, Malaysia also experienced the process of 
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monetisation and growth of financial intermediaries and intermediation in the 
development of its financial system. 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA 
Developments in the financial system are closely related to economic growth 
and development in a market oriented economy (Yan, 1984). The financial system in 
Malaysia had undergone significant transformation in line with the expanding and 
industrialising economy. It had transformed from playing the role of mainly financing 
trade to one that has begun to mobilise and channel resources more effectively and is 
responsive to basic needs and national priorities. 
In the early years the financial system was mainly dominated by the branches of 
a few foreign banks which were mainly British, specialising in trade financing serving 
the big British and European companies in Malaysia. Financing at the time was mainly 
for the exploitation of mineral resources and cultivation of rubber for export, for 
imports of food and manufactured goods, and domestic commercial and trading 
activities. There were very few local banks, of which most were generally family 
owned or formed by individual investors within the same clan. By the beginning of 
1959, there were 8 locally incorporated banks with 12 branches in few major towns. 
Their share of total deposits was less than 10 per cent in 1959, so also their share of 
total assets. In contrast, the growth of plantation, agriculture and mining in the 
country, had induced the expansion of foreign banks throughout the country and by the 
end of 1959, there were 18 foreign banks with 99 branches (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
1989). 
Access to bank credits by SMEs in the rural areas as well as for non export 
activities were presumably poor because of the export oriented nature of banking 
business and the concentration of the banking network in the urban areas. Since the 
majority of the Bumiputeras lived in the non urban areas, banking would generally be 
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"foreign" to them. Even for the Bumiputeras in the urban areas, access to bank credit 
was confined to the privileged few. 
When the Central Bank of Malaysia was established in 1959, measures were 
taken to develop the Malaysian banking system. Policies were designed to strengthen 
and develop the existing financial institutions and to introduce new intermediaries and 
markets. Following this, the 1960s saw the development of domestic commercial banks 
and the widespread branching of banking services particularly to the rural areas. New 
financial institutions and markets including discount houses, agricultural bank, money 
and stock markets were established and financing companies were also promoted. The 
country's first development bank, The Malaysian Industrial Development Finance 
Limited (MIDF) was established in 1960 with equity participation of the Federal 
Government, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the commercial banks and 
the insurance companies. The Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore was 
established in 1962 under the guidance of Central Bank. The Central Bank also 
promoted the development of Treasury bills and other Government securities. 
In the 1970s, more financial institutions including merchant banks (many with 
equity participation of foreign financial institutions) and development finance 
institutions were established to meet the financing needs of an increasing industrialising 
economy. By the end of 1970, the number of domestic banks had doubled to 16 with 
177 branches across all states and by the end of 1975, the domestic banks had equalled 
the foreign banks in terms of numbers, assets, total deposits and total loans. By end of 
the 1970s foreign banks no longer dominated the financial sector but continued to play 
an important role in the development and modernisation of the Malaysian economy and 
banking industry. Being a small open market economy, Malaysia relies heavily on 
international trade as well as foreign capital and technology; and foreign banks with 
their extensive international linkages, particularly with Malaysia's trading partners, 
would facilitate quick and reliable settlement of international trade finance. Foreign 
banks would also act as a media for transfer of financial innovation and new banking 
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technology. Additionally, foreign banks with their bankers who had first hand 
knowledge of the country, would also act as a channel for foreign investment. 
In the 1980s the financial system was strengthened further when the Central 
Bank imposed rules to ensure professionalism, accountability and integrity in the 
conduct of banking. Financial reforms, deregulations, reregulations and innovations 
were introduced to enhance competition, provide depth to the money market and 
further develop the capital market. To avoid banks being dominated by a single 
shareholder or a group of individuals, a regulation on maximum shareholdings in 
licensed financial institution was introduced in 1986 whereby the maximum 
shareholdings allowed for individual was 10 per cent and for non individuals was 20 
per cent. Not only was there a change in the shareholding structure of these banking 
institutions, their institutional structure also became more complex, involving a wide 
range of financial activities which include leasing and factoring, stockbroking, 
management of unit trusts, venture capital and insurance. With the establishment of off-
shore banks in Labuan in October 1990, some of these institutions would have 
expanded their activities into off-shore private banking, international portfolio 
management and advisory services. 
The keener competition in the banking industry and increased sophistication of 
consumers had generally led to the proliferation of the host of new financial 
instruments and new delivery systems. Additionally, the advance in computer 
technology had transformed the range of services available to the public and also the 
character of banking towards "convenience banking". Technological advancement had 
contributed to the reduction of costs of producing and delivering financial services, and 
information. Additionally, the establishment of automated teller machines (ATMs) had 
permitted cardholders the flexibility in withdrawals, transfers and the deposit of funds, 
including the payment of selected bills. By joining the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) which provides a computer-controlled system 
for transmitting messages throughout the world, the Malaysian banking system had the 
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opportunity to have direct links with world financial markets. In the domestic money 
market, the implementation of a completely computerised on line electronic Interbank 
Funds Transfer System, had speeded up the daily interbank funds transfer and 
settlement. Secondary market transactions for Malaysian Government papers and bonds 
could also be speeded up with the introduction of a Scripless Trading System in January 
1990. 
At the end of 1990 the number of bank and finance company branches totalled 
1,540 serving an average 11,566 persons per branch. Its per capita M2 rose from 
US$1,091 in 1982 to US$1,600 in 1989 and its total bank deposits per capita rose from 
US$958 in 1982 to US$1,600 in 1989. The financial assets/GNP ratio was 2.9 in 1990 
when the total assets of the financial system of Malaysia rose by M$48.5 billion or 
17.8 per cent to M$320.4 billion during the year ending December 1990. Total loans 
and advances extended by the financial institutions to private sector increased by 22.1 
per cent during the year to M$ 128.1 billion at the end of 1990 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
1991). 
To ensure that the banking system remains "solid" while it becomes increasingly 
competitive and sophisticated, the Base Lending Rate (BLR) was freed from the 
administrative control of the Central Bank. Under this deregulated regime, with effect 
from February 1,1991, individual banking institutions were free to fix their own BLR 
on the basis of free market forces. It would therefore be partly based on their cost of 
funds and administrative overheads. However, to prevent banking institutions from 
charging excessive interest rates, the existing guide-lines on maximum margin over 
BLR, where the lending rate for loans cannot exceed the declared BLR by more than 4 
per cent, would remain inforce. On lending to priority sectors, the Central Bank would 
still continue to determine the ceiling interest rates. 
In summary, the financial system and structure in Malaysia had developed from 
the domination of a few foreign banks specialising in external trade and trade in 
commercial bills to a Malaysian financial system that is able to mobilise and channel 
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funds more effectively and is responsive to the needs of national priorities in line with 
industrialising economic development. 
The Malaysian financial system is composed of the banking system and the 
system of non-bank financial intermediaries. 
BANKING SYSTEM 
The banking system in Malaysia was the main financial intermediary with total 
assets amounting to M$223.5 billion or 69.8 per cent of the total assets of the financial 
system at end of 1990. Total deposits mobilised (excluding Repos) by the banking 
sector amounted to M $ l l l billion at year end 1990. The loan portfolio of the banking 
system increased by 23 per cent to M$116 billion at year end 1990 (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1991). Within the loan category, term loans accounted for the bulk of total 
outstanding loans (60 per cent) compared to 22 per cent for overdrafts. This indicated 
that banking institutions had place more emphasis on term lending and also perhaps 
there was awareness among customers of its advantage over traditional overdraft 
arrangement for business investment and development. 
The banking system comprises the monetary institutions whose principal 
liabilities are generally accepted as money. In Malaysia they comprise the Central Bank 
which is the sole currency issuing authority, and the commercial banks which are the 
only institutions allowed to operate current accounts. Additionally, the banking system 
includes several non-bank financial institutions which are closely linked to the monetary 
institutions and whose liabilities are generally accepted as near money. These 
institutions which are supervised by the Central Bank are the finance companies, the 
merchant banks and discount houses. In addition, the banking system also includes the 
money and foreign exchange brokers, and the Credit Guarantee Corporation which was 
established by the monetary institutions to provide guarantee cover for commercial 
banks on their loans to small scale enterprises. 
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THE CENTRAL BANK 
The Central Bank of Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaya until the formation of 
Malaysia in September 1963) was established in January 1959 under the Central Bank 
of Malaya Ordinance 1958. It is wholly owned by the Federal Government of Malaysia 
and has the legal power to regulate and supervise the financial system in the country. 
The principal objectives of the Central Bank are to issue currency, to keep 
international reserves and safeguarding the value of the Ringgit, to act as a banker and 
financial adviser to the Government, to be responsible for monetary policy, and to act 
as a banker to the banks. However, it was not until June 1967 that it became a ful l 
fledged Central Bank. Up to June 1967, the currency issuing powers were still held by 
the Currency Board which was the Board of Commissioners of Currency, Malaya and 
British Borneo that continued to issue its currency in the Federation of Malaya, Sabah, 
Sarawak, Singapore and Brunei under the Malaya-British Borneo Currency Agreement 
of 1960. After Malaysia was formed, comprising the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, 
British North Borneo (now Sabah) and Sarawak in 1963, the Malaysian Government 
lodged a notice to the Currency Board of its intention to have the Central Bank as the 
sole currency issuing authority. However, when Singapore separated from the 
Federation and became an independent nation in 1965 it resumed as a participating 
Government in the Currency Board. By then there were three parties to the Currency 
agreement, namely Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. The currency Board continued to 
issue currencies in the three countries until June 1967, after which, the Central Bank 
replaced the Board of Commissioners of Currency, Malaya and British Borneo, as the 
sole currency issuing authority in Malaysia. The new Malaysian currency, the Ringgit 
was issued on June 12, 1967 but the old Malayan dollar continued to be legal tender 
during the transition period to change to new currencies in the three countries until end 
of 1968. The Central Bank which had a branch in Singapore continued its function and 
responsibilities in Singapore after 1965 with the consent of the Singapore Government 
til l 1967. 
68 
As a keeper of international reserves and safeguarding the value of the Ringgit, 
holdings of the country's official external reserves are centralised at the Central Bank. 
As at the end of September 1988, international reserves at the Central Bank amounted 
to M$15,888 million representing an external backing of 189.8 per cent for the 
currency issue (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1989). The external value of the Ringgit is 
determined in terms of a basket of the currencies of those countries which are 
significant trading partners of Malaysia. 
On the role of fiscal agent of the Government, the Central Bank acts on the 
public loan programme (internal and external loans) and managing the public debt. 
Additionally, it administers the Exchange Control Act, 1953 on behalf of the 
Government, and is the official depository in Malaysia for the International Monetary 
Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
Finance Corporation, the International Development Association and the Asian 
Development Bank. 
The Central Bank is responsible for regulating the country's supply of money 
and credit to promote monetary stability and a sound financial structure. The ability to 
influence the availability and cost of money contributes towards achieving the nation's 
overall economic objectives. Monetary policy instruments used by the Central Bank 
include the statutory reserve requirements, minimum liquidity requirements, regulation 
of discounting and open market operations, interest rates regulation, credit control and 
guide-lines on lending. To ensure effective implementation of these guide-lines, 
penalties are imposed for failure in compliance. 
Some of these guide-lines were made more specific such as the guide-lines 
introduced in February 1975 that required the commercial banks and finance companies 
to extend a minimum of 50 per cent of their increase in net credit during 1975 to the 
Bumiputera community and the manufacturing industry. These guide-lines were revised 
and made even more specific in 1976 when commercial banks were required to direct a 
minimum of 20 per cent of their increase in loans to Bumiputeras; in addition, a 
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minimum of 10 per cent of the net increase in loans must be for agricultural food 
production, 25 per cent to the manufacturing sector and 10 per cent for individual 
housing loans. Finance companies were required to extend a minimum of 20 per cent 
of their new loans to the Bumiputera community, 25 per cent for individual housing 
loans and 30 per cent for agriculture, manufacturing, building and construction, and 
real estates development. 
To ensure distribution of credits for national priority uses, a new set of guide-
lines based on the stock of loans outstanding was introduced in August 1979. Under the 
new guide-lines, ratios in relation to loans outstanding at a particular base period was 
prescribed. The August 1979 guide-lines required commercial banks to extend a 
minimum proportion of loan outstanding as at June 30 1979, to Bumiputera 
community, SSEs, agricultural food production, manufacturing and individuals for 
housing. Similarly, finance companies were required to extend a minimum proportion 
of loan outstanding as at June 30 1979 to Bumiputeras, SSEs, individuals for housing, 
agriculture, manufacturing, and building and construction. The August 1979 guide-
lines were reviewed and replaced in March 1981. Subsequently, these guide-lines were 
reviewed annually every March to ensure the priority sectors have ready access to 
credit at reasonable costs and also to allow adjustments of these guide-lines in 
accordance with developments in the economy. To ensure that the priority sectors 
would continue to have ready access to funds at reasonable cost, the Central Bank 
introduced a new set of lending guide-lines with effect, from April 1, 1990. The 
priority sectors covered included the Bumiputera community and the Principal 
Guarantee Scheme (PGS) of the CGC. Under these guide-lines, commercial banks and 
finance companies were required to extend a minimum of 20 per cent of their loans 
outstanding to the Bumiputera community. On lending under the PGS of the CGC, the 
commercial banks were required to extend loans to SSEs with guarantee cover by CGC 
of at least M$200 million, of which at least M$100 million must be the guarantee cover 
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of loans extended to Bumiputeras. The compliance date for these requirements was set 
for March 31, 1991. 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
In Malaysia the commercial banks dominate the financial structure in terms of 
head offices and number of branches and outlets. The commercial banks increased 
steadily from 26 (of which 18 were foreign incorporated banks) with 99 branches in 
1959 to 38 (of which 16 were foreign incorporated banks and 22 domestics) and 998 
bank branches (of which 852 represented branches of domestic commercial banks) in 
1990. Additionally, the Central Bank had already approved the establishment of another 
141 new branch offices. The increase in commercial banks and banking offices makes 
the country better served with banking facilities. As at the end of 1990, the population 
per banking office was 18,277 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
In terms of assets, the commercial banks (including Bank Islam) formed the 
largest group with total assets of M$130.6 billion (the foreign banks accounted for 
M$31.3 billion or 24 per cent of the total assets of all commercial banks) or 40.8 per 
cent of the total assets of the banking system. In terms of the share of total assets, the 
commercial banks accounted for 58.4 per cent at the end of 1990 (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1991). 
Total deposits mobilised by the commercial banks rose rapidly by M$7.6 billion 
or 10.1 per cent to M$82.4 billion at the year end 1990. Growth in the extension of 
credit had become most significant in Malaysia. Commercial banks provided about 60 
per cent of the total new credits during 1990, the same as in the previous year. Loan 
growth was 20.3 per cent increasing by M$13.6 billion to M$80.8 billion at end of 
1990 (foreign banks' share of loans was 25 per cent or M$18.6 billion; and deposits 
was 26 per cent or M$19.2 billion). During the year, overdrafts and term loans 
increased by M$3.6 billion and M$5.5 billion respectively. The new loans were 
extended mainly to the manufacturing sector (M$4.7 billion or 34.4 per cent of total 
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new loans extended in 1990) reflecting the commercial banks major role in the 
country's thrust towards industrialisation. Increases in new credit to other sectors 
included finance and insurance (M$1.7 billion), and general commerce ( M $ l . l billion). 
Although agriculture no longer played a predominant role in the economy, loans to the 
agriculture sector continued to increase by M$616 million during the year. 
Bank loans to the manufacturing sector had expanded rapidly since the late 
1960s and early 1970s both in value and scope. This expansion was initially for the 
financing of production for import substitution and at a later stage for industrial 
production. Financing of foreign trade had decline in relative importance over the 
years. In 1955, financing of foreign trade was as high as 40 to 50 per cent of the total 
bank credit but by the end of 1988 bank credit for general commerce accounted for 
only 17 per cent of the total (Bank Negara Malaysia 1989). Foreign banks' market 
share of trade financing was well over a third in 1990 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
Regarding financing SSEs, the Government seems to succeed in using the 
lending guide-lines imposed on commercial banks towards financing SSEs. On 
complying with the 1989 guide-lines as at compliance date of March 31, 1990, the 
commercial banks had approved loans of M$1.5 billion to SSEs, which was well above 
the minimum requirement of M$600 million. Of the amount approved for SSEs, 
M$208.8 million was extended to Bumiputeras. Guide-lines for financing SSEs were no 
more applicable after March 1990. However, commercial banks continue to be guided 
on lending to the Bumiputera community. Total non performing loans of the 
commercial banks as a proportion of total loans was reported to have declined to 20.4 
per cent from 24.7 per cent mainly due to the expansion of total loans (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1991). 
Banking services available to the public were improved with advances in 
banking technology. Presently, banks had computerised their operations and made the 
calculation of interest on savings deposits on a daily basis. The establishment of 
automated teller machines since 1981 had permitted cardholders the flexibility in 
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withdrawals, transfers and the deposit of funds, including the payment of selected bills. 
Cheque settlement was improved when the National Automated Cheque Clearing 
System (SPAN) was launched by the Central Bank in January 1987. 
In addition to computer technology investment, quality of services and assets of 
the banking industry depend ultimately upon quality of management. Hence, staff 
training and development were also emphasised. To instil greater sense of discipline, 
responsibility and ethics into the bank staff and to avoid getting staff from other 
financial institutions, a Staff Training Fund (STF), funded by contributions from 
financial institutions was established in 1985 for the purpose of training programmes to 
upgrade professional skills and to inculcate a high sense of moral responsibility in the 
industry. In 1987, the Central Bank issued guide-lines on staff training whereby 
commercial banks were required to spend each year at least 1.5 per cent of the total 
gross salaries of the preceding year on staff training and education. Institutions which 
failed to comply the regulation would be required to pay a levy to the STF. 
Performances of bank services and competition in the banking industry are also 
influenced by the interest rates charged on loans and deposits. A response to the 
deregulation would likely be an increase of interest rates. I f interest rates charged on 
loans are to increase, SSEs which no longer are considered as a priority from April 
1990 might face some financing problems. Even i f interest rates are not raised, as long 
as SSEs are being considered as riskier than large enterprises, SSEs may face financing 
problem because crowding out might occur. 
CREDIT GUARANTEE CORPORATION (CGC) 
The CGC in Malaysia was established in 1973 to provide guarantee cover to 
commercial banks for loans extended to SSEs, which had been redefined as registered 
businesses with net assets of up to M$500,000 each or in the case of limited companies, 
shareholders' funds of not more than M$500,000 each. The three main schemes 
administered by CGC are the Principal Guarantee Scheme (PGS), the Loan Fund for 
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Hawkers and Petty Traders (LFHPT), and the Association Special Loan Scheme 
(ASLS). Total loans guaranteed by CGC, under all its schemes as at December 31, 
1990 totalled 172,394 applications with approved loan limits of M$3,258.1 million 
compared with 162,609 applications with approved loan limits of M$2,933.6 million as 
at December 31, 1989. 
ISLAMIC BANKING 
Bank Islam Malaysia or the Islamic Bank of Malaysia was established in March 
1983 under the Islamic Banking Act, 1983 to meet the banking and credit needs of the 
Muslim population in Malaysia according to the rules of Syariah which prohibits 
interest. The Syariah instead provides non-interest based concepts such as the 
Mudharabah (financing project on a profit sharing basis but the lender has to share the 
loss in case of a failure); Musyarakah (partnership); Murabahah (sale and purchase 
agreement); Wadiah (asset deposit agreement); Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil (deferred sale), 
Al-Ijarah (leasing finance); Al-Takjiri (acquisition of leased asset by the lessee); Al-
Wakalah (agency); Bai'al-Dayn (debt trading) and Shahadah al-Dayn (promissory 
notes). Returns on investments would be in the form of dividends rather than interest. 
With 28 branches in operation, its total assets increased by 4.6 per cent to M$l,385 
million at year end 1990; and deposits mobilised rose by 0.5 per cent to M$l,151 
million, while financing extended rose by 14.1 per cent to M$865 million at year end 
1990. Financing under the principle of Al-Ijarah and Bai-Bithaman Ajil had increased 
by M$79 million (416 per cent) and M$44 million (8 per cent) respectively. Financing 
under Al-Murabahah had declined by M$20 million (15 percent) and financing under 
Al-Mudharabah remained unchanged at M$0.4 million. Out of the total loan extended, 
33 percent was granted to manufacturing sector, 21 per cent to individuals for housing 
and 12 per cent for real estate development (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
74 
(b) FINANCE COMPANIES 
In 1969, the Finance companies were brought under the jurisdiction of Central 
Bank under the Finance Companies Act 1969 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1989). They are 
the second largest group of deposit taking financial institutions in Malaysia. 
Finance companies came into being since early 1960s. They were established as 
limited companies engaged in money lending activities like the larger licensed 
moneylenders by providing loans for the purchase of consumer durables. But unlike the 
moneylenders, finance companies can mobilise savings and idle funds from the public 
in the form of deposits. Since finance companies are not allowed to accept demand 
deposits, they concentrated in mobilising funds through fixed deposits and savings 
deposits. Rates charged on loans are often higher than commercial banks which may be 
due to higher cost of funds. Additionally finance companies offered higher interest 
rates on deposits in order to attract more savings. Some companies tend to rely on their 
shareholders' funds for lending operations. 
Finance companies expanded in mid 1960s particularly with entry of 
commercial banks establishing their wholly owned finance company subsidiaries. To 
control and supervise the activities of all finance companies, the Central Bank is 
empowered to regulate and supervise the activities of all finance companies which 
accept deposits from the public in the interest of depositors. The Finance Companies 
Act 1969 distinguishes between those finance companies which are licensed under the 
Act and those which are not. Under the Finance Companies Act 1969, licensed 
companies were authorised to accept deposits (or loans) from more than 10 persons and 
to engage in the lending or investing of these funds. The unlicensed finance companies 
were no longer allowed to use the term finance companies in their company names in 
any language. To be eligible for a license under the Act, the company must be a public 
company incorporated in Malaysia, with paid up capital not less than M$l million. 
At the end of 1990, there were 45 finance companies in the country. Their total 
assets expanded by 35 per cent in 1990 reaching M$39.5 billion at end of year 1990, 
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equivalent to about 30.5 per cent of the total size of commercial banks assets. Total 
deposits mobilised (excluding Repos) rose by M$8.2 billion. Total loans extended 
increased by 35.9 per cent in 1990 mainly in the form of hire-purchase finance, which 
rose by 71.6 per cent (M$5.4 billion) to M$ 13.1 billion to account for 47.6 per cent of 
total outstanding finance company credit at the end of 1990. Leasing finance provided 
by the finance companies also increased (by 29 per cent). Small loans of less than 
M$100,000 each extended by the finance companies accounted for 83.6 per cent of the 
industry's total new loans. 
On compliance with the Lending Guide-lines, as at the compliance date of 
March 31 1990, loans granted to Bumiputeras accounted for 49.7 per cent of total loans 
outstanding as at December 31, 1987, well in excess of the minimum 20 per cent. As at 
the end of 1990, loans granted to Bumiputera individuals and Bumiputera controlled 
enterprises amounted to M$9 billion, an increase of 43.1 per cent from M$6.3 billion 
at end of 1989. The number of Bumiputera loan accounts rose by 60.1 per cent to 
715,842 at end of 1990, of which 99.1 per cent of the outstanding loan accounts was 
for loans not exceeding M$ 100,000 each. Outstanding loans to SSEs as at the same 
date (M$3.2 billion) represented 23.8 per cent of the total loans outstanding as at 
December 31, 1987 or 14.9 per cent of outstanding loans as at March 31,1990. Total 
non performing loans of the finance companies increased moderately from M$5.7 
billion at end of 1989 to M$5.9 billion at the end of 1990. However, with the 
expansion of total loans in 1990, the non performing loans as a proportion of total 
loans declined from 28.75 per cent in 1989 to 21.7 per cent in 1990. 
(c) MERCHANT BANKS: 
Merchant banks complement and supplement the activities of financial 
institutions by operating in "wholesale" banking and as corporate advisers and 
financiers. They specialise in financial services which cannot be adequately covered by 
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commercial banks such as the fee-based activities of underwriting of securities, 
portfolio management and other financial services geared to the corporate sector. 
In Malaysia there were 12 merchant banks and 5 branches operating at the end 
of 1990. Total resources of the merchant banks in Malaysia increased by 24.6 per cent 
to reach M $ l l . l billion at the end of 1990. More than three quarters (80.1 per cent) of 
the new resources were generated from borrowing from domestic financial institutions. 
The incremental resources were used to finance mainly in merchant banks' investments 
in marketable securities and lendings to domestic financial institutions. Total loans 
extended by the merchant banks increased by M$729 million or 13.2 per cent to reach 
M$6,254 million at the end of 1990. The larger part of the merchant banks' new credit 
was extended to the financing, insurance and business services sector. The balance was 
extended to real estate and property development, manufacturing and agriculture. Term 
loans with maturity period of 1 year or less accounted for 54.7 per cent of total loans, 
while term loans of more than a year accounted for 36.5 per cent of total loans. 
(d) DISCOUNT HOUSES 
The seven discount houses operating in Malaysia specialised in short term 
money market operations investing in treasury bills, Government securities, BAs, 
NCDs and Bonds. 
T H E NON-BANK FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
The non-bank financial intermediaries which are supervised by various 
Government departments and agencies, are broadly classified into five institutions 
namely the development finance institutions, the savings institutions, the provident and 
pension funds, the insurance companies, and a group of other financial intermediaries 
comprising the building societies, the unit trusts and several special investment 
agencies. 
77 
SAVINGS BANKS 
The savings banks in Malaysia started as post office savings banks. As postal 
savings banks, their operation for private savings were lethargic and prompted the 
government to amalgamate and absorb them into a national savings institution. The 
National Savings Bank (NSB) was therefore established in 1974. In 1990, the bank had 
a total of 313 regional, mini and sub-branches, 539 permanent and 232 mobile post 
offices with banking facilities. Total resources of the bank rose by M$307 million or 
10.5 per cent to M$3,236 million at end of 1990. Loans extended during the year 1990 
increased by M$166 million or 30.6 per cent to M$708 (M$315 million or 139 per cent 
in 1989). Bumiputera individuals received the largest share of the loans through the 
ASN loan scheme (the National Unit Trust Scheme) to purchase trust units which 
would have a market value depending on the market value of the portfolio of 
investments held by the scheme. 
Lending activities of saving banks were specified or subjected to some limitation 
since most of these banks were operated by Government. In compliance with the 
statutory requirement, the saving banks in Malaysia invested the bulk of its new 
resources in Federal Government securities. 
PROVIDENT, PENSION AND INSURANCE FUNDS 
Provident, pension and insurance funds are a group of financial schemes 
designed to provide members and their dependents with a measure of social security in 
the form of retirement, medical, death or disability benefits. 
In practise, all employers including the Government are required to adopt some 
form of social security scheme to protect the welfare of their employees. In Malaysia, 
the provident, pension and insurance funds consisted of the Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF), the Social Security Organisation (SOCSO), the Armed Forces Fund (AFF), the 
Teachers Provident Fund (TPF) and the seven largest separately constituted private 
pension funds, and life insurance funds provided the largest source of long-term 
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financing for the public sector. To widen the investment portfolio of the EPF, the 
Employees Provident Fund Act, 1991 which was passed by Parliament in March 1991 
would enable the EPF to widen its investments into immovable properties, promissory 
notes and bills of exchange. In addition, the Fund could also invest in joint venture or 
participate in privatisation programmes with prior approval of the Minister of Finance. 
For the contributions towards EPF, employers contributed 11 per cent and employee 
contributed 9 per cent of employee's monthly gross wage. 
INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The financial intermediary role of insurance companies are not as obvious as 
that of banks and other non-bank financial institutions because they are more associated 
with minimisation of and compensation for risks. Insurance companies accept funds in 
the form of premiums from those they insure and stand ready to pay off on the risks 
they insure. They also invest the funds they received, thus acting as a lender. Their 
liabilities were mainly in the form of insurance premium. Loans would also be 
extended to corporate and policy holders. Insurance companies in Malaysia were 
mainly private companies. As at the end of 1990, there were 58 registered insurers 
which comprised of 3 life companies, 39 general companies, 15 composite companies 
and one reinsurance company. In addition, there was Takaful Malaysia, the only 
Islamic insurance registered. 
(d) MALAYSIA E X P O R T C R E D I T INSURANCE (MECIB) 
MECIB was incorporated in 1977 to provide insurance coverage to Malaysian 
exporters against the risk of non payment of foreign buyers. In 1989 it launched a Bond 
Indemnity Support Facility to provide guarantees to commercial banks to encourage the 
issuance of bonds to support overseas projects. In March 1990, a new export credit 
insurance/guarantee scheme known as Bankers' Export Finance, was launched to 
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protect commercial banks and other financial institutions against default or non 
payment of advances taken by exporters or their suppliers. 
INDUSTRIAL FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
The industrial finance institutions comprise Sabah Development Bank, 
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance (MIDF) and its subsidiary, Malaysian 
Industrial Estates Ltd. (MIEL), Development Bank of Malaysia (BPMB), Industrial 
Bank of Malaysia (IBM) and Borneo Development Corporation. These institutions 
mainly cater for enterprises in the industrial sector. Total resources of these institutions 
expanded by 8.3 per cent to M$3,459 million at the end of 1990, arising mainly from 
larger borrowings and paid up capital. Total borrowings were mainly from both 
domestic and international sources which increased by 31.9 per cent to M$l,538 
million at end of 1990 with the larger funding provided by the Central Bank and the 
ASEAN-Japan Development Fund (AJDF). The share of total borrowings to total 
resources at end of 1990 was 44.5 per cent. The Federal and State Governments, the 
Central Bank and Government agencies were the main providers of credits to the 
industrial finance institutions, accounted for 64.8 per cent or M$997 million of their 
total borrowings at the end of 1990. Shareholders' funds constituted 21.1 per cent of 
total resources. Total credit extended by the industrial finance institutions increased by 
17.6 per cent to M$2,073 million at end of 1990. The share of outstanding credit to 
total assets were 60 per cent at the end of 1990 compared to 55.2 per cent at the end of 
1989. These industrial finance institutions expanded their trade financing by providing 
letter of credit facilities. They also diversified into venture capital operations and had 
programmes to assist SMEs engaged in manufacturing, particularly in the technical 
aspects of operations such as quality assurance and control, machinery utilisation, 
design and production process. 
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A G R I C U L T U R A L C R E D I T INSTITUTIONS 
Agricultural credit was mainly extended by three major groups of institutions. 
They were the banking system, Government development agencies and rural credit 
institutions. The banking system comprised of the commercial banks, finance 
companies and merchant banks. Government development agencies included the 
Federal Development Authority, and Sabah Development Bank while the rural credit 
institutions included Bank Pertanian Malaysia (BPM), Bank Rakyat, Farmers' 
organisations, cooperatives, agro based cooperative societies and the rural credit 
cooperatives in Sabah and Sarawak. The rural credit institutions were the main 
depositories of the savings of the rural populations and hence they had their main 
liabilities in the form of savings and fixed deposits. The bulk of their funds were lent 
out to agricultural and other rural activities. Total loans granted to the agricultural 
sector by the Agricultural credit institutions in Malaysia, at the end of 1990 were 
M$9,738 million an increase of M$690 million or 7.7 per cent from the previous year. 
URBAN C R E D I T C O O P E R A T I V E S O C I E T I E S 
The Urban Credit Cooperative Societies provided consumer credit and served as 
a channel for investment by their members. Total resources were mainly from share 
subscriptions and deposits. 
PILGRIMS MANAGEMENT AND FUND BOARD 
The Pilgrims Management and Fund Board was formed to mobilise the savings 
of Muslims and also to assist Muslims in their performing the pilgrimage. Resources 
were mainly from deposits which contributed 85 per cent of total resources in 1990. 
Total resources at end of 1990 were M$ 1,234 million. Investments of the Fund were 
mainly in corporate securities (M$588 million invested at the end of 1990). 
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UNIT TRUSTS, G I L T - E D G E D UNIT TRUST AND P R O P E R T Y TRUST 
Unit Trusts serve as a medium through which small individual investors can 
acquire a share in a diversified portfolio of corporate securities, government securities 
and real property. 
S P E C I A L INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS 
Komplek Kewangan Malaysia Berhad (KKMB), the Bumiputera Investment 
Foundation and its subsidiary, the National Equity Corporation (PNB) are institutions 
closely related to the unit trusts, established to promote the ownership of share capital 
by the indigenous population in Malaysia. 
OTHERS 
Other types of financial institutions that contribute to greater diversification of 
the financial structures but were seldom mentioned were the pawnshops. They did not 
have savings facilities but were involved in lending which still meet the emergency 
loans needed by the public and are now being supervised by the Government. 
PAWNSHOPS 
Pawnshops involve in lending money that is known as pawnbroking where loans 
are pledged on any item that can be of value. In pawnbroking, the pawn broker will 
appraise the value of the pawn (items can be anything from a watch, radio, and even 
cloth. But valuables like jewellery and gold or silver ornaments are commonly pawned) 
and the borrower simply sells the item to the pawnbroker on the condition that he (the 
borrower) buys back the item within a specified time for the same amount plus interest. 
If the borrower does not buy back the item, the broker may sell or keep it for himself. 
Pawnbroking is an attractive way of moneylending because of the low risk and 
low transaction costs involved. Appraisal time taken by the pawnbroker to appraise the 
value of the pawn usually takes a few minutes, therefore loan transaction in 
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pawnbroking occurs within a short period of time. Additionally, loan administration is 
simple and straightforward with no lengthy procedures and no lengthy forms to be 
filled. Moreover, the seller of the item or borrower who pledges the item, may use the 
funds for purpose of consumption, productive investment or capital formation. 
It was reported in the national Malaysian rural credit survey of 1986 that 
pawnbroking was the most important source of informal lending in Malaysia's rice 
producing areas (Bouman, 1989). 
T H E FINANCIAL S Y S T E M IN INDONESIA 
The financial system in Indonesia is basically composed of the banking system 
and the formal non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). At the end of 1977, total assets 
of the financial system totalled R$7,852,897 million compared to R$ 1,659,819 in 
1973. As at the end of 1979, there were 799 state owned bank offices, 102 private 
owned bank offices, 22 foreign bank branches and 186 domestic non foreign exchange 
banks totalling 1,109 of bank offices in all. The population per bank office ratio was 
135,220 in December 1979 (Nasution, 1983). However Yan (1984) reported that in 
Indonesia, a vast and underdeveloped economy, banking offices were found to be 
concentrated in the major towns. Frings (1988) supported the view by reporting that 
state and private national banking business was concentrated on the island of Java 
where Jakarta, the capital city, and the more affluent 100 million of the country's 
population are. Jakarta, was even reported to be overbanked. However, Yan (1984) 
further reported that each banking office was serving an average of 148,700 persons in 
1982. Its per capita M2 was only US$121 and per capita deposit was US$89, the lowest 
in the region of ASEAN countries. Its total financial assets/GNP ratio was 0.55 for the 
same year. In 1989, Indonesia's lower M2/GNP ratio of 0.31 also indicated a slow rate 
of penetration of the commercial banking system in the country (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1991). 
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T H E BANKING S Y S T E M 
The Banking system is the most important segment of the Indonesian financial 
system. In the period between 1973 and 1977, the banking system contributed about 96 
to 98 per cent of the financial system total assets. Its banking offices are also more 
widespread than the offices of NBFIs. At the end of March 1978 there were 134 
banking head offices with 1141 branches (Nasution, 1983) in the country. 
In the early days of Indonesia, the banking system was primarily for financing 
Dutch private enterprises in the colony. Under the "Guided" economy of President 
Sukarnoe, the Dutch banks and some other foreign banks were nationalised, while other 
foreign banks were closed down. The Dutch bank Javasche Bank, was nationalised and 
became Bank of Indonesia by statute in 1953 and it had the power to issue currency but 
it was also involved with commercial banking. The nationalisation of branch offices of 
foreign banks in Indonesia and excessive control of foreign exchange, had disconnected 
the link between domestic banks and the overseas money market. In its anti Western 
stance, Western aid was rejected, and Indonesia withdrew from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, United Nations, and other international 
organisations. In 1960s, Indonesia experienced constant inflation (due to budget deficit 
because of high Government expenditure and subsidies), widespread price control and 
political instability (to liberate West Irian from Dutch in 1959-1962, the rebellion in the 
outer islands in 1959-1960, and the confrontation against Malaysia in 1963-1965). The 
people at that time distrusted the banking system because there were several deposit 
freezes, bank failures and monetary purges. People even went back to barter trading 
and reversed the monetisation of the economy (Nasution, 1983). In May 1965, the 
central bank, three state commercial banks, one state savings bank, and state 
pawnshops were consolidated into one single institution called Bank Negara Indonesia 
(Indonesian State Bank), composed of five units. However, under the New Order 
regime of President Suharto who came to power in September 1965, a series of new 
banking laws was introduced by Bank Indonesia to reorganise the banking institutions. 
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The single Bank Negara Indonesia was reorganised into separate banks namely the 
central bank, one development bank, one savings bank, and five state owned 
commercial banks with defined functions for each. The commercial bank department of 
Bank Indonesia was transferred to other state commercial banks. Since then, Bank 
Indonesia has taken the role of Central Bank as the country's sole issuer of currency, a 
banker's bank and bank to the Government, a controller of foreign exchange, regulator 
of financial institutions except insurance companies. 
The banking system in Indonesia was allowed to extend medium and long term 
loans as well as capital participation in non bank business ventures. Direct credits were 
extended to non financial institutions to finance the implementation of Government 
programmes. Additionally, commercial banks were also encouraged to finance credit 
for small agriculture, small businesses, handicraft industries and other traditional 
enterprises. 
Contacts with the West were re-established and Indonesia rejoined the IMF, 
World Bank, and other international organisations. To overcome constraints in capital 
and technical skills, foreign investors were invited. Foreign banks were allowed to 
open their branches and sub branches but only in Jakarta and a joint venture bank was 
allowed to operate in Surabaya, as protection for state owned and national private banks 
outside Jakarta. 
Resumption of diplomatic and economic ties with Malaysia and Singapore 
allowed the resumption of regional trade and reopened avenues to international markets 
and also finance. 
With political and economic stability, people's confidence in money and 
banking was gradually restored. 
T H E C E N T R A L BANK 
Bank Indonesia became the central bank by statute on July 1, 1953. However, it 
was not until 1968 under the "New Order" regime that it began to function as a pure 
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central bank (Nasution, 1983). As the central bank, Bank Indonesia is the sole issuer of 
the Rupiah, the Indonesian currency. Other roles and responsibilities of the central 
bank are to hold the official international reserves of the country, supervise and 
regulate all financial institutions (with exception of insurance companies) and NBFIs. 
Bank Indonesia is also responsible for the preparation and implementation of the 
monetary policy under the direction of the Economic Stabilization Council, a 
governmental advisory body chaired by the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, 
Finance, Industry and Development Supervision, and consisting of the Minister of 
Finance, the Minister of Trade and the State Minister of National Development 
Planning. Under the direction of the Government the bank also regulates the money 
supply, credit policy and interest rates through its portfolio-cum-selective credit policy 
(Nasution, 1983). Bank credit was allocated directly through selective credit control by 
setting interest rates for short term loans higher than those of the longer term loans. 
Priorities of credit uses were by economic sector, economic activities and recipients 
determined by directives from the authorities. Rediscounting facilities at the Central 
Bank were restricted to state banks and only occasionally available for domestic private 
banks on a limited basis. The purpose of the rediscounting facilities was mainly to 
subsidize state banks where in many instances their average interest rates on savings 
and time deposits were higher than their average lending rate. Due to the selective 
credit policy, there were different levels of interest rates at the state banks. At private 
banks, NBFIs, and at the interbank money market, there were also different levels of 
unregulated interest rates. 
Scarce availability of credit and high interest rates for non priority sectors and 
non favoured borrowers such as multinationals and Chinese-owned businesses, had 
encouraged capital inflows to meet their demand of credit. The red tape and time 
consuming administrative procedures in applying for credit from state banks was also a 
contributing factor for prime business establishments to have borrowed from abroad. 
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Reserve requirements were also imposed on commercial banks. The definitions 
of reserves and current liabilities were changing from time to time with changes in its 
monetary policy. However, different ownership of banks (state, foreigners, private 
nationals) was subjected to different definition of reserve base which therefore imposed 
different effective reserve requirement even though the reserve ratio was made uniform 
for all banks. But as each group of banks served a different class of customers, 
interbank funds movement were said to be minimal during periods of tight money 
(Nasution, 1983). 
The Central Bank also acts as an adviser and a banker to the Government. 
Activities of the Bank are supervised by a commissioner appointed by the President, 
and the Bank is required to submit annual and supplemental budgets to the Government 
for approval. The governor of the Bank and his managing directors are appointed by 
the President for a term of five years. 
C O M M E R C I A L BANKS 
Commercial banking in Indonesia is the main source of financing for firms in 
Indonesia as the capital market was reported to be undeveloped (Frings, 1988). 
In October 1968, savings and time deposits were introduced and savings 
schemes were introduced in 1969. Until May 1969, the Central Bank had to subsidise 
the interest cost of savings schemes to commercial banks because the interest rates paid 
on savings and time deposits exceeded the average interest rates earned on their loans. 
When the Government started its five years development programme starting from 
1969, the subsidy on interest at state banks was abolished. In 1969, state banks started 
to offer government guarantee and tax free high interest rates on time and savings 
deposits. Tax facilities was also made available to savings schemes deposits at non state 
banks. In 1973, special concession credit programmes to promote the development of 
the indigenous SSEs were introduced. They included the Kredit Industri Kecil (KIK) or 
Small Investment Credit and Kredit Modal Kerja Pemasaran (KMKP) or Small 
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Permanent Working Capital Credit offered to all sectors in the economy. In Indonesia, 
the commercial banks formed the largest institutions which contributed 47.9 per cent of 
its total financial assets. As at 31 December 1979, there were 5 state owned 
commercial banks, 83 private national banks and 10 branches of foreign banks 
(Nasution, 1983). 
D E V E L O P M E N T BANKS 
Development banks raise funds from time and savings deposits and the issuance 
of medium and long term financial papers. In 1978, there were 28 development banks 
of which one is Government owned, one privately owned, and 26 owned by provincial 
governments (Nasution, 1983). The responsibilities and functions of the state 
development bank were to assist the Government in financing its development projects. 
Since 1966 the state development bank became a commercial bank. 
Provincial development banks were established by provincial governments to 
finance development projects in their jurisdiction. Besides acting as provincial cashiers 
they also handles demand deposits like commercial banks. 
SAVINGS BANKS 
Savings banks in Indonesia are non deposit money banks. Their sources of funds 
are mainly from saving and the uses of funds are mainly in trading of financial paper. 
In March 1978, there were one state savings bank and six small private savings banks. 
NON BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Non bank financial institutions that were in operation in Indonesia were the 
rural banks, pawnshops, insurance companies, the Development Finance Corporation 
and the Investment Finance Corporation. The main source of funds for the NBFIs were 
the International Development Association and the World Bank. 
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R U R A L BANKS 
In Indonesia, rural banks were classified according to their clients that they 
served namely, employees, village, paddy and petty traders. At the end of March 1978, 
there were 5928 branches of rural banks which were under the supervision of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia with guidance of the Central Bank. The three types of rural banks 
were the village banks which were mainly concerned with extending small loans to 
farmers; the Paddy Banks which extends rice loans to members in the village; and the 
Petty Traders' Bank which extends loans to petty traders. 
PAWNSHOPS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 
State pawn service came under the supervision of the Directorate General of 
Domestic Monetary Affairs, Ministry of Finance while the insurance companies came 
under the supervision of the Directorate of Financial Institution, the Directorate 
General of Domestic and Monetary Affairs, Ministry of Finance. At the end of March 
1978 there were one head office with 441 branches for the pawnshops; and 53 
insurance companies head offices with 259 branches. 
FINANCE COMPANIES 
The Development Finance Corporation concentrates its activities on medium 
and long term financing and equity participation while the Investment Finance 
Corporation's main activities were to act as intermediaries and underwriters of financial 
papers and to finance medium and long term investments. At the end of March 1978 
there were 2 development finance corporation head office with 2 branches. As at the 
same date, there were 10 Investment Finance Corporation head offices with 10 
branches. Nine out of the twelve finance corporations were joint ventures between 
public and private enterprises. State commercial banks or the Central bank were the 
majority participating shareholders in the NBFIs and through NBFIs, the state banks 
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and the Central bank extend short term credits and invest in sectors and activities that 
the banks themselves could not reach. 
The finance companies in Indonesia, were limited to issuing promissory notes 
and other papers in their fund gathering activity. They contributed 2 per cent of its 
financial system's total assets (Tison, 1986 p:28). 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN SINGAPORE 
Singapore which was reported to have led in terms of economic performance 
was also reported to be the most financially developed among the ASEAN countries. 
Yan (1984) found that Singapore had a broad network of banking offices, each serving 
an average of only 7,300 persons in 1982. The development was also reflected in a 
high per capita M2 (M2 being private sector liquidity) of US$4,314 and per capita 
deposits of US$4,519. Its financial assets/GNP of 2.74 in the same year indicated its 
monetisation and financial deepening where financial assets had increased at a much 
more rapid rate than its non-financial wealth. 
Singapore was also reported to be a major international financial centre (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 1991). With foreign exchange averaging some US$80 billion a day, 
Singapore was considered the fourth most important foreign exchange centre in the 
world after New York, Tokyo and London (Balakrishnan, 1991). 
At the end of March 1991, there were 137 commercial banks and 71 investment 
banks operating in Singapore with almost all the world's leading financial institutions 
represented except the Bank of Credit and Commerce International which failed to get 
an operating license despite having applied several times. Reports have shown that 
there has not been a single bank failure in Singapore since it gained independence in 
1965. 
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BANKING SYSTEM 
The banking system comprises the monetary institutions whose principal 
liabilities are generally accepted as money . 
THE CENTRAL BANK 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) was reported to be the most powerful, 
politically independent central bank in ASEAN (Balakrishnan, 1991). Except for 
issuing of currency, the MAS is responsible for overseeing virtually all other financial 
matters in Singapore, including monitoring commercial and investment banks, the stock 
and future exchanges, and the insurance industry. 
Singapore has few controls on how much money that can be taken in or out of 
the country for off-shore transactions. However, Singapore does not allow the local 
currency to be internationalised, to be borrowed for projects or acquisitions elsewhere. 
This has made Singapore the only financial centre of any stature whose currency cannot 
be freely traded (Balakrishnan, 1991). 
The value of the Singapore dollar is measured against a basket of the country's 
main trading partners' currencies. 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
The commercial banks dominate the financial structures of Singapore in terms 
of assets, deposits mobilised and credit extended. Singapore had (excluding the off 
shore banks) 51 commercial banks with 250 branches as at the end of 1984 (Tison, 
1986). The leading role of commercial banks could be explained partly by the fact that 
they are the first institutions to emerge in the organised sector of the financial structure. 
Their early establishment enabled them to reap the benefits associated with the pioneer 
in the financial service industry without competition from other organised 
intermediaries. An oligopoly granted them for accepting demand deposits and dealing 
in international trade financing and foreign exchange, which principally distinguishes 
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the commercial banks from other financial institutions. At the end of March 1991, there 
were 239 local bank branches which also owns securities houses, finance, insurance 
and property companies (Balakrishnan, 1991). 
FINANCE COMPANIES 
In Singapore, the finance companies raised funds by regular deposits (savings 
and fixed deposits and certificates of deposits) in addition to issuing their own papers. 
In Singapore, the finance companies accounted for 5 per cent of its financial system's 
total assets (Tison, 1986 p:28). 
MERCHANT BANKS 
Singapore has the largest number of merchant banks in ASEAN and they are all 
multinationals. 
SAVINGS BANKS 
Singapore still had post office savings banks in 1984. However, in 1984, a 
legislature amendment to the charter of the Post Office Savings Bank of Singapore 
authorised it to accept chequing accounts. The Post Office Savings Bank of Singapore 
participated actively in the money market as supplier of funds and had set up joint 
ventures with other financial institutions. The bulk of savings bank funds went to the 
government and other public enterprises either in the form of direct loans or purchases 
of Government Securities. 
PROVIDENT AND PENSION FUNDS 
These institutions have a captive market since all employees with a few 
exception have to contribute regularly to their funds. In view of this, provident and 
pension funds could gather a sizeable amount of funds, the investment of which could 
have a substantial impact in the financial market. The regular contributions of members 
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and the more predictable nature of cash outflows, would make the pool of funds 
gathered ideal for long term investment. In Singapore, both employer and employee 
contributed equal shares. 
OTHERS 
Pawnshops are also found in Singapore. In 1990, it was reported that 
pawnshops in Singapore lent as high as S$700 million (or $260 for every Singaporean) 
compared to S$513 in 1985 (Veloo, 1991). Loan period from pawnbrokers may be up 
to six months though extension may be granted with continual payment of interest. It 
was reported that generally people who cannot get a bank loan or qualify for credit 
cards to pay their bills go into debt at the pawnshops and these borrowers were no 
longer only those of the lower income bracket. Direction of loan is not available but 
presumably they are for consumption purposes. Moreover, the problem was refered by 
the Prime Minister as the "middle class squeeze" due to people whose earnings do not 
qualify for welfare, but desire some finer things in life that they could not afford. In 
Singapore failure to redeem the pawned items were reported to be less than 10 per cent. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINANCE THEORY, INSTITUTIONS AND SMALL FIRMS 
INTRODUCTION 
Business is about making profits and profits will be determined by the way in 
which resources of the business in terms of capital, physical resources, people and 
other elements were being organised. In organising the firm, the business 
owner/manager faces many problems; and securing funds for the business venture 
seems to be a major problem throughout the life of the firm. From the stage of business 
idea to that of profit returns, finance is needed for the initial capital, working capital, 
and buffer capital to sustain business at existing level and also to stay in business during 
bad times and emergencies. Harper (1984) suggested that most small business people 
believed that shortage of capital was their major i f not their only problem. The more 
readily finance could be obtained, the more easily it seemed that other difficulties and 
constraints could be overcome. Not only the firm's growth from entrepreneurial 
activity would be constrained by lack of finance, but undercapitalisation could cause 
the firm to fail. 
Whenever finance is needed for the firm, the owner/manager of the firm 
seeking finance, needs to identify the types of finance that he needs and the different 
sources of finance available because the suitability of different sources of finance 
appears to vary according to the needs of the firm. For example, it would appear to be 
inappropriate to borrow on overdraft to finance the purchase of building. The amount, 
the type and the timing of finance needed and the reliance on credit in general may 
vary by type of enterprise. 
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL ENTERPRISE 
The traditional view of the financial life cycle of the firm based on Evans' 
Hypothesis is that the life cycle of the firm has an influence on the pattern of financing 
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(Ray and Hutchinson, 1986). According to Weston and Brigham (1978) the hypothesis 
suggests that there are three stages of growth in a business firm which might be 
referred to as (i) the early stage (ii) the maturity stage (iii) the levelling stage. 
Table 4.1: The Traditional View < Off The Ftaanda il Life Cycle Off The Firm 
Stage Source of 
finance 
Potential 
problem 
Managerial 
Characteristics 
Inception Owner's 
resource 
Under 
capitalisa-
tion 
Personal 
Growth I As above 
plus: 
retained 
profits, 
trade 
credits, 
bank loans 
and 
overdrafts, 
hire 
purchase, 
leasing. 
Overtrading, 
liquidity 
crisis 
Growth I I As above 
plus: 
Longer term 
finance from 
financial 
institutions 
Finance Gap? Competent 
Management 
Growth III As above 
plus: 
New Issue 
Market 
Loss of 
Control 
Competent 
Management 
Maturity All sources 
Available 
Maintaining 
ROI 
Decline Withdrawal 
finance, 
Firm taken 
over, 
liquidation 
Falling ROI Insufficient 
management 
foresight 
Source: Weston and Brigham (1978); Ray and Hutchinson (1983) 
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In developing the traditional view of the financial life cycle of the firm, Weston 
and Brigham (1978) suggested six stages for enterprise development. They are the 
inception stage, growth I , growth I I , growth I I I , maturity stage and decline. Each stage 
of the Weston and Brigham model is characterised by financial and managerial profile. 
The elaboration of the traditional view of financing of the small growing firms states 
that small firms start by relying upon the owner's resources and the start up stage is 
often accompanied by under capitalisation. The initial period of growth is characterised 
by over trading where the sales of the firm expand more quickly than its financial 
resources. Since owner's personal resources are usually already commited to the 
business, and since there is no easily available market for raising new equity, it means 
raising longer term loans from financial institutions and seeking venture capital ( Ray 
and Hutchinson, 1986). 
Hisrich (1989) categorised the stages of business development funding into (i) 
Early stage Financing (ii) Expansion or Development Financing and (iii) Acquisition 
and Leverage Buyout Financing. At the early stage of financing, two types of financing 
are said to occur. They are seed capital and start up. Seed capital is the relatively small 
amount of funds needed to prove concepts and finance feasibility studies; while start up 
finance is needed to develop and test initial products or services to determine if 
commercial sales are feasible. Funds at this early stage are mentioned as usually 
difficult to obtain from external finance. 
The expansion or development financing is known to consist of the second stage 
where funds are used as working capital to support initial growth; the third stage where 
the company is at break even or a positive profit level and uses funds for major sales 
expansion; and the fourth stage where funds are used as bridge financing in the period 
when the company prepares to go public. For the final type of financing, Acquisitions 
or Leveraged buyout Financing, funds are used to buy out present owners or to enable 
a publicly held firm to become a private company. 
96 
MATCHING OF MATURITIES 
It is commonly known in the finance literature that financing strategy should be 
based on the matching of assets and liabilities. This implies that short term assets 
should be financed only by short term funds. By using th© shortest possible maturity, 
this means minimising risk and possibly minimising capital costs i f we assume that the 
short term interest rate is less than the long term rat©. 
Tabic 4.2i FtoanBcimg Wortdimg CapfiteHs A staple medoQ 
$ 
Financed by 
short-term 
credit 
Fixed assets 
Financed by 
• long-term 
1 1 l 
capital 
4 Tim® period 
Source: Levy and Samat (1988, p. 471) 
In the simple model it illustrates that resources acquired at the beginning of the 
production period are used up during the period and resources fully reacquired at the 
beginning of the next period. However, in the uncertainty of the real world, firms have 
reserves of cash, inventories and account receivables which in a sense are considered as 
the fixed portion of the firm's current assets. Hence, the matching strategy is to employ 
long term funds to finance fixed assets plus the fixed portion of current assets, and the 
short term funds to finance only those current assets that fluctuate over the firm's 
operating cycle. The component of current assets which is financed by long term funds 
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is defined as the net working capital (the excess of current assets over current 
liabilities). 
Table 4.3: Financing Workimg Capitol Umdop Umceirtoiinifty 
f Fluctuating current assets 
^Short-term 
financing 
Permanent current assets 
Fixed assets 
1 1 1 1 1 1 i l 1 1 I 1 J 
Financed by 
• long-term 
capital 
Time period 
Source: Levy and Sarnat (1988, p.472) 
Table 4.4; The Working Capitol 
Current Current 
assets liabilities 
Nei working 1 
capital! | Long-term 
Fixed 
assets 
debt 
and equity 
Source: Levy and Sarnat (1988, p.472) 
Some writers regard the firm's financing needs as the firm's cummulative 
capital requirement which is defined as the cost of both current and fixed assets and 
should be financed mainly by long term sources. This viewpoint suggests that the long 
term finance is the determinant of short term finance. The implication is that if the 
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raised long term finance exactly meets the cummulative capital requirement, the firm 
faces no financial constraints; if the raised funds are less than the cummulative capital 
requirement, the firm has to borrow on a short term basis to bridge the gap; and if the 
raised long term finance exceeds the firm's cummulative capital requirement the firm 
has the opportunity to invest the excess raised funds. However, why should the firm 
raise funds in excess of its needs? If the firm invest the excess funds on other activities, 
it would imply that the returns on this particular activity of the excess funds must be 
greater than or at least equal to the cost of the long term finance. Even if the raised 
long term finance meets the cummulative capital requirements, some of the funds may 
not be put to use as yet, as not all assets are bought at the same time. These unused 
funds, as a form of short term assets may need interest payments which may be long 
term based. Additionally, when the raised long term finance falls short for the firms 
cummulative capital requirement, and the difference financed by short term financing 
(which obviously has shorter maturity period), this may result in using the short term 
financing to finance long term assets. 
Some writers view that there are strong similarities between a long term 
financing and a lengthy finance relationship of a sequence of short term financing. This 
view is based on the notion that a long standing lender-borrower relationship will 
enable short term loans to be extended even in bad period and makes the maturity 
period of such loans indefinitely long. This means that short term loans are often 
granted with mutual expectation of the borrower and the lender that the loan will be 
renewed. Even when the unexpected happens, the lender is not expected to reject the 
renewal of the short term loan. 
However, the borrower's application for short term loans should be based on his 
financing needs according to investment plans and lenders should advance loans only 
after assessing the borrower's application and other factors. Perhaps, the lender may 
wish to put the funds to other use in investments which may bring higher returns or less 
risk. Therefore, loan renewals should not be expected to be often granted. 
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The matching of maturities is not an easy task especially for newly established 
enterprises because their financial needs have to be predicted which requires an 
assessment of their future investment plans (both short term and long term), with 
consideration of the currency of the debt portfolio (if assets and/or liabilities are held 
overseas), and the interest rate (fixed or floating). 
Future investment plans depend on the future expected market share, the 
availability of finance and the cost of financing. To the established enterprises, the 
matching of maturities of assets and debt maturities depends to a large extent on their 
experience in the business world. 
However, the matching concept should be the basis for determining the 
financing needs of the firm to avoid the consequences of unmatched maturities. 
Financing decisions should be based on facts for a sound planning policy. 
SOURCES OF FINANCE 
In every society, lending and borrowing does take place. The amount, the type 
and the timing of this financing and the extent of the reliance on credit in general may 
vary enormously by place, and by type of enterprise. Peterson and Shulman (1987) had 
showed that the capital structure of growing firms depends on age, size of the level of 
economic development of the country. There are also decisions to be made that 
influence the amount of funding required by directly affecting the risk accepted by the 
entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs with different attitudes to risk aversion could have 
different financial requirement for the same project. However, for a given level of risk 
aversion, the amount of finance required for a given project will be determined by the 
costs established in the market confronted. 
The influences of religion and beliefs, on work, saving, risk-taking and other 
elements of entrepreneurial behaviour may vary widely and can be most important. 
Religious prohibitions on loan interest (as in Islam) may or may not discourage 
participation in schemes with such charges. The charges may sometimes be reclassed as 
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administration fees or profit sharing to the satisfaction of the borrowers or lenders. 
Interest sometimes is concealed also by requirements that a loan issued in one 
commodity be repaid in another. 
The efficiency and risk aversion of external equity investors also affects the 
volume of funds available to entrepreneurs. The more unsuccessful external investors 
are at assessing risk, entrepreneurial visions, the entrepreneurial team, the more 
inaccessible external equity becomes. Providers of debt finance can constrain the firm's 
activity if they overdiscount the value of the firm's assets. Imperfections may also be 
present in the finance market. 
There are broadly two types of financing available, namely internal financing 
and external financing. 
INTERNAL FINANCING 
Internally generated financing can come from several sources from the firm 
itself such as retained profits, sales of assets, reduction in working capital, credit from 
suppliers and account receivables (Hisrich, 1989). While self financing (generated from 
accumulated wealth and savings of the entrepreneur, personal loans and/or sales of 
personal properties and assets) is believed to be the most important source of start up 
capital (Choy, 1990), it is the traditional view of financing of the firm that additional 
funds are needed to be raised to sustain growth. While funding problems as well as 
costs of funds are said to be different at each stage of development of the firm, the start 
up stage is particularly often costly and difficult to obtain through external finance. 
Thus, the start up years may usually involve retaining all profits and reinvesting them 
back into the firm to finance growth. 
Sometimes the needed funds can be generated internally by selling off little-used 
assets of the firm. However, wherever possible, in a start up stage, assets should be on 
a rental basis and not ownership basis as long as the terms are favourable. 
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Reducing short term assets inventory, cash and other working capital items may 
also contribute to the funds needed through internal financing. 
Internal financing can also be generated through credit from suppliers. By 
delaying the payment of bills, needed short term funds which would otherwise be used 
for the payment would be available to be put to other uses. However, care must be 
taken to ensure good relations with suppliers for continuous supply. 
Another source of internal financing is collecting bills more quickly, allowing 
short aging period in account receivables. However, the firm's owner/manager has to 
be careful in implementing the practise to maintain good customer relation. 
EXTERNAL FINANCING 
Owner/managers of firms may at some stage of the business venture, find it 
essential to seek additional funds through external financing. There are two forms of 
external financing, namely debt financing and equity finance. When considering the 
alternative sources of external financing that are available, evaluation is needed in 
terms of among others, the period of fund available, the costs involved in terms of 
interest rates and also in terms of the amount of company control lost. 
E Q U I T Y FINANCING 
Equity financing typically does not require collaterals as security but offers the 
investor some form of ownership of the firm. It is essentially a permanent risk of 
financing as it is not repayable and the investor has no assurance that he/she will 
receive payment for the use of his/her money. On the other hand, the whole profits of 
the firm, after its creditors and tax have been paid and any debt has been serviced, 
belongs to the equity holders. Since returns on the investment depend entirely on the 
outcome of the project, it is the investor's interests to conduct careful appraisal and 
monitoring of the project. Equity finance therefore inevitably incurs information 
gathering costs. Equity cost is determined by the price an investor will be prepared to 
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pay for a given share in the project, which varies from case to case in accordance with 
the distribution of expected returns of the project in question. Since monitoring costs 
contain a high fixed element which does not depend on size of the project, they may 
contribute in some way to the investors' apparent biasness against SMEs resulting to 
lack of SMEs' accessibility to equity finance. 
Equity finance may be required when the firm needs permanent capital for 
expansion and development, for technological innovation, and for refinancing of 
borrowings. 
Main sources of equity finance are investment trust companies, venture capital 
and other specialist investment institutions, pension funds, insurance companies and 
government agencies. Additional equity can be obtained from new external source or 
can be provided by present owner(s) of the firm. 
However, even when equity finance is available on terms comparable to those 
pertaining to large firms, some proprietors of small firms might not wish to take it on 
the grounds that the dilution of ownership and control from accepting outside equity 
reduces the attractions of running a small business. 
These arguments suggest that small firms are likely to be less dependent on 
external equity funds than large firms and also that external equity is likely to be a 
relatively minor source of funds for very small firms in particular. Oakey (1984) found 
that external equity capital was very little used by UK firms and that venture capital 
was a more important source of funds for firms in his US sample. However he 
suggested that the venture capital market is relatively well developed in that particular 
part of US where high technology firms are likely to be particularly attractive to 
potential equity stake holders. 
In Malaysia, the response for venture capital financing comes a little late 
considering that the Government had just set up a Joint Venture Trust in April 1990 but 
investment had not been carried out yet (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). In Singapore, a 
venture capital fund was set up by the Economic Development Board (EDB) to assist 
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local companies to acquire new technology or to diversify into new technology 
companies and also to support local entrepreneurship and innovation under its umbrella 
scheme which started in February 1987. When the project is successful, the local 
investors were given the opportunity to buy out the EDB's shares within a specified 
time period at a fair market price. Local companies in Singapore may also use the 
scheme to set up local venture capital funds jointly with EDB to undertake venture 
investments in Singapore or overseas. 
DEBT FINANCING 
Debt financing is a financing method involving an interest bearing loan. 
Repayment for debt is normally due according to an agreed schedule or after an agreed 
period of time while interest is payable regularly. Lending may be secured by fixed 
charges upon certain specified assets, or by a floating charge upon the whole of the 
assets of the firm, or both; or it may be unsecured. Banks' request for security or 
collateral is a step to limit the downside risk of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
While the adverse selection problem arises from hidden knowledge, moral hazard arises 
from hidden action. Adverse selection problem arises if borrowers know more than the 
banks about the riskiness of project returns, and if banks are unable to identify the 
specific riskiness of each particular project, they may find their risky lending 
unprofitable. Moral hazard arises when once a bank had made a loan to finance the 
particular project, the borrower is able to take actions that make the project riskier and 
may mean that the risky loans make losses. The willingness to offer collateral has the 
added attraction to the bank that it provides a positive signal about the borrower's own 
belief in the viability of the project. However, viable projects which are not supported 
with sufficient security to insure the bank against the downside risk may continue 
facing the problem of getting finance. Additionally, due to imperfections in banks' 
internal decision making processes such as the irrational bias and risk attitudes of credit 
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managers, some potentially profitable projects may not being funded by financial 
institutions. 
Some forms of lending have built-in security. In leasing finance for example, 
the title of assets being financed remains with the lender. Small firm owners may be 
able to offer as security their personal assets such as their house; or external guarantees 
may be available from family, friends or contacts. For firms borrowing under the 
Government's loan guarantee scheme complete security is provided on the percentage 
of such borrowing. Lenders are said to assume less risk when compared to equity 
investors because their claims have preference over the equity holders if a firm fails; 
and secured lenders have preference over the unsecured. 
The many forms of debt finance include among others, overdrafts, leasing, hire 
purchase, factoring, term loans and mortgages. These types of debt are usually 
described as short, medium or long term depending on the length of time before 
repayment is due. 
SHORT TERM FINANCE 
The term used to cover the repayment period may not be the same period of 
years, but short term finance usually refers to loans borrowed under three years (Bank 
of England, 1983). Short term finance is most suitable for financing transactions that 
are self-liquidating over a short period of time and to cover the working capital needed 
in the day-to-day running of business such as financing the fluctuations in saleable 
goods; increase in debtors; financing seasonal peaks and investment in short-lived 
assets. Investment in vehicles may also need short term finance. 
The traditional view of the financing of the firm suggested that small growing 
enterprise had great reliance on short term finance due to lack of access to capital 
market (Ray and Hutchinson, 1986). 
Main sources of short term finance are trade credits; accruals in taxes and other 
short term payments such as wages; bank credit in the form of short term loans and 
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overdrafts; bills of exchange; some hire purchase; discounting debtors; factoring 
debtors; customers' advance and some government incentive schemes. 
(a) Bank credit 
Banks are keen to lend money to businesses but are certainly not keen to have 
businesses default on their loan (Choy, 1990). Therefore, Bank credits are normally 
granted to firms that can show an evidence of their capability to repay. Short term 
financing available through bank credits are in the form of overdrafts and short term 
loans. 
(i) Overdrafts 
A bank overdraft is a widely used type of short term finance. It is particularly 
used to provide short term working capital for production cycle; finance seasonal 
requirements; and bridging loans for the purchase of assets with repayment coming 
from the realisation of another asset. 
The system of overdraft is simple where arrangements can be negotiated and be 
set up fairly quickly. It is also flexible in the way that amounts can be drawn or repaid 
within the agreed limit at any time entirely at the option of the borrower and without 
prior notice. Not only is overdraft a cheaper form of borrowing where interest is 
payable only on the amount outstanding each day; it is also generally renewable subject 
to the creditworthiness of the borrower and may be some other factors. The 
disadvantage of overdraft is that it is subject to periodic renewal and in general is 
inappropriate and risky for long term requirements of the firm. 
(ii) Short term loan 
A short term loan is usually made for a specific purpose rather than for general 
working capital. It has a more formalised term of repayment than overdraft. The 
interest rate may be fixed or set at variable interest. 
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(b) Trade credit 
Short term working capital can be added by making use of trade credits that 
suppliers extend. However, to depend on finance through trade credit may be risky and 
expensive i f cash discount is taken into considerations. 
(c) Bi l l Finance 
It is as a post dated cheque that can be sold for cash at a discount. It enables the 
seller of goods to obtain cash as soon as possible after goods are despatched while 
allowing the buyer to delay payments until the goods reach them. Bills of finance are 
usually used for imports and exports, and also to provide working capital. 
(d) Factoring 
Factoring is an arrangement where the factoring company purchases all the trade 
debts due to business as they arise and relieves the businessmen of debt collection; thus 
providing cash for the day to day needs of business. The cost of the services of the 
factor is a service fee which is normally expressed as a percentage of debts purchased. 
In Singapore for example, factoring is being offered at a rate of nine per cent 
per annum on a reducing balance by the Small Industry Finance Scheme (SIFS) through 
its Development Bank Finance programme. In addition, the firm had to pay an 
administrative fee which ranges from 0.25 per cent to 1.5 per cent of the gross invoice 
value factored. 
(e) Invoice discount 
Invoice discount is a means of generating cash by selling to a factoring company 
at a discount on a selection of invoices or the entire sales account. The cost of service 
is expressed as a percentage discount charged on finance used. 
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(ff) Hire purchase and other installment credit 
Short term finance through hire purchase agreement enables the firm to acquire 
the ownership of the goods after making an initial downpayment, and paying regular 
fixed amount over an agreed period which covers interest and the balance of capital 
cost. Interest charged is usually at a fixed rate for short term contracts, on the amount 
or value initially advanced. Security is provided by the goods being purchased as they 
remain the property of the finance company until final repayment is made, when the 
ownership passes to the firm. 
Credit sales may be offered instead of hire purchase and ownership is obtained 
at the outset. The borrower must however continue to pay the agreed payments. The 
security here is the borrower's promise to pay. The advantage of instalment credit is 
the flexibility on repayment terms which can be arranged to suit the firm's cash flow 
pattern, the absence of legal fees and the widespread availability of the facilities. 
The Malaysian Industrial Development Finance (MIDF) provides hire purchase 
arrangements for SMEs under its machinery finance scheme. Borrowers are required to 
provide at least 25 per cent of the price of plant or machinery and MIDF advances the 
balance and arranges for the borrower to repay over a period of not more than four 
years (Chee, 1986). 
(g) Government Incentive Schemes 
Government incentives may be in the form of tax incentives through tax 
exemptions, tax deductions and tax allowances; special loans; and grants provided 
under special schemes. For example, tax incentive in the form of pioneer status 
exempted firms from paying tax for a specified period of years while tax deductions 
relieved firms with a certain percentage of tax, and tax allowance benefited firms in the 
benefits received. Tax incentives would usually be granted to firms engaged in 
specified activities or promoted activities. 
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Short term finance through special loans schemes may include loans at 
concessionary interest rates and/or require no collaterals or guaratees. For example in 
Malaysia, under the Association Special Loan Scheme (ASLS) a maximum loan of up 
to M$2,000 is made available at free interest rate, repayable monthly over a repayment 
period of 24 months, and requires no security nor guarantor (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
1991). MARA also provides loans of M$2,000 each without collaterals or guarantee, 
for petty traders and hawkers especially those willing to start a business. Loans not 
exceeding M$3,000 under the Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGC) also require no 
collaterals and the maximum interest charged was set at 8.5 per cent per annum which 
was below the market rate of 12 per cent in 1986 (Chee, 1986). Collaterals were also 
not required for loans under the Hawkers and Petty Traders Scheme of the CGC where 
loans up to a maximum of M$ 10,000 each at a concessionary interest rate of 4 per cent 
were made available for SMEs (Latiff, 1990). 
M E D I U M TERM BORROWING 
Medium term finance is the term usually used to cover a period of three to ten 
years of borrowing (Bank of England, 1983). Typically medium term finance is raised 
by borrowing from the banks although other financial institutions also provide such 
finance. It may be secured or unsecured, and at either a fixed or variable rate of 
interest. Borrowings with variable rates may be advantageous over borrowing at a high 
fixed rate i f there is a possibility that the market rate will fall. On the contrary, variable 
rate borrowings can be disadvantageous at times of rising market interest rates. Term 
loans may be more expensive than overdrafts but with term loans the repayment date 
and schedule is certain and clear that the firm owner/manager can make necessary 
future plans without unnecessary uncertainties. 
Medium term finance is usually used for financing plant and machinery of the 
firm; general working capital; and overdraft funding. Main sources of medium term 
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finance are bank credits, other financial institutions' credits, public sector agencies, 
leasing companies, venture capital and other specialist investment institutions. 
(a) Term loams 
Medium term loans are provided by banks often as a part of a package of 
financial facilities. Repayment pattern may be set to suit the earning capacity of the 
asset being acquired or to match the overall cash flow of the firm. Thus, repayment 
may be immediate or after a short grace period, or after a long grace period, or it may 
be deferred until the end of the loan period. Interest rates are generally higher than 
short term loans. 
(b) Leasing 
A leasing arrangement is essentially a contract whereby the leasing organisation 
retains ownership of the leased equipment, while the firm has possession and use upon 
payment of agreed rentals over a specified period. 
(c) Instalment credit 
Instalment credits may also be available for the medium term as for the short 
term though agreements are usually not more than five years. 
(d) Government agencies 
In Malaysia, loans from the Industrial Adjustment Fund (IAF) through the 
Industrial Bank of Malaysia, the Development Bank of Malaysia (BPMB), and through 
MIDF are provided mainly for the purchase of new machinery, plant and equipment. 
Under IAF, the maximum lending rate was set at 7.75 per cent per annum and the 
repayment period must not exceed eight years. MIDF assists in the purchase of factory 
building and land through its Factory Mortgage Credit Scheme. Up to 80 per cent of 
the cost may be granted under such loans and the repayment period extends over three 
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to five years. Additionally MIDF also provides loans normally referred to as project 
loans for the financing of fixed assets such as factories, land, building, machinery and 
equipment. Through the Malaysian Industrial Estates Limited (MIEL), a subsidiary of 
MIDF, factory mortgage loans to assist in the purchase of factories are available and 
may be repaid by equal monthly instalments of principal and interest at prevailing rate 
over a period of 10 years or less. 
The Development Bank of Malaysia (BPMB) provides term loans to develop 
new entrepreneurs particularly in small scale sectors at special rates of interest from as 
low as five per cent. Additionally, under its Leasing and Plant Hire scheme, machinery 
together with operators and technical assistance are provided at special rates. 
LONG TERM FINANCE 
Long term finance usually refers to borrowings of more than ten years (Bank of 
England, 1983). Long term finance is usually needed for financing of buildings, 
permanent working capital and corporate acquisition. Sources of long term finance can 
be provided by the owners of the firm, banks, venture capital and specialist investment 
institutions, insurance companies, finance corporations, trust and private loans. 
(a) Term loans 
These are conventional loans for periods exceeding ten years. Rates of interest 
may be fixed or variable. Borrowers usually have to provide comprehensive 
information of past performance and future prospect in the application for the loan. 
Additionally, the loan normally requires a security tied to existing fixed assets of the 
firm. At times, an independent valuation of assets securing the loan is required by the 
lender but cost of valuation and investigation has to be paid by the borrower. 
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(b) Mortgage loan 
These are loans where specific assets in land and buildings are used as security. 
Interest rates are usually fixed but more flexible arrangements are increasingly being 
used. 
(c) Sales and Leaseback 
Sales and leaseback normally operate for property and large items of capital 
equipment. A company sells a specific major asset to a buyer and then leases it back on 
a rental. The advantage of this arrangement is that the firm's gearing (debt to equity 
ratio) is lower than with a conventional loan. 
(d) Government Agencies 
In Malaysia, Government agencies like BPMB also provide fixed asset loan and 
lease financing on a long term basis. MIEL offers long term credit on sale of modern 
factories that they construct in industrial estates. Long term secured loans to help small 
entrepreneurs to plan, equip and operate the factory are also available from MIDF. 
EXPORT FINANCE 
Other finance that a firm may need is export finance to develop export market 
and to finance export trade. Sources for export finance included banks, finance houses, 
factoring companies, foreign banks and government incentive schemes. 
FINANCING FROM THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
The informal sector seems to have a role in providing finance to entrepreneurs 
despite the expanding role of formal financial intermediaries. Contributing factors for 
the choice of raising finance from the informal sector include the simple and 
straightforward loan administration and procedures that do not require lengthy and 
bureaucratic paperwork, convenient opening hours, easy access and speedy loan 
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transaction service, experienced appraisers and no restrictions on the use of loan. Most 
common sources of financing from the informal sector are family members and friends 
(Choy, 1990). Connections and loose friendships may also lead to other sources of 
finance outside family members and close circle of friends. Other sources of financing 
from the informal sectors are the moneylenders and the rotating credit and savings 
associations. 
(a) Moneylenders 
Where moneylenders exist they may lend for production, distribution and 
consumption, or only for consumption. In Malaysia, the Chettiars were known for their 
specialising in moneylending. However, there are other people who lend money but do 
not seem to specialize in moneylending as a sole occupation. Frequently they are 
landlords, shopkeepers, produce buyers or dealers. Interest rates charged by 
moneylenders often appear usurious to their borrowers but they may be partly justified 
by high rates of inflation, high risk of lending, high cost of supervision on borrowers 
and the opportunity cost of capital. Furthermore moneylenders often lack the social 
networks of kinship, friendship or other informal associations by which pressure can be 
exerted on borrowers to ensure loan repayments. 
(i) Pawnbrokers 
Pawnbroking is a form of moneylending where the borrower sells an item to the 
pawnbroker on condition that he buys back the item within a specified time for the 
same amount plus interest. 
(b) Rotating credit and savings associations 
These locally organised groups occur in many regions of developing countries 
though not in every society (Ardener, 1964). They are known as Tontines (in French) 
or Huays, and are commonly found among Chinese and other Asian communities 
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(Choy, 1990). In Indonesia, it is called Arisan which literally means mutual help. In 
Malaysia and Singapore it is known as Kootu which in Tamil means cooperative 
endeavour (Shanmugam, 1991). 
The groups are based on the simple principle that in periodic meetings, all 
members contribute except one who takes home the total amount, and that each 
member has a turn as a recipient. The contributions may be fixed or variable, and so 
may the order of rotation. Interest may or may not be paid. However, where there is no 
fixed order of rotation for recipient, at each periodic meeting eligible members who are 
interested to get access to the fund have to make a bid with a premium that a member is 
willing to pay to the group (as an interest) for using the fund first. The member who 
makes the highest bid at the meeting will usually have access to the fund. Eligibillity to 
bid for use of the fund would depend on the number of shares the member has. Unless 
the member has more than one share, he is allowed to use the funds only once after 
which he is no more eligible to bid. The last person who uses the fund obviously does 
not need to pay any premium and obviously has benefited most from the premiums paid 
by other members. With the last member getting the funds, the tontine is terminated. 
Some governments discourage these associations, because their assets are 
difficult for the government to tax and control. There are even cases where a member 
(the one who does the collection of the contributions from members) had absconded 
with the pool of funds. In Malaysia, rotating credit and savings associations are 
prohibited by the Kootu Funds Prohibition Act 1971. Despite that, Kootu activities are 
still going on. Perhaps the multiple useful functions for borrowers brought about by the 
activities had contibuted to the survival of these associations. Not only does the rotating 
credit and saving association provide credit (for borrowers early in the cycle) but also 
savings (for those later in the cycle); they provide a form of insurance (order of 
disbursement may be altered in emergencies); and they serve as social gatherings. 
Among the advantages that these associations can offer over formal credit 
organisations are that they are conveniently located, accessible to the illeterate, and not 
1 
as intimidating as institutional offices. Also their funds are hard to embezzle. Where 
rotating credit associations exist, members commonly belong to several simultaneously; 
the associations thus serve to circulate funds through a capital short population in useful 
sums. Additionally, because they spring from local initiative, they can generate greater 
incentive and loyalty than other kind of lenders. 
Little is known about the durability of rotating savings and credit associations, 
nor is it yet clear whether they can serve as useful links between formal financial 
institutions and small entrepreneurs. In some regions, there may even be no readily 
apparent sources of credit at all. Yet credit may occur inconspicuously in the form of 
inter-familial exchanges, tributes to and redistributions by local authorities, brides' 
wealth and dowry, share contracting, and other practices often not recognised as credit. 
Nevertheless, a firm's financial needs are frequently met by employing a combination 
of both debt and equity finance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
ON 
FINANCING OF SMEs I N MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter wil l attempt to analyse and discuss the financing of SMEs in 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. In the analysis, firstly, the national development 
policy of each country wil l be looked into to identify each government's priority 
objective in promoting SMEs. Secondly, the business environment issues and 
Government policy to improve the business environment will be analysed to show those 
external environment factors that may affect the finance of SMEs. Thirdly, 
Government direct intervention policy through its financing programmes and activities 
will be analysed to identify the achievement of each country in filling up the financing 
gaps of SMEs. 
The analysis and discussion hope to answer the following questions: 
(a) Has the financial constraint on SMEs shifted such that institutional source of funds 
is no longer a major constraint? 
(b) Is there an over emphasis on the adequate provision of finance? 
(c) To identify i f there are any other significant gaps contributing to the problems in 
SMEs finance? 
(d) Should the Government develop and/or adopt a new set of programmes for 
financing of SMEs in these countries? 
Generally, any Government involvement in the promotion of SMEs was in due 
recognition of the significant role of SMEs in their contributions towards economic 
development. However, economic development varies from country to country, so does 
the potential of SMEs. In view of this, it is therefore believed that the promotion of 
SMEs in each country would be influenced by its development priorities spelt in their 
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development policies. In promoting SMEs, Government establishes policy and 
programmes to improve the business environment for SMEs and also provides facilities 
and incentives to redress the constraints faced by SMEs; and finance is known to be 
one of the major i f not the only constraint. 
To compare and discuss the financing of SMEs in Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore, we first need to look into the national development policies of each country. 
THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY OF MALAYSIA, INDONESIA 
AND SINGAPORE 
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Malaysia's national development policy 
goes back to the New Economic Policy (NEP) which was introduced during the period 
from 1971 to 1990 to eradicate poverty and to restructure the society so as to eliminate 
the identification of race with economic function. The restructuring of society involves 
the attempt to increase indigenous Bumiputera entrepreneurs and to encourage 
Bumiputera active participation in business ventures in all categories of enterprises and 
at all levels of operations. Building on the thrust of the NEP in eradicating poverty and 
restructuring society, the New Development Policy (NDP) which was formulated to 
cover the period from 1991 to 1995, emphasised growth with equity. In Malaysia, the 
promotion of SMEs was in due recognition of their role particularly in achieving the 
goals of NEP and NDP because dynamic SMEs can be a major contributor to the 
country's economic development and also can offer a source of income to large number 
of people. 
In Singapore (where there is dominance of multinational firms) however, its 
national development policy is to restructure the economy into one manufacturing high 
value products, high technology and capital intensive activities. The restructuring 
involves the attempt to be a viable exporter of manufactured goods to world markets 
through the phasing out of low value, labour intensive manufacturing activities and 
upgrading of technology and skills to export more high value manufactured goods. So, 
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the promotion of SMEs in Singapore would involve promoting high technology, capital 
intensive activities , and the manufacturing of high value products. 
In Indonesia, the promotion of SMEs was a response to criticism of earlier 
strategy that stressed economic development and industrialisation at the expense of 
equitable income. Therefore, it can be considered that the promotion of SMEs was a 
means for redistributing income in view that SMEs can be generators of employment 
and can offer sources of income to a large number of people. The redistribution of 
income policy involves the attempt to promote the indigenous Pribumi enterprises and 
the weak economic groups. 
From the above, it is evident that different countries have different national 
development policies which set different development and objective priorities. 
Therefore, the analysis and discussion on financing of SMEs of Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Singapore has to be against the background of their national development policies. 
For Malaysia and Indonesia, they seem to have a common social objective of 
promoting the indigenous SMEs. While Malaysia's promotion of indigenous SMEs was 
towards achieving the objective of eradicating poverty, and restructuring of society to 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function and geographical location, 
Indonesia's promotion of indigenous SMEs was mainly to achieve the objective of 
redistributing income. For Singapore, it appears that it has a policy of promoting SMEs 
into one manufacturing high value products, high technology and capital intensive 
activities in the attempt to be a viable exporter of manufactured goods to world 
markets. 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
A conducive business environment which positively influence the performance 
of SMEs is more likely able to stimulate the growth and performance of SMEs. 
Business environmental factors included government regulations, suppliers of resources 
(labour, money, materials, informations etc), markets, competitors, current price 
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levels, the economy, the political system, the society's social structure, the financial 
system and structure, and the state of technological development. However, as 
environmental factors are changing, the ability of SMEs to learn and to adapt to the 
changes in the environment would naturally affect their performance because 
information regarding the environment may improve business decision making and their 
performance. Lack of information however, would create uncertainty which increases 
the business risks. Changes in economic condition such as changes in interest rates, 
inflation, material resources may not only cause important changes to product mix but 
may also cause major changes to the cost of business operations which subsequently 
may change the working capital requirement. Many SMEs cannot cope with high levels 
of inflation for extended periods because in a keen competitive market they have very 
little control over the prices they can charge, and they usually cannot quickly establish 
cost control. Rising interest rates which normally reflect the scarcity of funds, tend to 
affect small firms more severely than large firms because small firms tend to rely 
heavily on financial institutions for capital requirements for expansion. The rising 
interest rates would tend to boost the operation costs. In addition, as debt comprises a 
large proportion of the SME's capitalisation, the firm's net worth would tend to be 
reduced. 
Other changes that may affect cost of business operations include changes in 
government administration and regulations regarding tax policy, product safety, 
product quality, consumer protection, transportation; market changes such as changes 
in population, sales and potential sales size, competing products, entry of new firms; 
and changes in service and production technology. Large organisations' managers 
often have better access to formal information gathering systems (Johnson and Kuehn, 
1987). For example, large organisations generally have qualified accountants, auditors, 
and marketing experts to advise the management in the effects of the changes in the 
environmental factors above. Small business owner/managers, which seem to require a 
broad and continuing search for information about the external environment due to their 
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inability to specialize, may have to devote a higher proportion of their time and energy 
in search of this information. However, they generally narrow the focus of their 
information search on their marketing channels and rely primarily on information from 
suppliers, distributors and customers views towards uncovering opportunities in the 
market place. Changes to tax law for example, are generally confusing and lack clarity 
and may take a long time to obtain, to interpret and to understand in their implications 
for SMEs. Franklin and Goodwin (1983) in their study suggested that small business 
owners considered most important those sources that were convenient and required 
minimal aggressive effort to employ. It appears that since their access to specialist tax 
consultants to advise them on tax planning strategy were rather limited, SMEs would 
therefore be less likely to take advantage of any changing tax law. To improve business 
environment for SMEs, the Government in its activity included among others, 
reregulations or rather simplifying rules and regulations; deregulations; administrative 
reforms and defining roles of key factors; improving the accessibility of SMEs to 
suppliers of resources (such as access to loans, marketing channels, raw materials, 
technology and training) and the setting up of a special governing body to care for the 
interests of SMEs. 
Having discussed the environmental issues affecting the finance of SMEs, we 
now look into accessibility to the capital market or rather accessibility in raising 
capital, an external factor affecting SMEs finance. 
ACCESSIBILITY TO CAPITAL MARKET 
Accessibility to capital market or the sources of capital would obviously be a 
major factor affecting the finance of SMEs because some form of capital is needed to 
start a business. Accessibility to capital appears to have a significant impact on the 
success of SMEs. The composition of the initial capital (ie. debt versus equity) may 
also have an effect on business success. While undercapitalization was often generally 
reported to be a major cause of small business failure, too much debt may lead to 
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liquidity problems especially during the early years when there are high start up 
expenses and low revenue. Inability to repay short-term borrowing at maturity is a 
potential problem because when this happened the firm may refinance the original 
amount or the original amount plus accumulated interest. Businesses that continue to 
refinance the original amount plus accumulated interest would eventually experience 
liquidity problems especially when the lending institutions must finally be repaid. 
Shortage of funds for investment purposes and for maintaining adequate 
working capital for operational needs are often suggested as the main financial problem 
faced by SMEs (Ch'ng, Tan and Lim, 1986). Factors contributing to the shortage of 
funds included the high operating costs from added fees, charges and taxes that were 
imposed by the government through its regulations; secondly, their borrowing capacity 
was constrained due to having limited assets, or insufficient track records to show their 
credit-worthiness, even i f they had adequate collateral. As such, SMEs were regarded 
by banks and financial institutions as higher risk borrowers and involving higher 
administrative costs (from higher information and higher transaction costs incurred in 
project appraisal and monitoring). As a result, SMEs were either charged with high 
interest rates or their loan application turned down. However, when banks raise interest 
rates in an attempt to compensate for the risk of default, some potential borrowers are 
discouraged more than others. The change in risk composition of the bank's lending 
portfolio may have an adverse effect on banks returns which exceeds the beneficial 
effect from higher interest. Therefore, profit maximising banks may prefer to set 
interest rates at a level where demand exceeds the supply, thus creating credit 
rationing. Additionally, because dealings with SMEs require relatively small loans, 
commercial banks had preferred dealing with larger businesses . Finally, SMEs were 
not able to use public stock issues for source of capital because regulations of public 
stock offering made the option impractical for SMEs as they cannot spread cost of the 
issue over a large number of shares to be marketed nationally. In addition, funds from 
pension and trust funds were not made accessible to SMEs. Therefore, SMEs were 
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facing a restricted set of financial markets and option to raise funds for their capital 
needs. However, not only the external factors but also internal controllable factors can 
affect the finance of SMEs. 
INTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE FINANCE OF SMEs 
Beside the external factors, several internal controllable factors such as 
management incompetence, management inexperience and poor decision making ability 
regarding purchasing, production and products, improving sales and attracting 
customers, may affect the financial position of SMEs. Scarborough (1988), revealed 
that over 90 per cent of all business failures in any given year resulted from 
incompetence and lack of experience. In Malaysia, there was evidence that due to lack 
of capital and business management skills, Bumiputera entrepreneurs have had limited 
success in business activities. Osman (1989) found that entrepreneurs were too involved 
with daily problems such as handling unmotivated, less disciplined, unskilled and low 
productive workers so that entrepreneurs had less time for production, product quality, 
inventory and financial control. However, Chee (1986) suggested that lack of 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills were mainly due to relatively low level of formal 
education and limited training. Shahadan, Berma, Zin and Mahbar (1990) found that 
despite having low levels of education, many SMEs entrepreneurs had some basic 
managerial skills and concluded that previous business experience rather than formal 
education provided the most significant training to acquire entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills. Not only are these skills required to cope with establishing a new 
enterprise but these skills may also be required to cope with the problems of its day to 
day running. For example the skills may help in deciding the financial structure of the 
firm, arrangment in the types of finance from sources available and optimisation of the 
firm's finance. Dependence on debt capital or loan from banks may mean losing profits 
to interest payments. Undercapitalisation from lack of cash flow, may make it 
impossible to take advantage of discounts on special terms with suppliers and therefore 
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affect profitability directly. Additionally, poor financial control such as lack of 
inventory control, lax customer credit, and overestimating in fixed assets can also 
contribute to the financial problems. For example, lack of control on credit sales to 
customers would affect the financial health of SMEs because additional capital for 
investment may be required during the lag between the sale of an item and the actual 
collection of the proceeds. Furthermore, credit collecting could be an extremely 
difficult task requiring a great deal of skill and persistence in order not to lose 
customers or end up with uncollected accounts. Participation in Government 
procurement which may secure market for production and/or services of SMEs may 
also affect finance i f payments were not settled on time for deliveries of the 
Government orders for these goods and/or services. Federal Government had been 
reported to be one of the slowest paying customers a small business could have 
(Chilton, 1984). 
SME finance would also be affected when the owner/manager had invested 
excessive amount of capital on fixed assets such as land, building, and equipment so 
that there would be insufficient liquid funds to finance expansion i f the need arose. To 
obtain further borrowing could be difficult as they may be considered by the banks to 
be already over-borrowed. 
Lack of inventory control with both insufficient inventory or excessive 
inventory would also affect business finance. While insufficient inventory levels may 
result in shortages and stockouts causing customer disillusionment, too much inventory 
or too much of the wrong inventory would cause excessive amount of working capital 
tied up in an accumulation of needless inventory, not to mention the cost of storage. 
Additionally, improper pricing of inventory such as underpricing of goods or services 
may result in lower revenue and lower profits. 
SME owner/managers were often found not up to date with financial records 
and statements. For example, Shahadan, Berma, Zin and Mahbar (1990) found that 
many small firms do not differentiate between their business and personal finances. 
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Some did not even bother to keep any records while some would only keep special 
records for legal requirement and tax purposes. Perhaps, a reason for not keeping 
records of financial statements was to evade tax. However, i f records were kept, these 
statements when analysed and interpreted properly could be a reliable indicator of 
potential financial problems. For example, declining sales, slipping profits, rising debt 
and deteriorating working capital could be symptoms that require immediate attention. 
In summary, it can be said that financial problems of SMEs are due to a 
combination of internal financial factors (which the owner/manager deals with in the 
day to day management and has some degree of control), external or environmental 
factors (factors which are usually beyond direct control of management such as 
inflation, taxes and government regulations) and the external capital market (Franklin 
and Goodwin, 1983). The Government therefore in their activities of promoting SMEs 
tries to redress these financial constraints through its policy in improving the business 
environment, and also through its direct intervention policy which includes provision of 
guidance, advice and training, and the provision of financial facilities and incentives. 
Government intervention in the financial market may be justified by the 
possibility that market imperfections may have prevented apparently viable SMEs from 
raising finance. The possibility that SMEs activities may bring about greater public 
benefits (such as employment creation, entrepreneurship development, geographical 
dispersion of economic growth, etc.) than their private returns, provided the motive for 
some form of subsidy. The choice in the ways to provide SME finance may vary from 
country to country. For instance, the Government may establish an independent 
government agency or arrange a ministerial division or section of the Government to 
finance SMEs. However, in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, financing SMEs was 
by ministerial division of the Government. 
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A CASE OF MALAYSIA 
Malaysia is made up of Peninsula Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, covering a 
total land area about 329,293 square kilometres. It is a plural society with an estimated 
population of 17.8 million in 1990, comprising about 56 per cent Malays and other 
indigenous people (together, they are referred to as Bumiputeras), 33 per cent Chinese, 
10 per cent Indians and 1 per cent others (Financial Times, August 29, 1991). GDP 
growth rate was 10 per cent for 1990 compared to 8.8 per cent in 1989 and 8.9 per 
cent in 1988; GDP per capita was US$2,388 in 1990; growth of consumer price 
showed 3.1 per cent for 1990 compared to 2.8 per cent in 1989 which indicated that 
inflationary pressure was low. Its current account of the Balance of Payments showed a 
deficit of 4.3 per cent of GNP in 1990 compared to a deficit of 0.4 per cent in 1989. 
During 1990, there was strong growth in merchandise imports (30 per cent) and 
imports of investment goods (42.9 per cent). The nation's external debt was reported to 
decline by M$791 million to M$41.4 billion at end of 1990. The reduction of external 
debt during the year was said to be negated to some extent by an exchange loss of 
M$2.1 billion which arose from the weakening of the Malaysian Ringgit against 
Japanese Yen and major European currencies. However the overall external debt 
service ratio had improved to 7.2 per cent in 1990 compared to 9.6 per cent the year 
before. 
Malaysia's financial system and structure appears pretty developed, with a 
complex of financial intermediaries offering a variety of financial instruments as 
savings media as well as a wide range of credit and investment facilities to meet the 
financing requirements. At the end of 1990, there were 38 commercial banks, 45 
finance companies, 12 merchant banks with their branches totalling 1,540 serving an 
average 11,566 persons per branch. Its per capita M2 was US$1,600 and its deposits 
per capita was US$1,600 in 1989. Its financial assets/GNP was 2.9 in 1990 which 
indicated that financial assets had increased at a much more rapid rate than its non 
financial wealth (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). With computer technology, financial 
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information and services are speeded up contributing to a more conducive environment 
for business. 
Political stability, price stability, good infrastructure and communication system 
contributed to a conducive environment for business. Law and regulations, 
administrative procedures and policy adjustments also influence the economic 
environment for business. Some environmental issues however, tend to be biased 
against SMEs and affect their finance, for example, regulations relating to zoning, 
health, safety, pollution, product quality and social benefits contribution. Zoning 
regulations had imposed the heaviest burden on small industry (Chee, 1986). Chee 
(1986) also reported that due to inadequate capital and limited market location, a 
number of small firms would tend to start up in a residential area which is violating the 
law and they would be fined or forced to close down. It was alleged that some would 
even engage in business illegally without a business licence. To neutralise the effect of 
zoning regulations so as to make the business environment more conducive to SMEs, 
the Government had provided industrial sites to relocate small and medium industries. 
These sites were provided with common infrastructure facilities and services to promote 
research and development activities, improve productivity and increase competition. 
Examples are a furniture complex in Olak Lempit in Selangor state, and land provided 
for pipeline projects in the state of Perak, Negri Sembilan, Sabah and Sarawak. 
Business premises were also allocated for SMEs activities in both rural and urban 
areas: for example, the business premises in the form of shopping complexes, shop 
lots, and bazaars set up by Government agencies like MARA, the State Economic 
Development Corporations (SEDCs), Urban Development Authority (UDA) and the 
National Corporation (PERNAS). 
A study revealed that many small manufacturing firms did not have a licence to 
operate business in residential dwellings to avoid government taxes (Chee, 1986). 
Therefore, it appears that tax was a determining factor to operate illegally in residential 
arears. However it was not revealed as to what aspect of tax was a problem to those 
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small manufacturing firms. Perhaps the complexity of the tax system faced by many 
SMEs was a contributing factor or perhaps tax itself was a burden as it means less 
profit. 
Special rates on electricity and water supply were provided for industrial 
activities, but this seemed to benefit those plants which generally have larger industrial 
activities and were therefore more likely to enjoy the cost advantage. 
The social legislation in relation to contributions to the Employees Provident 
Fund, Employment Insurance Scheme and Invalidity Pension Scheme have raised 
directly the costs of employing labour in all sizes of establishment but, they inevitably 
weighed more on the small enterprises than the larger enterprises. 
Government administrative requirements and environmental contexts are 
increasingly changing and getting more complex so that information gathering 
regarding these changes would mean extra cost for SMEs (Chee, 1986). For example 
tax related incentives, double deductions for tax purposes and tax allowances provided 
by the government are too complex for the ordinary small and medium entrepreneurs to 
digest and understand. Although SMEs are now eligible to apply for the pioneer status 
incentive which provides five years tax relief, it is granted for the manufacture of 
gazetted products and meeting certain conditions and criteria laid down by the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry. Investment tax allowance is also provided on condition that the 
firm produces promoted products or engages in promoted activities. Information 
gathering on these promoted activities and promoted products may be too time 
consuming and costly for SMEs in relation to its returns. The administrative procedures 
and red tape involved may also contribute to the problem. For example in order to 
claim the abatement of adjustment income, and double deductions on selected expenses 
on promotion for exports, firms need to register with the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and to get their approval. Double deductions on training expenses are granted 
only to approved training institutions which in many cases are situated in major towns 
and far from the locality of SMEs. 
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The incentives for Research and Development give five years tax exemption to 
approved research companies, but the field of research or development is not specified. 
However, it may not be wrong to say that larger companies are more likely eligible for 
this incentive. In addition, larger firms are also more likely to benefit on capital 
allowance provided on motor-cars. 
Unlike large enterprises who have specialised personnel in their payroll, to 
advise on the related matter, SMEs need to get external expertise to interpret and to be 
able to get the benefits from tax policy but that means added cost. Perhaps i f 
Government could give location incentive to accounting firms to set up branches 
throughout the country to provide professional services to clients, it would indirectly 
help SMEs who would then be able to utilize these professional services such as 
auditing, accounting and taxation services and at relatively much less cost. 
Due to limited resources, knowledge and skills, SMEs would face a higher 
degree of uncertainty which may block or hinder their performances. The Government, 
in their activities to redress these constraints had also included the provision of 
financing facilities. 
FINANCING SMEs 
In Malaysia, as already mentioned in an earlier chapter, a total of 13 Ministries 
and more than 30 government and other agencies were involved in one way or another 
with SMEs policy and programmes. The Ministries involved in financing SMEs were 
mainly the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and Industries, the Ministry of 
National and Rural Development and the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture. 
Agencies under these ministries that were involved in providing financial and credit 
facilities to SMEs were the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC), the Malaysian 
Industrial Development Finance (MIDF) and its subsidiary, the Malaysian Industrial 
Estates Private Limited (MIEL), the Development Bank of Malaysia (BPMB), the 
Industrial Bank of Malaysia, Council of Trust for Indigenous People (MARA), the 
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Agricultural Bank of Malaysia, Bank Rakyat, National Corporation (PERNAS) and 
State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs). Additionally, commercial banks 
and finance companies were required to provide finance and credit facilities to SMEs 
through the lending guide-lines set by the Central Bank, the latest to be complied by 
March 31, 1990. After that date guide-lines regarding finance and credit facilities to 
SMEs no longer applied. A new guide-line however, which came effective from April 
1, 1990, required commercial banks and finance companies to extend to the Bumiputera 
community a minimum of 20 per cent of their loans outstanding as at 31 December 
1988 (base year), to be complied by 31 March 1991. In addition, with effect from 
February 1, 1991, commercial banks and finance companies were free to set their Base 
Lending Rate (BLR) which was previously set under the administrative control of the 
Central Bank. Their BLR would be based on their cost of funds. However, ceiling rates 
for loans to priority sectors (which includes the Bumiputera community) and loans 
under the CGC would continue to be fixed by the Central Bank. Special funds were 
made available to SMEs. They were among others, the New Investment Fund, 
ASEAN-Japan Development Fund, New Entrepreneurs Fund, Industrial Technical 
Assistance Fund, Special Fund for Tourism, Abandoned Housing Projects Fund, and 
Enterprise Rehabilitation Fund. Funds were also made available for special schemes 
such as The World Bank Special Loan Scheme, Special Loan Scheme for Hawkers and 
Petty Traders, Export Credit Refinancing Scheme, Export Credit Insurance and 
Guarantee Scheme and the Rural Industries Programmes. The enlarged spectrum of 
intermediaries used to provide assistance shown in the range of financial and credit 
facilities provided under the different ministries and by different organisations through 
the different funds and schemes, and Government's direct intervention through lending 
guide-lines for SMEs in Malaysia seems to indicate the importance placed by the 
authorities in enlarging the spectrum of end users of this assistance towards creating 
entrepreneurship and widening investment. 
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Initially, commercial banks were encouraged through moral suasion to increase 
their lending to priority groups which included Bumiputera community, Small Scale 
Enterprises and prospective house buyers. However, when the result were not 
satisfactory, specific guide-lines on direction of bank lending were introduced in 
October 1976 and were reviewed annually ever since to meet the needs of the economy. 
COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS TO SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES (SSEs) 
The guide-lines on direction of bank lending were issued to stimulate private 
sector investment support for economic growth and also to ensure that priority sectors 
had ready access to credits at reasonable costs. The guide-lines had a provision which 
covers enterprises that fi t within the definition of small scale but there were no specific 
guide-lines of bank lending for medium scale enterprises. The definition of SSEs was 
found to vary from time to time. Perhaps the change of definition was necessary to 
keep up with the changing needs of the economy, but then the information gathering 
regarding these changes involved time for SSEs and therefore involved costs, either the 
direct cost in gathering information or the benefit lost in not being able to take the ful l 
advantage in time with the changes. However credits extended by commercial banks to 
SSEs was initially defined as loans of M$ 150,000 or less, granted to enterprises with 
fixed investments not exceeding M$300,000 each. With the guide-lines, the loans 
granted to SSEs increased from M$311 million at the end of 1970 to M$1872 million at 
the end of 1978. In 1979, the definition of SSE was expanded to include loans of 
M$250,000 or less granted to enterprises with fixed investments not exceeding 
M$500,000 each. The definition was revised in March 1981 as loans of M$250,000 or 
less, granted to registered businesses (including petty traders who had licence to trade 
and borrowers engaged in agriculture) with net assets of up to M$250,000 or in the 
case of corporation, had shareholders' funds of up to M$250,000. In support to the 
country's industrialisation drive, SSE was redefined in 1981 to include registered 
businesses with net assets of up to M$500,000 and for limited companies which had 
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shareholders' funds of up to M$500,000 and a loan limit not exceeding M$500,000. 
Total credits extended to SSE during the period between 1970- and 1978 ranged from 
14.5 per cent to 19.2 per cent of total bank loan outstanding during the period. In 
1979, a specific lending guide-line to SSE was introduced whereby commercial banks 
were required to extend at least 20 per cent of their loans outstanding at end of June 
1979 to SSEs, to be complied by end of 1980. In 1981, following the redefinition of 
SSE, new guide-lines were introduced, requiring at least 12 per cent of total bank loans 
outstanding as at December 1980 to be extended to SSEs. Additionally, commercial 
banks were also required to extend 5 per cent of their total loan outstanding as at 
December 31, 1980 under the Special Loan Scheme (SLS) of the Credit Guarantee 
Corporation (CGC). These guide-lines which were reviewed annually required (after 
the fourth revision of the definition of SSE in March 1988) commercial banks to extend 
at least M$300 million of new loans to SSEs, of which at least M$150 million must be 
extended to Bumiputeras. These loans included loans under the SLS of the CGC and 
must be complied by March 31, 1989. In the first nine months of 1988, total loans 
approved for SSEs amounted to M$537 million, of which M$74 million were approved 
for loans under SLS (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1989). 
Lending guide-lines to priority sectors announced in March 1989 required not 
only commercial banks but also finance companies to provide loans to SSEs to be 
complied by March 31, 1990. On the compliance date as at March 31, 1990, 
commercial banks had approved M$1.5 billion which was above the minimum 
requirement of M$600 million (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
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Table 5.1; Outstanding Loans To SSEs Against Total Outstanding Loans (in M$ 
million) 
Year Loans to SSEs Total loans Percentage 
1980 3330.7 18798.6 17.7 
1981 2890.0 22711.3 12.7 
1982 3216.2 26167.6 12.3 
1983 3468.7 32624.1 10.6 
1984 3673.5 38374.8 9.6 
1985 3473.5 42675.4 8.1 
1986 3232.0 45290.0 7.1 
1987 2983.6 44922.0 6.6 
1988 3819.5 48738.0 7.8 
1989 3712.4 58999.0 6.6 
Source: Haron (1990) 
The above figures shows that during the period between 1980 and 1984, there is 
a general increase on amount of loans to SSEs. For the period of 1985 to 1987, the 
amount of loans to SSEs is shown to decline, perhaps due to the slow down in the 
economy during that period. However, the amount of loan had increased tremendously 
from M$2983.6 million in 1987 to M$3819.5 million in 1988 during a period of 
economic improvement. Overall, it can be said that there is an increase in the amount 
of loans granted to SSEs. However, the percentage of outstanding loans granted to 
SSEs to total loans is shown to have a declining trend from 17.7 per cent in 1980 to 6.6 
per cent in 1989. Perhaps this is due to the greater increase in the total amount of 
outstanding loan when compared to the increase in loans to SSEs. It may indicate that 
commercial banks are more committed in granting loans to larger enterprises and it 
may also indicate that perhaps there is less demand for small loans. 
However the general increase in the amount of loans granted to SSEs seems to 
indicate that commercial banks as a source of institutional funds for SMEs is no more a 
major constraint. It appears to show that commercial banks had managed to fill the 
financing gap for SSEs following the lending guide-lines set by Bank Negara. Whether 
commercial banks could continue to provide these services to SMEs on their own 
accord without the requirements of lending guide-lines is yet to be seen. Considering 
the amount of loan given out to SSEs was much more than the required amount stated 
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by the lending guide-lines, and the experience that the banks had in dealing with small 
loans and small borrowers, perhaps banks had discovered the potential of good business 
dealings with SSEs. It therefore seems to show that institutional source of fund is 
generally no longer a major constraint to SSEs in Malaysia. However, certain groups of 
SSEs such as the Bumiputeras seems to continue facing the constraints. For example 
on the proportion of loan to SSEs that was extended to Bumiputera SSEs only M$208.8 
million out of the M$1.5 billion (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). This indicated that 
although there was a policy preference for promoting Bumiputera SSEs, the 
Bumiputeras could enjoy only a small proportion of the total value of loan offered to 
SSEs. Although the number of Bumiputera loan accounts was reported to have 
increased by 48.1 per cent to 493,765 at the end of 1990, 96.1 per cent of the 
outstanding loan account was for loans not exceeding M$ 100,000 each (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1991). The large number of end users indicated that the loan had benefited a 
large number of Bumiputeras. However, considering that small enterprises were 
defined as those with net assets of up to M$500,000 perhaps the loan of not more than 
M$ 100,000 each could be considered only as a small portion that could be used to start 
a small Bumiputera enterprise. In terms of value, the credit extended to these small 
Bumiputera borrowers accounted for 26.3 per cent (M$5.7 billion) of the total loan 
outstanding to Bumiputera community (M$21.6 billion excluding trade bills at end of 
1990 or about 7.05 per cent of total outstanding loan at the same date). Loans of more 
than M $ l million each were extended to 2,369 borrowers (compared to only 14 in the 
early 1970s) with a total value of M$12.2 billion or 56.3 per cent of total credit 
outstanding to Bumiputera community in 1990. There was a growing participation of 
Bumiputeras in larger scale projects but a gap between the large number of Bumiputera 
borrowers (96.1 per cent) who were granted small loans of not more than M$ 100,000 
and the few Bumiputera borrowers (0.48 per cent) who were granted loans of more 
than M $ l million. Was there a gap of funds for those borrowers who wished to take 
loans in the range between M$ 100,000 and M $ l million or a gap of borrowers to take 
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up loans in the stated range of loans made accessible to them? Lack of Bumiputera 
borrowers in the M$ 10,000 to M $ l million loan range could be due to an information 
gap where Bumiputera SMEs, many of whom were newcomers to the enterprise world, 
may lack information on the different types of loans offered by different financial 
institutions including the commercial banks. Additionally perhaps, Bumiputera SMEs 
did not have sufficient knowledge, advice or know how regarding the process of 
presenting a case for loan application due to inexperience in the trade. 
Regarding the distibution of loans by commercial banks, during the first half of 
1970s, loans extended to SSEs were generally well distributed among the domestic and 
foreign-incorporated banks. However, since 1977, domestic commercial banks had 
extended more share of loans to SSEs. As at September 1988, domestic banks 
accounted for 78.2 per cent of the total commercial bank credits to SSEs (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1989). 
In terms of direction of loans to SSEs, a greater portion of the loan was 
channelled to wholesale and retail trade, and hotels and restaurants which increased 
from M$93 million (or 27 per cent of total bank loan to small borrowers) at the end of 
1970 to M$l,751 million (or 47.1 per cent) at end of September 1988. The second 
largest portion went to manufacturing sector which accounted for about 13.3 per cent 
of total loans to SSEs in 1988. 12 per cent of total SSE loan were channelled to small 
contractors and 6.5 per cent of the total credit to SSE went to the agriculture sector 
during the same period. 
LOANS UNDER CREDIT GUARANTEE CORPORATION (CGC) 
The lending guide-lines also required commercial banks to extend loans under 
guarantee cover by the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC). Under the Principal 
Guarantee Scheme (PGS) of the CGC, commercial banks were required to extend loans 
with CGC guarantee cover of at least M$200 million, of which M$100 million must be 
guarantee cover for loans extended to Bumiputera community. The compliance date 
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was however, extended to March 31, 1991. As at December 31, 1990, M$391.8 
million of loan had been approved with guarantee cover of M$144.9 million which was 
still below the required amount (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1991). 
Table 5-2; Bank Lending Under The CGC Scheme - General Guarantee Scheme 
(GGS), Special Loan Scheme (SLS) and Principal Guarantee Scheme (PGS) 
Year 
(M$million) 
Total value Total Number 
1973 11.8 2,292 (GGS) 
1980 124.3 6,103 (GGS) 
1981 524.0 18,309 (GGS and SLS) 
1982 519.3 16,958 (GGS and SLS) 
1983 298.3 10,563 (GGS and SLS) 
1985 142.6 5,372 (GGS and SLS) 
1986 250.48 11,290 (GGS and SLS) 
1988 50.5 2,470 (GGS and SLS) 
1990 391.8 7,279 (PGS) 
SLS started in 1981 
PGS replaced GGS and SLS in 1989 
Source: Phang (1989); Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report (1990) 
The guaranteed loans extended by commercial banks over the period of 1980 to 
1990 fluctuated in the amount and number of loans. Banks were reluctant to utilise the 
guarantee facilities, in spite of the Central Bank's directives, and incentives provided to 
participate in the scheme. (Participating banks were granted a tax concession in respect 
of the amount loaned under this scheme and borrowers were eligible for double 
deduction for tax purposes). Perhaps the reluctance was due to the lower profit margin 
as compared to the returns from ordinary loans. The CGC only covers 60 per cent of 
the amount of loans and advances in default not recoverable by commercial banks. In 
other words, the commercial banks were responsible for the 40 per cent default which 
may be considered a fairly high proportion of bearing risk especially for loans made 
without any security (the guide-lines stated that loans may be made without security); 
and the banks had to pay a guarantee fee of 0.5 per cent per annum on credit 
outstanding. In addition the commercial banks were required to take all possible legal 
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actions (costs to be borne by the banks concerned) to recover the loans before claims 
can be submitted to the CGC. Although it was stated in the claim procedures that CGC 
had a right to reject claims which had low quality appraisal and poor follow up by the 
individual bank, the procedures and arrangement before claims can be brought forward 
to CGC could be a deterrent for commercial banks to push all their risky loans towards 
the claim against CGC because guarantee cover for loans was given automatically by 
the corporation when approved by commercial banks. However, there was evidence 
that some banks were rather reluctant to use the guarantee facilities and comply to the 
guide-lines regarding loans under CGC. Latif (1990) reported that at end of 1976 only 
10 out of the 36 banks were fully taking part in the scheme and by the end of 1987 only " 
1.2 per cent of total loans granted by banks were made through CGC. Some banks 
were reported as preferring to face being fined rather than complying to the guide-lines 
regarding loans under CGC. There were also cases where participating banks' claims 
were not made in cases of default. Levitsky and Prasad (1987) reported that the 
handling of claims had been very poor. Up to December 31, 1981, a total of 1,342 
claims valued M$4.39 million had been lodged with the CGC but only 132 claims for 
M$277,787 had been paid out while, 760 claims valued M$2.17 million had been 
rejected. Up to end of 1985, a total of 1,935 claims had been processed but only 429 
claims for M$1.27 million were paid out, 1,186 claims were rejected and 320 claims 
were withdrawn by the banks. This seems to be a deterring factor contributing to the 
performance of commercial banks in this programme. At the request of the Malaysian 
Government, a World Bank consultant who reviewed the scheme in 1982, found that 
the scheme was grossly underfunded in view of the volume of guarantees given. Latif 
(1990) found that the lack of enthusiasm of the bankers for CGC activities were due to 
the following: 
(a) Credit risk was neither reduced nor really transferred from the bankers since 
commercial banks were the majority shareholders of CGC. 
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(b) The CGC provided cover for 60 per cent of defaulted loans while the remaining 40 
per cent had to be borne by the individual bank. 
(c) Legal charges in the claim process for a bad loan had to be borne by the lending 
bank. 
(d) Time taken for recovery of claims was "fairly long". 
(e) More paperwork involved for CGC loan as compared to those for normal loan and 
unit cost in handling per CGC loan was higher than normal loan. 
Additionally, credit officers and banks tend to be risk averse since performance 
is generally judged by the number of problem or bad loans they were responsible for. 
Since SME loans were regarded as high risks, in addition to the above reasons banks 
had preferred to keep their CGC loans to the barest stipulated minimum. 
Currently there are three schemes administered by the Credit Guarantee 
Corporation (CGC) namely PGS, the Loan Fund for Hawkers and Petty Traders 
(LFHPT) and the Association Special Loan Scheme (ASLS). However, the corporation 
still continued to monitor those loans under schemes that had ceased to operate but 
were still subject to its guarantee. 
As at December 31, 1990, within six months of its implementation, total loan 
approved under ASLS (funded from M$20 million provided by the Central Bank) 
amounted to M$4.2 million of which M$4.1 million (97 per cent) was granted to 2,043 
Bumiputera borrowers. Perhaps this indicated that the majority of Bumiputera trade 
association members have very small businesses because to be eligible for the ASLS 
scheme, total business assets should not be more than M$ 10,000 and total existing loan 
should not exceed M$2,000. Through the provision of this scheme it appears that the 
financial constraint on these very small business persons could be reduced. 
The LFHPT scheme which was implemented in March 1990, had approved 
loans amounting to M$6 million of which M$5.2 million (87 per cent) was granted to 
1,479 Bumiputera borrowers. The maximum loan granted under the LFHPT was 
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M$ 10,000 each. The initial fund of M$50 million for LFHPT scheme was increased to 
M$100 million set aside from the New Investment Fund provided by Central Bank. 
Total loan guaranteed by CGC under all its schemes as at December 31, 1990 
totalled 172,394 applications with approved loan limits of M$3258.1 million compared 
to 2,292 applications with loan approved which amounted to M$11.8 million at end of 
1973 (Bank Negara Malaysia 1991). From the above it was found that although the 
number of applicants has increased over the years since its implementation, it appeared 
that SMEs may still have constraints in securing external finance through CGC. 
LOANS FROM FINANCE COMPANIES 
The lending guide-lines announced in March 1989 required finance companies 
to comply with the guide-lines on lending to Bumiputera community and SSEs by 
March 31, 1990. As at compliance date, the finance companies had approved loans to 
SSEs amounting to M$3.2 billion which represented 23.5 per cent of total loan 
outstanding as at December, 1987 (base year) against a minimum requirement of 15 per 
cent. It showed that loans from the finance companies were no more a major constraint 
to SMEs. The lending guide-lines could have influenced the extent of loans to SMEs. 
Having the experience in small lending perhaps, would improve the handling of small 
loans from the stage of appraising small loans proposals to the supervision of 
repayments of the loan, hence reducing the uncertainty or risk facing finance companies 
which would therefore be more encouraged to grant loans to SME. There were no data 
available regarding amount of loan granted to Bumiputera SSEs. Regarding compliance 
with lending to Bumiputera community, the finance companies had granted M$6.8 
billion or 49.7 per cent of total loan outstanding as at December 1987, well in excess 
of the minimum requirement of 20 per cent. Probably this aggregate amount would 
appear satisfactory but the proportion of 49.7 per cent of loans included all loans for 
housing, consumption credit and also for other purposes in the Bumiputera community. 
Increases in loans for consumption purposes would surely not contribute to the creation 
138 
of a Bumiputera commercial and industrial community in the country's development 
plan. Data regarding loans that were extended to Bumiputera SMEs were again not 
available. 
Beside loan from banks and finance companies, special schemes and special 
funds were also set up by the government to help ease the financial constraints of 
SMEs. Among them were the Enterprise Rehabilitation Fund (ERF), New Investment 
Fund (NIF), New Entrepreneurs Fund (NEF), and ASEAN-Japan Development Fund 
(AJDF). 
THE ENTERPRISE REHABILITATION FUND (ERF) 
The M$500 million Enterprise Rehabilitation Fund, managed by MIDF on 
behalf of the Central Bank, was to provide financial assistance to ailing (financial 
problems due to the last recession) but viable enterprises with good recovery prospect. 
Only members of the Malay Chamber of Commerce are eligible to apply. However, 
not many SME entrepreneurs are members of the Malay Chamber of Commerce. 
Therefore, the larger enterprises are more likely to be able to apply and more likely to 
benefit from this fund. As at the end of 1990, a total of 1,485 application had been 
received, of which 692 applications for projects amounting M$479.9 million had been 
approved (Malaysia, 1991). It shows that nearly half (47 per cent) of the total number 
of applicants were successful in getting loan from this scheme. Perhaps, these were the 
applicants considered to have a viable plan for rehabilitation which was a criterion to 
qualify for the loan. 
THE NEW INVESTMENT FUND (NIF) 
The NIF was launched in 1985 with an initial allocation of M$ 1,000 million by 
the Government to stimulate new investments in selected sectors such as manufacturing, 
agriculture, tourism and mining which was part of the Government effort to promote 
growth and shift new lending away from low priority sectors of property and real 
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estates (Malaysia, 1991). The fund was later expanded by M$200 million to support 
Government's effort to promote private sector cash cropping on a commercial basis. 
The fund was further expanded by an additional M$500 million bringing the total to 
M$ 1,700 million. At the end of 1990, 422 loans amounting M$ 1,428 million was 
approved. Of the total amount, M$l,024 million was for manufacturing sector, M$277 
million for the agriculture sector, M$80 million for tourism sector and M$47 million 
for the cash crop scheme. It was reported that the NIF would no longer be extended as 
the economy was well on recovery and there was ample liquidity in the banking 
system. 
THE NEW ENTREPRENEURS FUND (NEF) 
The M$250 million NEF was launched by the Central Bank in December, 1989 
to provide funds at reasonable costs to encourage new Bumiputera entrepreneurs to 
engage in new ventures especially manufacturing, agriculture, tourism and export 
oriented industries. As at the end of 1990, 280 applications were received of which 153 
applications for M$21.7 million had been approved (Malaysia, 1991). It shows that 
more than 50 per cent of applications were successful in getting loans from this 
scheme. 
THE ASEAN-JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT FUND 
The AJDF loan scheme with M$890 million provided by the Overseas 
Fxonomic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the Export-Import Bank of Japan (EXIM) 
was launched by the Government in 1989. The fund was to provide loans to SMEs at 
an interest rate of 6.5 per cent per annum from the OECF portion while loans from the 
EXIM portion wil l be charged at an average of 7.85 per cent per annum. As at July 
1990, M$602 million had been approved of which, M$403 million was from the OECF 
and the balance of M$199 million was from EXIM. 
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ABANDONED HOUSING PROJECTS FUND 
As the rehabilitation of abandoned housing projects was the focus of ERF, a 
separate scheme, the Abandoned Housing Projects Fund with M$600 million allocation 
was set up in June 1990 (Malaysia, 1991). The scheme was to help housing developers 
to revive abandoned housing projects. Most housing developers are large enterprises 
which therefore had more opportunity to benefit from this scheme. At the end of 1990, 
a total of 33 applications for M$137 million had been approved. 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
The development finance institutions which comprise the Malaysian 
Development Finance (MIDF), the Borneo Development Cooperation, the Sabah 
Development Bank, Bank Pembangunan Malaysia (the Development Bank of 
Malaysia), Bank Industri Malaysia (the Industrial Bank of Malaysia) and Bank 
Pertanian Malaysia (the Agricultural Bank of Malaysia) complemented the role of the 
banking system in terms of providing medium and long term capital financing as well 
as supplying a range of financial services not normally provided by commercial banks 
and finance companies. 
The Development Bank of Malaysia was reported to be a major player among 
the multitude of organisations in the promotion of SMEs (Abdullah, 1990). Although it 
was not exclusively set up to cater for SMEs, it had a great role in project financing to 
assist and develop such enterprise. The Development Bank of Malaysia classified small 
and medium loans as those of less than M$1.5 million each. Abdullah (1990) reported 
that in May 1990, almost 93 per cent or 3,418 borrowers of the Bank portfolio of 
clients were in this group. Loans of M$500,000 each were considered small and 
comprised 82 per cent of borrowers, while the remaining 11 per cent were classified as 
medium borrowers. In terms of value, SME loans accounted for 42 per cent or M$708 
million. The loan extended by the bank to small and medium projects were charged 
interest rate as low as 5 per cent. 
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The Development Bank of Malaysia was involved in extending the M$150 
million credit line from the World Bank and the Malaysian Government through the 
Small-scale Enterprise Programme. SME loans totalling M$189.6 million were granted 
to assist about 900 entrepreneurs under this scheme at end of December 1989 when the 
programme expired. 
CREDIT PROGRAMMES FROM MARA (Council off Trust for Indigenous 
People) 
MARA, which is financed by the Federal Government in the form of loans and 
grants, was established in 1966. It had a role in promoting the development of 
Bumiputeras in training, education, commerce and industry. To ensure greater success 
in business venture, MARA provided various assistance, guidance and support 
programmes. Financial assistance to SMEs were provided in the form of three types of 
loans (Chee, 1986). Firstly, the ordinary loans which have a maximum of M$50,000 
each. Secondly, the New Entrepreneurs Loans provided M$150,000 each for setting up 
manufacturing enterprises and thirdly the Special loans which provided smaller loans of 
M$2,000 each (without collaterals or guarantors) for petty traders and hawkers. The 
maximum loan ceilings offered by MARA were later increased (Malaysia, 1991). 
Loans of M$250,000 to M $ l million are now being provided. Chee (1986) also 
reported that between 1966 and 1982, MARA had granted 60,257 loans which 
amounted to M$388.2 million and 90 per cent of MARA loans were said to be below 
M$5,000 while nearly 60 per cent of MARA loans were given out without any 
security. The high proportion of loans granted without collateral seems to show that 
SMEs loan applications process by MARA was quite flexible. However, the large 
number of small loans given out and the high proportion of loans without collaterals 
were reported to be a contributing factor to the supervising of loans problem and loan 
recovery faced by MARA. 
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RURAL SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES PROGRAMME 
The rural industries programme was aimed to increase the villagers income. 
Previously, the objective was to be achieved through productive work during the spare 
time but now it was to be implemented mainly by projects that could be a main source 
of income and have potential for expansion and diversification. Financing under this 
programme is in the form of grants which vary according to the management of the 
enterprise. For individual entrepreneurs, a grant of not more than M$10,000 for the 
value of machines wi l l be provided. For a group project run by 3-14 persons, a grant of 
not more than M$50,000 for the value of machines plus M$20,000 for the value of the 
workshop. For cooperatives of 15 or more entrepreneurs, a grant of not more than 
M$ 100,000 for the value of machines and M$20,000 the value of workshop would be 
provided. Activities under the rural industries programmes included handicraft 
(consisting of weaving, woodcraft and furniture, batik, leathercraft, metalcraft, 
mudcraft and songket), and food processing. 
Siwar, Jaafar, and Zin (1990) in their study on rural small industries 
programmes found that although there were sufficient funds channelled through 
commercial banks, finance companies and specialised financial institutions like MIDF, 
MARA, the Agricultural Bank and the Development Bank to finance urban SMEs there 
was insufficient funds being channelled to rural areas. Siwar, Jaafar and Zin also 
found that only 24.5 per cent of their respondents' source of initial capital was from 
Government and private finance institutions while 60.3 per cent of the respondents 
obtained their initial capital from private savings, sales of private property and 
contributions from family members and/or friends. Those who had obtained credits 
from government and private financial institutions had problems in repayment. Gosling 
(1983) found that in the rural areas Government backed sources of credit had been less 
successful in displacing local moneylenders' credit or Chinese dealer credit because 
even though government credit charges were lower, most of the credit programmes 
were less flexible and less efficient than the moneylender credit or Chinese dealer 
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credit. The moneylenders and credit dealers tend to be more flexible and provided more 
personal service than formal institutions. Government funded rural credit was also 
reported to be channelled mainly through cooperatives which had a wide range of 
limitations, often required a guarantor and usually had fixed schedules of repayment. 
Dishonest or inefficient management of cooperatives were also reported and rural 
farmers in Malaysia were said to find it easier to deal with the one person credit dealer 
who provided them with goods, services, information, crop marketing and credit 
without all the restrictions imposed by cooperatives and banks. Government had 
attempted to utilise these credit dealers where private traders were permitted to operate 
one third of the Government-sponsored local credit centres, set up to channel credits 
from banks to farmers, but it seems that the dealers were not interested in working 
through Government programmes. The credit terms (where loans were for production 
only), formal and systematic collection of interest and principal and aggressive 
insistence on repayment were seen as damaging to the smooth dealer operations. The 
traditional ways of collecting overdue accounts through shortweighting, overcharging 
for inputs and goods were seen to be more subtle and the subterfuge was claimed to be 
preferred by both borrowers and lenders. 
In summary, the promotion of SMEs in Malaysia is influenced by its priority 
objective of its development policy in eradicating poverty and restructuring the society. 
The restructuring of society involves creating a viable Bumiputera commercial and 
industrial community. Since finance is generally believed to be one of the major 
problems facing SMEs particularly Bumiputera SMEs, it justifies the need for 
Government to provide financial facilities for SMEs. The range of financial facilities 
provided and the number of organisations involved implies that the Government was 
highly favourable towards supporting entrepreneurship and promoting investment by 
SMEs. Whether the provision of facilities and the involved organisations had really 
facilitated the creation of more successful entrepreneurs and investment, is a complex 
problem because it would involve comparison of the effect on entrepreneurs before and 
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after the provision of these facilities, and also a comparison with those entrepreneurs 
that missed out or do not benefit from any of these facilities. Additionally it is difficult 
to say whether the facilities provided for SMEs and the involved organisations had 
influenced the restructuring of society, eradication of poverty and improvement of 
income distribution. However, it was reported in the Sixth Malaysia Plan that the 
growing participation of Bumiputera in modern economic activities had improved the 
income distribution. In terms of inter ethnic income differences, the ratio of mean 
income for Bumiputera compared with that of Chinese in Peninsula Malaysia improved 
from 56.7 per cent in 1985 to 58.8 per cent in 1990. At the same time, the ratio of the 
mean income of Indians to Chinese also improved from 72.8 per cent to 75.9 per cent. 
Additionally, there was a narrowing of income differentials between rural and urban 
households where the ratio of rural household income to that of urban household had 
increased from 53.5 per cent in 1985 to 58.3 per cent in 1990. The achievement in 
poverty eradication showed an overall decline of poverty from 20.7 per cent in 1985 to 
17.1 per cent in 1990 (Malaysia, 1991). 
On the objective of restructuring of society, the rapid expansion of investment 
activities had generated many new jobs in the manufacturing, agriculture and 
commercial sectors where Bumiputera had gained as much as 60 per cent of the new 
jobs. However, in terms of occupational categories, the majority of Bumiputera 
workforce was still in the lower-pay categories (Malaysia, 1991). 
In the objective of restructuring of the corporate sector, the share of Bumiputera 
including trust agencies accounted for 20.3 per cent (Bumiputera individuals as direct 
investors only accounted for 8.2 per cent i f trust agencies and related institutions were 
excluded) of the total paid up equity capital in the corporate sector in 1990 while non 
Bumiputeras held a total of 46.2 per cent, the foreigners held 25.1 per cent and 
nominee interest held 8.4 per cent (Malaysia, 1991). Despite various forms of 
assistance given by the Government, Bumiputera still lacked the corporate control. 
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In the objective of creating the Bumiputera commercial and industrial 
community, it was reported in the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991 that the overall impact 
remained limited. Sallih and Yong (1988) reported that the Government objective in 
creating 30 per cent of viable Bumiputera commercial and industrial community was a 
definite failure. 
Although finance was agreed to be a major problem facing SMEs this problem 
appears to be closely related to management, marketing and opportunity identification. 
It was reported in the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991 that a major factor contributing to the 
low performance of Bumiputera in the commercial and industrial sector was the small 
and narrow base of business enterprise, inadequate experience and lack of management 
capabilities. The lack of success of Bumiputera were also reported to be partly due to 
their inability to take ful l advantage of the opportunity given to them. It therefore 
appears that Bumiputera SMEs need training and development in management, 
marketing and opportunity identification because the above skills may be acquired 
through training in the related field. It can therefore be concluded that currently, there 
is a training and advice gap. 
The Government and the list of involved organisations claimed to have provided 
financial facilities and support services for SMEs. However, it appears that little is 
done to communicate regarding what is available and offered by the Government to 
meet the needs of SMEs. Provision of facilities without reaching the target market at 
the right time and provision of facilities without meeting the needs of SMEs would 
seem meaningless. Information on the facilities and support services provided, must be 
linked to SMEs through effective communication network. Partly, it would appear that 
there is an information gap due to this communication gap. 
Overall, the facilities provided and the organisations involved seem to indicate 
that institutional funds were no longer a major constraint for some SMEs while others 
seem to still have the problem of securing a loan from finance institution. More funds 
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seem to be allocated for specific sectors rather than providing for all SMEs without bias 
irrespective of any specific sector. However, there seem to be a need for Government 
support beyond the financial facilities to include other support programmes like 
training, marketing etc. 
Perhaps the continued provision of all these facilities would mean greater 
reliance on Government support and therefore entrepreneurs to be created would not be 
entrepreneurs in the true meaning any more because entrepreneurs are suppose to be 
self reliant, innovative, risk takers and motivated. Perhaps the training, advice, and 
information can be given (though it may take time) to gain skills, knowledge and 
experience but without the inner motivation in the person himself, entrepreneurs cannot 
be created. However it can be argued that all financial support 
and facilities wil l not necessarily create entrepreneurship but financial and other support 
can facilitate the creation of enterprises and entrepreneurship. 
FINANCING SMEs IN INDONESIA 
Indonesia comprises 13,667 islands, covering a distance of about 3,500 miles 
from west to east and covering a total area of 1,919,443 sq km. Its population of 
182.6 million in 1990 (from over 300 different ethnic groupings) is the f if th largest in 
the world (Financial Times, March 22, 1991). Indonesia had a vast and 
underdeveloped economy. Its infrastructure and communication system was not 
efficient and there was power shortage as the state electricity monopoly was only able 
to provide electricity to 54 per cent of urban households and 13 per cent of rural 
households (Schwarz 1991). Banking offices are concentrated in major towns, and each 
bank office was serving an average of 148,700 persons in 1982. Its per capita deposit 
was only US$89 and per capita M2 was only US$121 indicating a lag in its financial 
development (Yan 1984). Additionally, Rahardjo and Al i (1986) found that financial 
institutions were not much utilised by SMEs in Indonesia because most SMEs were 
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mainly located in small towns, while financial institutions were situated in large towns 
usually a distant away. 
In Indonesia, the promotion of SMEs was under the Directorate of Small 
Industry created in the Ministry of Industry. The Government's involvement in 
financing SMEs included direct control over bank credit ceilings and interest rates and 
subsidising credit rates such as those provided for its small investment credits (KIK) 
and small working capital credits (KMKP) programmes introduced in 1974. However 
the interest rates control was later removed in 1983. To provide greater access to bank 
loans, Credit Guarantee schemes were also established. Askrindo, a publicly financed 
credit insurance corporation set up in 1971, provides a guarantee coverage of 75 per 
cent against defaults on business loans to both large and small. At the end of 1983, it 
was claimed that Askrindo's over generous terms had contributed to a high arrears and 
default rate in KIK/KMKP programmes. As a result, claims on KIK/KMKP loses rose 
from Rp6.0 billion in 1981 to Rp 13.2 billion in 1982. As of 1983, loans under 
KIK/KMKP were limited to loan amounting to the equivalent of US$15,000 (Levitsky 
and Prasad, 1987). 
In the early 1980s, small, usually Pribumi businessmen, were also given 
contracts through Government procurement. Around the same period, the concept of 
adoption in the Bapak Angkat or foster parent relationship programme, was introduced 
to link large companies with small businesses. Through the link, it was thought by the 
Ministry of Industry then, that SMEs would have better access to credit using the link 
with foster parent as collateral for loans. Beside that, large companies were encouraged 
to provide finance to SMEs beside other assistances such as production and 
management. Suhartono (1988) reported that during the period of 1974-1986, there 
were constraints in expanding the KIK and KMKP programmes. Although it had been 
found that the ceiling for both KIK and KMKP loans were increased from Rp 5 million 
to Rp 15 million, the average size of KIK and KMKP loans did not rise. For example, 
the average loan size in 1986 was below the ceiling in the range of Rp 3.6-4.2 million 
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for KIK and Rp 0.9-1.5 million for KMKP. While the number of cumulative loan 
approvals for small industries had increased from less than 5,000 in 1974 to more than 
225,000 in 1986, the number of industries receiving loans was relatively small 
compared to the estimated 1.7 million small industry establishments. It indicated that a 
major proportion of SMEs were still not able to benefit from the financial facilities 
provided by the Government. Financial assistance to SMEs through cooperatives was 
introduced during the third 5 years Development Plan (1979/80-1983/84). 
The importance of cooperatives as a source of institutional credits as compared 
to commercial banks need further discussion. As a source of long term loans, 
cooperatives contributed 40 per cent compared to 18.8 per cent from commercial banks 
while the rest of the loans were raised from the informal sector such as private 
individuals and moneylenders. Reasons for the banks' low performance in extending 
loans to SMEs were reported by Rahardjo and Al i (1986) to be due to difficulties 
experienced by SMEs when requesting bank credits. Among the difficulties faced were 
not having a certificate of fixed assets; no business licence; interest rate was high; 
period of credit was too short before debt had to be paid off; lack of knowledge in the 
procedure of requesting credits; and high cost incurred for administration to comply 
with the conditions. Perhaps, the lack of knowledge on the part of potential borrowers 
about the availability of credit and the procedures for requesting credits were either due 
to lack of information or due to the distance from the bank office. The mobile and 
village bank branches were only opened on certain days for certain office hours and 
were not contributing much to giving information and educating the people. In 
addition, apparently, bank employees were unfamiliar with the local rural problems. To 
ensure bank personnel familiarity with local factors, perhaps recruiting bank employees 
at local level may help; also the cost of information would be much reduced. Although, 
interest rates charged by banks were low, the procedure for obtaining credit required 
too much paper work. In addition banks required collateral that was difficult for many 
to meet. These are a few of the reasons which had led SMEs to prefer borrowing from 
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cooperatives (interest rate at 2-3 per cent per month) and moneylenders which charged 
interest rate at 3-30 per cent per month (Rahardjo and A l i , 1986). 
The usurious interest rates charged by moneylenders not only cause hardship to 
the borrowers but also prevent the flow of funds for long term development purposes 
because profits in money lending were so large that there would be little incentive to 
invest in development projects in which returns cannot be equally high. It is for this 
reason that perhaps, the Government should consider a law limiting interest rates 
charged by private pawnbrokers and moneylenders, but, this law is known to be very 
difficult to enforce. In Indonesia, there were government pawnshops whose pawn 
services were under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. These government 
pawnshops had a partial monopoly on loans whereby private money lenders by law, 
were not allowed to grant loans of less than a minimum amount against the security of 
pawns in areas served by the government pawnshops. 
Other agencies involved in financing SMEs in Indonesia at the province and 
regency levels included the Department of Social Affairs, the Department of Industry, 
and the National Family Planning Coordinating Board and the Subdistrict Credit Body. 
Savings may be an essential part in investment activities because, investment 
may be seen as a form of savings for productive purposes. However some people could 
not afford to save while others could not save because of compulsive spending and lack 
of savings habit. Regarding savings, Rahardjo and Al i (1986) found that 53.2 per cent 
of SME owners/managers had no savings. Of those who had savings, 43.1 per cent of 
them had savings in the form of non money such as rice fields, jewellery, other land 
and houses, indicating the lack of liquid funds for production. However, Conroy and 
Drake (1990) reported that Indonesia's real saving and investment aggregate was 
increasing approaching 30 per cent and over 30 per cent of GNP respectively in 1989. 
Bank credits to private sector increased by 37 per cent in 1987, by 77 per cent 
in 1988 and by 79 per cent in 1989 which probably was a response to the removal of 
credit ceilings in 1983 over bank lending. The dominant state banks were however 
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reported to be slow in their lending policies and procedures adjustment. The 
deregulation had created opportunities and strengthened commitment to the private 
sector. The Chinese, which made up only 4 per cent of Indonesia's population and 
accounted for two thirds of the private economic activity, owned most of Indonesia's 
largest conglomerates and almost all of the biggest private banks. As a result, they 
appear to have greater access to capital and managed to seize the opportunity from 
deregulations. Effective from March 1990, the Government in its attempt to curb 
inflation, adopted a tight money policy through phasing out the liquid credits system or 
the subsidised refinancing facilities, and the issue of Bank Indonesia certificates. The 
subsidised refinancing facilities were reduced beginning March 1990 because of the 
growth in bank lending and base money in 1989. Another reason contributing to the 
phasing out of liquid credits was the allocation abuse found in the system (Conroy and 
Drake, 1990). Perhaps with Indonesia's open exchange regime it would not be easy to 
control inflation. Inflation reached 9.5 per cent in 1990 compared to 6 per cent in 1989 
(Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 1990). Some banks became chronic net borrowers on 
the interbank market when they expanded their loan assets much faster than they could 
raise deposits to support loan growth. The inadequate professional accounting standards 
and training was partly to be blamed as Indonesia had only 390 Certified Public 
Accountants in the whole of the private sector in 1988 (Conroy and Drake, 1990). 
The tight capital and liquidity positions in times of high interest rates would 
appear to be detrimental to SMEs whereas large public companies could easily borrow 
from cheap funds from state banks or resort to off-shore borrowing at lower interest 
rates and raise capital in the stock market. Many large private companies own private 
banks to cater for their financial needs. To ensure that SMEs had access to bank loans, 
every national bank was required to allocate within a year a minimum of 20 per cent of 
its loan portfolio to small businesses effective from January 1990. It has been suggested 
that this requirement had put tremendous lending pressure on some banks which had no 
staff who had expertise and experience in small credit assessment (Conroy and Drake, 
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1990). In the activity to reduce income disparity, through the policy package of March 
1990, the corporate sector was required to make shares available to cooperatives (many 
SMEs in Indonesia form cooperatives through its "sentra" development programmes). 
By early 1991, 105 companies had complied with the requirement but shares issued 
only represented 1 per cent of the capital of participating companies from the call for 
10-40 per cent of capital to be distributed. Neither the Chinese nor the Pribumis seem 
to be able to see the effectiveness of the scheme. Government officials were also 
reported to feel uncomfortable with the requirement, which may harden attitudes rather 
than foster partnership (Schwarz,1991). 
Lately, since February 1991, the concept of foster parent was reemphasised in 
the attempt to narrow the income disparities that were increasing. In the attempt to link 
SMEs with the country's large business companies, the Ministry of Industry had 
identified 10,000 companies that were to become foster parents to SMEs, with the 
ministry acting as the match maker. However, up to May 1991, only 200 large firms 
were reported to have responded to the programme. State owned firms would also be 
made foster parent to SMEs in areas where there were few large private companies. In 
this campaign, large companies were urged to take smaller Pribumi enterprises as 
suppliers, agents, distributors, subcontractors and retailers. In doing so, the financial 
position of SMEs could be strengthened. The Pribumis were also expected to be given 
the opportunity to integrate into the top management of large Chinese owned firms 
(Scharwrz, 1991). The programme was reported to have obstacles because while the 
ministry thought that smaller firms would be cost competitive alternatives as suppliers, 
distributors etc., the larger companies had doubts and some had claimed that capable 
Pribumis were very few. Perhaps with intensive education and training for Pribumi 
SME owner/managers, the integration process can speed up and be in better form. 
As race is a sensitive issue in Indonesia, the Government did not make an ethnic 
distinction but rather described its efforts as support for the weak economic groups. 
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In May 1990, a policy package known as Pakmei was introduced. In the new 
policy package, specific deregulations and reductions of tariff levels were introduced. 
The deregulated measures included the lifting of export controls over 4 main 
agricultural commodities and the lifting of import controls of foreign retail drugs. 
However, 80 per cent of agriculture exports in Indonesia were handled under 
arrangements which limited access to new players (Conroy and Drake, 1990). Thus it 
gave the implication that the potential of new entrants into the activity to take 
advantage of the opportunity was rather tight for a nation where 70 per cent of the 
population still live in rural areas and where the agricultural sector contributed about 
one fif th of GDP. 
Previous deregulations (such as the removal of credit ceilings) had aggravated 
the income imbalance. The resurgence of the private sector had meant a relative decline 
in the economic role of the state, traditionally viewed as the protector of small and 
medium scale enterprises, Pribumi enterprises, against big businesses. Without 
Government intervention, such as the provision of financing facilities and financing 
incentives for SMEs in the short term, income disparities would more likely increase 
than decrease. Perhaps deregulations would increase competition and enhance true 
entrepreneurship but when there is distortion in the capital market where large private 
companies have monopoly control of part of the financial system (since many private 
companies had their own private banks) and there is monopoly of the marketing 
system, income disparities would more likely remain high for a long while. 
In summary, Government policies in promoting SMEs for employment creation 
particularly to achieve the equity objective seems to be limited mainly to the provision 
of credits through its banking system. In spite of that, SMEs in rural and province areas 
appear to prefer to continue to borrow from moneylenders than borrow from the banks, 
which implies that rural banks have not been successful in reducing or eliminating 
financial constraints of SMEs through the credit facilities provided by the banking 
system. Perhaps, related policies such as education policy on vocational training, and 
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fiscal policy incentives in the form of tax exemption, tax deductions and tax allowances 
not only to SMEs but also to larger companies that help SMEs, may help to foster the 
linkage aimed for. Additionally, to encourage formal financial institutions as a source 
of finance for SMEs, perhaps loans through group lending may help to reduce 
transaction costs both for the formal institutional lenders and borrowers. Through group 
lending, the total amount of loan would be large enough to reduce transaction costs. 
Administrative costs for group lending could also be reduced if the group of borrowers 
were responsible for supervision of each loan repayment such that members of the 
group could not get further loans if repayment is not fulfilled by present borrowers in 
the group. 
FINANCING SMEs in SINGAPORE 
Singapore, a newly industrialising country, is a small island covering only about 
626 square kilometres with an estimate population of about 2.71 million in 1990. For 
the same year 1990, its economic development indicators like GDP showed its growth 
rate was 8.3 per cent; GNP per capita was US$12,765 third highest in Asia after Japan 
and Brunei; unemployment rate was estimated to be 2.5 per cent of labour force; 
growth of consumer prices was 3.4 per cent per cent and there was a surplus in the 
current account of the Balance of Payments (Financial Times, April 30, 1991). The 
external debt was estimated to be US$0.1 billion in 1990 (Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia, 1990). 
Its financial system and structure were reported to be matured, highly developed 
and sophisticated making it a major international financial centre (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1991). Singapore had a broad network of banking offices. In 1982 each 
banking office was serving an average of 7,000 persons and its per capita M2 was 
US$4,314 while its per capita deposit was US$4,519. Its financial asset/GNP was 2.74 
indicating the financial assets had increased at a much more rapid rate than its non 
financial wealth (Yan, 1984). 
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Its efficient communication system, minimal price distortion, educated labour 
force and stable political system had contributed to Singapore's economic environment 
for business. 
It seems that due to the small land size, lack of natural resources, small labour 
force and the reluctance to employ large numbers of foreign workers, Singapore had 
embarked on a policy of promoting high technology enterprises producing high value 
added products. 
Its 1979 corrective wage policy which recommended a 20 per cent wage 
increase for three consecutive years meant higher cost of employing labour. In 
Singapore where 94 per cent of its establishments were local enterprises (which referred 
to companies with more than 30 per cent local equity), this wage policy had forced 
firms not to rely excessively on labour, consistent with the objective of encouraging 
high value added and technologically sophisticated firms in Singapore. 
Various tax incentives and various financial assistance schemes had been 
formulated and implemented by the Government to promote higher value added and 
new technologically based activities, operational upgrading and innovation. However, 
Singapore government did not intervene in commercial banks' credit policy as it had 
believed that the market can provide services to SMEs more effectively than the 
Government. Perhaps, the non intervention or free market policy may work well for a 
developed economy like Singapore. It is a major international financial centre which is 
not only attractive to foreign investors, but also within easy reach for its own 
sophisticated domestic investors who are able to make a choice in investing using the 
range of instruments offered by the network of financial intermediaries in its financial 
system. Its financial services industry even grew at a rate of 22 per cent in 1990. 
Perhaps the accessibility to the financial institutions had an influence contributing to the 
growth. 
In Singapore, generally, the official support for SMEs was provided by five 
main organisations namely the Economic Development Board (EDB), the Skills 
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Development Fund, the Singapore Institute of Standard and Industrial Research, the 
National Productivity Board, and the Trade Development Board (Chew, 1988). These 
organisations help in the implementation of the fiscal incentives and financial facilities 
provided by the Government to help local SMEs in all aspect of SME development 
needs. 
The main tax incentive used by SMEs were investment allowance, pioneer status 
and double deduction. 
Table 5.3a; Tax Incentives Awarded to SMEs (Number of Approvals) 
Scheme 1976-80 1981-85 1986 1987 1988 Total 
Total N/A 381 528 851 1225 2,985 
LIAS N/A N/A 88 477 555 1,120 
PSC N/A N/A 10 2 4 16 
DTD N/A 381 430 372 666 1,849 
Table 5,3b; Tax Incentives Awarded to SMEs (Amount Approved in S$ million) 
Scheme 1976-80 1981-85 1986 1987 1988 Total 
Total 4.97 13.76 33.63 51.2 103.56 
LIAS N/A N/A 4.9 24.1 38.0 67.0 
DTD N/A 4.97 8.86 9.53 13.2 36.56 
Source: Economic Development Board, National Computer Board, National 
Productivity Board, Singapore Science Council, Trade Development Board 
For investment allowance, companies were allowed to deduct 30-70 per cent of 
costs incurred in projects that required investment in capital assets for operational 
upgrading or to generate higher value added activities against taxable income, based on 
merits of the project. In 1988, the S$38.0 million for 555 applications were approved 
compared to only S$4.9 million for 88 applications approved in 1986. This shows that 
a large number of SMEs appeared to have enjoyed this special benefit which implies 
that a large number of SMEs had upgraded or generated higher value added activities. 
Under Pioneer status, companies could enjoy corporate tax relief of five to ten 
years. Not only companies engaged in new activities but also existing companies 
engaged in substantially higher technology content than the prevailing industry 
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standards were eligible to apply. The number of SMEs granted the pioneer status was 
10 in 1986; only 2 were granted in 1987 and only 4 SMEs were granted the pioneer 
status in 1988. The fall in the number of firms being granted the pioneer status may 
indicate that new high technology SMEs born in those years were not many. 
Additionally, for firms to undertake a higher technologically oriented activity, they 
have to be aware of the ever changing state of technology to realise that their 
techniques require upgrading. 
Double tax deductions were awarded to companies engaged in marketing 
activities to promote the export of Singapore made goods or in research and 
development activities. 
Companies could also apply for the Overseas Investment Incentive, a scheme 
encouraging local enterprises to go international, and the Venture Capital Incentive, a 
scheme which promote investments in venture capital funds. 
The number of approvals given for Double Tax Deductions in 1988 were 666 
with the amount approved being M$13.2 million compared to 381 amounting S$4.97 
million during the period from 1981-1985. This again shows the ever increasing 
number of SMEs that were able to enjoy the benefits. 
LOANS 
Financing in the form of soft loans for equipment and machinery, industrial 
buildings, working capital and export factoring were provided under the Small Industry 
Finance Scheme (SIFS). It was operated by 32 participating banks and financial 
institutions on a joint risk-sharing basis. SIFS loans were extended to SMEs in 
manufacturing, construction, commerce and service sectors. Additionally, a Special 
Interest Rate Programme had been introduced to promote investments leading to 
substantial upgrading. It is a soft loan scheme which comes with an interest grant and a 
packaged deal ranging from advice on buying, installation, implementation, and 
software programming to provision of management expertise. The effective interest rate 
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was 3.5-4.0 per cent per annum, much lower than the market rate which was about 9-
10 per cent per annum in 1986. 
Export factoring under the SIFS was to improve the competitiveness of small 
local exporters. A cash advance up to 90 per cent of the invoice value would be 
provided on postshipment goods. A discount fee of 6 per cent per annum would be 
charged, much lower than the current market rate of 9.5-10 per cent in 1985. 
Table 5.4; Total Number And Amount Of SIFS Loans Approved For SMEs 
Scheme 1976-80 1981-85 1986 1987 1988 Total 
Number 382 1,341 929 1434 1355 5,441 
Amount 81.2 420.7 250.1 289.2 254.1 1,295.3 
(S$ Mill) 
Source: Economic Development Board, National Computer Board, National 
Productivity Board, Singapore Science Council, Trade Development Board 
SIFS loans extended to SMEs had increased from S$81.2 million in the period 
of 1976-80, and reached S$254.1 million in 1986, bringing the total amount approved 
since the inception of the scheme to S$l,295.3 million. Total number of loans 
approved had increased from 382 during the period of 1976-1980 to 1,355 in 1988 
bringing the total number of loans approvals since its inception to 5,441. This shows 
the SIFS growth had been remarkable and the scheme had benefited a large number of 
firms. 
The main emphasis of SIFS was on the provision of development financing to 
encourage SMEs to upgrade their operations and enhance their capacity while the 
private financial institutions were encouraged to play a greater role in operational 
financing for SMEs. To expand the role of private financial institutions, they were 
encouraged to provide financial advisory services and setting up a review system. A 
special training course on appraising SME loan proposals for credit officers was also 
being developed. 
The large number of participating banks and financial institutions in the scheme 
indicated that they are willing to take a greater role in extending loans to SMEs. 
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GRANTS 
Grants provided by the Government of Singapore to relieve part of costs 
incurred by SMEs cover major aspects of development activities of SMEs. This is 
shown in the grants provided in the wide range of schemes established by the 
Government such as the Small Industry Technical Assistance Scheme (SITAS), 
Business Development Scheme (BDS), Product Development Assistance Scheme 
(PDAS), Software Development Assistance Scheme (SDAS), Research and 
Development Assistance Scheme (RDAS), Market Development Assistance Scheme 
(MDAS), Initiative in New Technologies Scheme (INTECH), and the Skills 
Development Fund (SDF). 
Table 5.5a: Total Number Of Grants Approved For SMEs 
Scheme 1976-80 1981-85 1986 1987 1988 Total 
Total 11,681 5,476 6,183 8,304 31,648 
SITAS N/A 82 318 490 288 1,178 
BDS N/A N/A 58 53 15 126 
PDAS 4 42 11 9 14 80 
MDAS N/A 48 243 233 228 752 
RDAS N/A 2 1 1 0 4 
SDAS N/A 1 0 4 4 9 
SDF N/A 11,506 4,845 5,393 7,755 29,499 
Table 5.5b: Total Amount Of Grants Approved For SMEs (in S$ million) 
Scheme 1976-80 1981-85 1986 1987 1988 Total 
Total 0.25 21.15 16.38 15.34 17.17 71.99 
SITAS N/A 0.7 1.8 2.7 2.8 8.0 
BDS N/A N/A 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 
PDAS 0.25 3.2 0.7 0.8 1.8 6.75 
MDAS N/A 0.36 1.7 1.48 2.11 5.65 
RDAS N/A 0.87 0.37 0.50 0 1.74 
SDAS N/A 0.12 0 0.35 0.34 0.81 
SDF N/A 15.90 13.41 9.41 9.92 48.64 
Source: Economic Development Board, National Computer Board, National 
Productivity Board, Singapore Science Council, Trade Development Board 
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(a) Small Industry Technical Assistance Scheme (SITAS); 
SITAS was designed to provide technical expertise to local industries. SITAS 
grants were provided to relieve part of the costs incurred by SMEs in their activity to 
improve productivity or build up technological competitiveness or managerial 
capabilities. SMEs were allowed to engage the services of private consultants, 
government agencies or tertiary institutions to undertake the projects. SITAS would 
fund up to 90 per cent of the consulting cost incurred in engaging the expert. 
To speed up the process of application, EDB had established Approved-in-
Principle arrangements with the National Computer Board (NCB), the National 
Productivity Board (NPB) and Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research 
(SISIR) where the NCB's Small Enterprise Computerisation Programme and Small 
Enterprise Computerised Accounting Programme, NPB's diagnostic and consulting 
services, and SISIR's technical consulting and incubator programmes were funded by 
SITAS. 
Also funded under SITAS were EDB's Local Industry Upgrading Programme 
(LIUP) and Design Advisory Scheme (DAS), and the Manufacturers' Association's 
European Article Numbering Programme (EAN). Under LIUP, MNCs would be given 
a grant of up to 90 per cent of training costs if they train local supplier firms in areas 
such as management, quality control, production process, technology and equipment. 
Under this programme, local firms would benefit from easy access to the latest 
technological development. However the success of this programme seems to depend 
on the willingness of MNCs to provide the training. Perhaps a full grant on the cost of 
training would be a better incentive, though MNCs would undeniably benefit by getting 
higher quality products from better trained and more knowledgeable local suppliers. 
Total loans extended to SMEs under SIFS amounted to S$254.1 million over 
1,355 applications approved in 1988 compared to S$81.2 million over 382 approvals in 
the period 1976-80. The total amount of loan extended since it started to 1988 
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amounted to S$ 1,295.3 over 5,441 approvals. This appears that the loan scheme under 
SIFS had benefited many SMEs. 
(b) Business Development Scheme (BOS) 
Local SMEs participating in business development missions to seek 
opportunities for marketing arrangements, technological tie-ups or partnerships with 
foreign firms could apply for grants under BDS. In 1988, only 15 firms received 
grants, amounting to S$0.2 million compared to 58 firms with grants which amounted 
to S$0.1 million in 1986. It is interesting to note that although the number of approvals 
had reduced dramatically the amount of grants approved had doubled. Perhaps the 
current high technology involved and information gathering on the ever changing and 
complex technology, had contributed to the increase in cost of business development 
missions. 
(c) Product Development Assistance Scheme (PDAS) 
PDAS was established to develop local applied research and product 
development capability, and to build up indigenous technology. Under the scheme, 
grants of up to 50 per cent of direct development costs (which may include manpower 
costs, consulting fees, overseas travelling expenses, and charges for patent searches, 
and the costs of market feasibility and technical feasibility) incurred in product or 
process development were provided. In 1988, 14 applications were approved granting 
S$1.8 million. 
(d) Software Development Assistance Scheme (SDAS) 
SDAS is similar to PDAS and designed to encourage local information 
technology companies to develop innovative and high quality computer software. Up to 
1988, a total of 9 grants amounting S$0.81 million had been approved. 
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(e) Research and Development Assistance Scheme (RJDAS) 
Companies engaging in longer term research and development projects were 
eligible to apply for grants under RDAS administered by the Singapore Science 
Council. Up to 1988, only 4 approvals for S$1.74 million in grants had been approved. 
(f) Market Development Assistance Scheme (MDAS) 
MDAS is administered by the Trade Development Board (TDB). Grants of up 
to 50 per cent of eligible costs were provided to assist local companies to develop 
export markets. In addition, the Design Venture Programme introduced by TDB 
provided grants of up to 75 per cent subject to a maximum of S$ 100,000 to encourage 
companies to undertake product design and packaging. 
The number of approvals for the grants under MDAS was 288 in 1988 
amounting S$2.11 million compared to 48 approvals for S$0.4 million in the period 
1981-85. The tremendous increase in the number of approvals for grants in the scheme 
shows the increase in the number of projects to develop the export market. However 
the number of projects approved for grants may not indicate the number of SMEs that 
had benefited from this scheme because a firm could be involved in more than one 
promotion activity. Nevertheless, the great increase had shown that SMEs are 
increasingly exposed to international markets which may indicate that SMEs had 
managed to produce high quality products that are of international standard. 
(g) Initiative in New Technologies Scheme (INTEC) 
This scheme had an objective in the development of a pool of highly trained 
professionals and scientists who will form the catalyst for building up knowledge and 
competence in new technologies in Singapore. INTEC grants were given to encourage 
companies to invest in the development of their manpower resources in areas of new 
technologies, industrial research and development, design and development of new 
products, processes or services. Only Singapore registered companies were eligible and 
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the person to be developed to work in the new technologies must be a Singapore citizen 
or permanent resident. 
(h) Skills Development Fund (SDF) 
The SDF was established in 1979 to provide financial assistance to employers 
for the training of their workers. There are many schemes under SDF which included 
the Core Skills for Effectiveness and Change scheme (COSEC), the Approved in 
Principle Scheme, Introducing Training Opportunities Scheme, and Training Needs 
Analysis Grant Scheme. 
Under SDF, assistance is provided for firms to recruit experts and train 
supervisors to help workers gain a set of five core skills namely, communication, 
personal effectiveness, problem solving, work economics, and computer literacy. The 
COSEC scheme was aimed at training workers earning less than S$800 a month. Under 
COSEC scheme, SDF provided nine-tenths of the development cost and trainer's 
salary, and half of the trainees' absentee payroll. 
The above financial assistance through tax incentives, loans and grants given to 
SMEs amounted to S$3322.47 million over 10,884 number of approvals in 1988 
compared to only S$81.45 million over 386 number of approvals in the period between 
1976 and 1980. This seems to show that generally a large number of SMEs had 
benefited from the financial assistance provided by the Government. It also shows that 
the Government is very much concerned in promoting SMEs to be involved in higher 
technology, capital intensive activities producing high value products. Whether it was 
the financial assistance and incentives provided by the Government or the changing 
economy that had caused the reported SMEs growing awareness to mechanize their 
operations and upgrade to high technology, capital intensive activities and the 
manufacture of high value products is a complex problem. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASE STUDIES 
INTRODUCTION 
The chapter will present case studies on five institutions in Malaysia which 
provide finance to SMEs. Firstly, the study is to investigate the financing facilities 
provided for SMEs by these institutions. Secondly, the study is to identify the financing 
problems of SMEs as perceived by these providers of finance. 
The five institutions chosen were Bank Pertanian Malaysia (the Agricultural 
Bank of Malaysia), a development finance institution and a rural credit institution; 
Bank Pembangunan Malaysia (Development Bank of Malaysia), a development and an 
industrial finance institution; Bank Rakyat, a cooperative finance institution; MARA, a 
council trust of the Indigenous people of Malaysia; and the Ministry of Youth, Sports 
and Culture. 
Resources for the development institutions in Malaysia arise not only from 
shareholders' fund but also from borrowing from domestic and international sources. 
However, the Federal and State Governments, the Central Bank and Government 
agencies remain as the main providers of credit to the development institutions. 
Deposits were also a source of funding for the Agricultural Bank and Bank Rakyat. 
Resources of Bank Pertanian amounted to M$1396 million at end of 1990 and resources 
of Bank Rakyat amounted to M$1771 million at end of 1990 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
1991). 
R A T I O N A L E FOR T H E C A S E STUDY 
There are numerous studies done to investigate the financing problems of SMEs 
as perceived by the demand side of finance which is from the owner/manager of SMEs. 
For example, Yaacob (1981), Hashim (1983), Mohamed (1988) had made 
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investigations on this aspect of financing. However, there is little research done in 
Malaysia on the financing problems of SMEs as perceived by providers of finance 
particularly from government related agencies. It is for this reason that this study was 
initiated. 
The choice of the above institutions in the case study was based on three major 
reasons. Firstly, these institutions represented different types of financing institutions. 
For example, Bank Pertanian Malaysia were to represent the institution that served the 
agricultural sector; Bank Pembangunan Malaysia were to represent the institution 
involved in enterprise development; Bank Rakyat were to represent the cooperative 
sector; the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture were to represent the Ministry 
involved with Youth development; and MARA were to represent the institution 
involved in Bumiputera development. 
Secondly, not only do these chosen institutions substitute for the private banking 
system in terms of providing medium and long term capital financing, they also supply 
a range of complementary financial services not normally provided by commercial 
banks and finance companies. Among the services provided by these institutions were 
concessionaire lending under the set margin funds to priority sectors identified by the 
Government and also financing high risk projects which other financial institutions 
were reluctant to finance. Thirdly, all these institutions had a common characteristic 
where the major source of fund was from the Government and had the objective of 
financing SMEs. 
O B J E C T I V E O F STUDY 
The case study will investigate the role played by these institutions in filling up 
the financing gaps of SMEs and the facilities provided towards their objective of 
helping SMEs. The study will also identify the problems of SMEs as perceived by these 
chosen providers of finance. The following questions are hoped to be answered. 
165 
(a) Is financing SMEs a priority objective of the organisation? 
(b) What are the major problems of SMEs as perceived by these providers of finance? 
(c) Does the structure of the organisation facilitate services in helping SMEs? 
METHODS OF STUDY 
Questionnaires and in depth interviews were the methods used in this study. 
Questionnaires were sent out to senior officers of the institutions chosen. To get 
extended informations from the Questionnaires, in depth interviews were also carried 
out. Beside the in depth and structured interviews and the administration of 
Questionnaires there was certain information which required further clarification and 
the respondents were later interviewed through telephone. 
ANALYSIS 
Although all the five institutions claimed to provide finance to SMEs and had a 
stated objective of helping SMEs, it appears that financing the SMEs was not a 
common priority objective to all these institutions. It seems only natural that the 
Agriculture Bank's top priority objective was to promote agricultural development and 
the main objective of the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture was stated as "to 
provide all forms of guidance to youth to be economically progressive, socially cohesive 
and nationally dedicated". The other main objectives included were the coordinating 
and supervising of credits from public funds. However, the Development Bank of 
Malaysia and MARA had specifically suggested that the objective of financing SMEs 
was one of their priority objectives. 
Bank Rakyat on the other hand had listed making profit as one of its main 
objectives. Interestingly, it was the only organisation that stated profit making as one of 
its priority objective. Perhaps, being a cooperative organisation it had an obligation to 
pay dividends to its shareholders which therefore had a rational objective of maximising 
profit. 
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OBJECTIVE I N HELPING SMEs 
On the objective of helping SMEs, the Agricultural Bank stated that its 
objectives beside providing easy access to credit was to supplement other institutions in 
the development of SMEs. All the other institutions seems to be directly involved with 
the objective of promoting the development and growth of SMEs and to increase the 
participation of Bumiputera entrepreneurs, in line with the Government's Policy. 
PREFERENCES 
Regarding preference in serving the SMEs, Table 6.1 reveals that all except 
Bank Rakyat had preference on sector, group and race. On sector preference, the 
Agricultural Bank had preference on the Agricultural/Agro based sector, the 
Development Bank had preference on the manufacturing sector, the Ministry of Youth, 
Sports and Culture had least preference on construction and retailing with no 
consideration given to trading, and MARA had preference on the commercial and 
industrial sector. 
On Group preference, the Agricultural Bank had preference on the rural group, 
the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture had preference on youth club members 
between the ages of 18 and 35, while the Development Bank had no group preference. 
On race or ethnic preference, only MARA and the Development Bank had stated their 
preference on the Bumiputeras. 
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Table <S>At Sector, Group And Ethnic Preferences Of Institutions Financing Simai 
Firms 
Institutions Sector 
Preference 
Group 
Preference 
Race/ethnic 
Preference 
Agricultural Bank Yes Yes No 
Development Bank Yes No Yes 
Bank Rakyat No No No 
Ministry of Youth 
and Sports Yes Yes No 
MARA Yes Yes Yes 
Therefore, it appears that a Bumiputera SME owner/manager aged between 18 
and 35, a member of a youth club, engaging in manufacturing agricultural based 
products would be more likely to get financial help from these institutions. 
Consequently, what would be the chance of those non Bumiputera SMEs 
owner/manager aged beyond 35 and engaging in non manufacturing activity, getting 
financial help from these institutions? Perhaps, this may suggest that there is some form 
of sectoral financing gap. Beside having the five "Cs" which lending decisions were 
normally based on, character, capacity, capital, collateral and conditions, would 
contacts or connection of owner/manager with the "right" people have any effect to 
financing? Somehow, there always seems to be a gap in financing. In providing 
finance, these institutions help to narrow down the financing gap. 
INFORMATION MEDIA 
Regarding methods of informing SMEs regarding loans and schemes that were 
available, all institutions had used their branch networks and most organisation had 
made use of the mass media for promotion and advertisement. In addition, the 
Development Bank used business brochures, business advertisement in selected 
magazines and seminars as its media for spreading information. The number of SMEs 
owner/manager that had ready access to these business magazines and newsletters was 
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not known. Perhaps not many of the potential clients had ready access to these media of 
information because these magazines and newsletters were usually available to clients 
on request only. The list of participants in a seminar with reference to the International 
Conference on Small and Medium Scale Enterprises held in Langkawi, Malaysia in 
1990, suggested that only a handful of SMEs owner/manager had participated in 
seminars or had access to seminar papers. Moreover, it would appear that the number 
may not be large as attending seminars may mean costs to the SMEs especially on time 
while being away from business. 
It is interesting to note that the cooperative Bank had specified existing clients as 
its common channel to prospective borrowers. MARA had stated that politicians' 
speeches and campaigns were also its means of informing SMEs on its schemes and 
loans that were available. This gave the impression that MARA may be directly 
politically influenced. If so, what standing has the non politically involved SMEs 
owner/manager, or a known supporter of the political oppositions in getting MARA's 
help? 
ORGANISATION STRUCTURE 
Only MARA and the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture had stated that they 
had a SME division in their organisation for the processing of loan applications, and 
supervision of loan usage and repayment service. Additionally, the SME division is 
said to have its own key and auxiliary staff who were specially trained through formal 
courses, on the job training and also through experience. 
Although the Agricultural Bank reported that it did not have a SME division in 
its organisation, it however, claimed to have a core of well trained staff to attend to 
SMEs. The Agricultural Bank did not even have a special section in its credit 
department for SMEs, with reason given that the proportion of SME portfolio to total 
loan was small. 
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The Development Bank, however, stated that all the departments in its 
organisation were expected to discharge the function of providing assistance to SMEs. 
Its credit department had a section that handled SME loans but there were no special or 
specific people assigned to the section. 
Bank Rakyat admitted that it did not have even a special section in the credit 
department that handled SME loans. The reason given was that the distribution of job 
function in the credit department of the Cooperative Bank was defined by the purpose 
of the credit such as bridging loan, hire purchase, leasing, etc. and not by amount of 
loan. Helping the SMEs was said to be a part function of the credit department of the 
Bank and "loan appraisal for SMEs are treated much similar to any other credit 
appraisal". 
From the above, perhaps it is not wrong to deduce that most of the staff of these 
organisation were to assume that SMEs are mini big enterprises. 
DECISIONS ABOUT L O A N 
Bank Rakyat and the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture reported that they 
allowed their senior local staff to take decisions about loan. The maximum limit of loan 
allowed to be decided on was M$5,000. at department level in the Ministry of Youth, 
Sports and Culture. In Bank Rakyat, a department head was allowed to decide on loans 
amounting to a maximum value of M$50,000; the executive director was allowed to 
decide on loans amounting to a maximum value of M$250,000; and for all loans that 
exceeded M$250,000 the decision was by a management committee or a board. 
Al l loans given out by the Development Bank were said to be decided by 
committees set up for such purposes. These committees were reported to meet every 
week. There are three main committees: 
(a) management credit committee to decide on loans of M$30,000 to M$99,000. 
(b) credit committee to decide on loans of M$100,000 to M$1,000,000. 
(c) loan and investment committee to decide on a loan of more than M $ l million. 
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A l l MARA loans were reported to be decided by committees, (a) The State 
Loan Committee chaired by the state MARA Director, may decide on loans amounting 
to M$50,000 each; (b) the Loan Committee chaired by the Loan Division Director, 
may decide on loans of up to M$250,000; and (c) the High Committee chaired by the 
Director General may decide on loans of up to M $ l million. 
BRANCH NETWORK 
Perhaps the number of branches that an institution has may indicate the extend 
of network coverage offered to SMEs. The Development Bank reported having 12 
branches; the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture said that it had branches in every 
state therefore totalling 14 state branches in all; Bank Rakyat had 34 branches; the 
Agricultural Bank had 60 branches and MARA claimed to have branches in every states 
and districts totalling 84 branches in all. At state branches, MARA and the Ministry of 
Youth, Sports and Culture claimed to have a special section for SMEs with specially 
trained staff to attend to SMEs clients. 
PERCEIVED PROBLEMS OF SMEs 
Al l five providers of finance had perceived management related problems faced 
by SMEs such as, lack of managerial skill, lack of management experience, lack of 
alternative solutions when faced with difficulties, lack of exposure to innovative 
technique of production, low level of technologies adopted, and lack of marketing 
strategy. Lack of self confidence was also perceived as a problem faced by SMEs by 
two of these providers of finance. 
Four out of the five providers of finance perceived that SMEs in Malaysia were 
faced with finance related problems such as undercapitalisation, shortage of working 
capital, do not have credible/positive track record and highly geared. The problem of 
having difficulty in gaining access to financing from financial institutions due to 
inadequate securities or collaterals for taking up loans was also highlighted. Problems 
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in the lack of working space within affordable rent and the lack of strategic places for 
SMEs were perceived by two of these providers of finance. 
In ranking the severity of these problems (5 for most severe) they are presented 
in Table 6.2: 
Table 6.2: Ranking Of The Severity Of Problem 
Problems Agric. 
Bank 
Develop. 
Bank 
Bank 
Rakyat 
Ministry 
of Youth 
MARA 
Finance 5 5 5 3 3 
Management 3 4 4 4 5 
Marketing 4 2 3 1 4 
Production 2 3 2 2 2 
Staff 1 1 1 1 1 
Others Yes - - Yes Yes 
Key: 
Agric. Bank = Agricultural Bank 
Develop. Bank= Development Bank 
Most Severe = 5 
Least Severe = 1 
Table 6.2 suggests that financial problems may be considered to be the most 
severe problem followed by management, marketing and production. Other problems 
listed included getting strategic premises for the operation of SMEs and the lack of 
working space within the affordable rate. Highly politicised interference was also listed 
as a problem by an institution which resulted in bad loans or non performing loans of 
SME. 
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SUGGESTIONS TO OVERCOME FINANCIAL PROBLEM 
Among the suggestions given were: 
a) Government to create special funds for providing cheap, soft loans to SMEs. 
b) Easy access to soft loans towards proven SMEs. 
c) Financial intermediaries that provide soft loans to SMEs to have longer repayment 
periods. 
d) Government to devise special incentives such as giving a total waiver of interest 
payment to successful SMEs within a stipulated time. 
e) SMEs to limit their borrowing to working capital requirements only. 
f) SMEs to have a proper and good cash flow management 
g) SMEs to expand their venture gradually. 
h) Some form of Government's participation and interference in the overall marketing 
channels. 
i) Some form of entrepreneurs development programmes. 
j ) Joint venture programmes with Government or private agencies, 
k) cooperative programmes. 
DIFFERENCES REGARDING PROBLEMS ACROSS ETHNIC GROUP 
Al l the providers of finance with the exception of the representative from the 
Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture agreed that there are differences regarding 
problems faced by SMEs across ethnic groups particularly between the Bumiputeras 
and the Chinese. The differences stated were mainly related to management problem, 
the limited experience and limited exposure of Bumiputera entrepreneurs in comparison 
with other races particularly the Chinese. Bumiputeras were generally rated as 
newcomers in business and it is interesting to note that most Bumiputeras were said to 
be wanting "quick" success and tended to be heavy spenders whereas most Chinese 
were reported to look to long term success and tended to be cautious savers. 
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Other problems stated were the marketing problems of Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs having limited market and having problems of penetrating or creating 
new market whereas the Chinese were said to have a very well established marketing 
network and were supportive of one another. Unlike the Bumiputeras, the Chinese were 
also said to have strong business supportive groups, associations and Chamber of 
Commerce. 
The Agricultural Bank further noted the differences of problems across the 
region of the country where certain businesses were linked to the state of origin. For 
example, batik industry and silvercraft industry were linked to the East Coast States of 
Peninsular Malaysia. 
Perhaps through entrepreneur management training and education, the desired 
entrepreneurial culture could be created and development in entrepreneurial activity 
could be achieved. 
HANDLING SMEs LOANS 
MARA is the only organisation that claimed to handle only SMEs and said it 
had special people who had been trained in various fields and had staff that perceive 
problems of SMEs to be different from those problems faced by large enterprises. 
The Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture also claimed to have special people 
who were specially trained to handle SME loans but the staff are said to perceive that 
problems faced by SMEs are no different from those faced by large businesses. I f that 
is the case, it would appear that perhaps its organisation would not need specially 
trained staff to attend to SMEs or it may be a question of their training emphasis. 
On the other hand, even though the Agricultural Bank and the Development 
Bank did not have special staff to attend to SME loans, the staff were said to perceive 
that problems faced by SMEs were different from those problems faced by large 
businesses. 
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Among the common problems faced by SMEs were said to be the lack of 
capital; inability of SMEs to furnish adequate securities or collaterals for loans; lack of 
credible/positive track record; and difficulty in gaining access to financing from 
financial institutions. 
CRITERIA I N ASSESSING SME LOANS 
MARA reported it processed loans only for SMEs. Among other providers of 
finance, only the Agricultural Bank reported to process SME loans differently from 
large business loans. The differences reported were that for SMEs, simple applications 
forms were used, security could be exempted for potentially profitable SMEs with 
proven good track records, and the processing of the loans were accelerated. 
For other institutions, it is reported that the process of assessing SME loans 
were no different from the process of assessing large businesses loans. The criteria that 
were normally used in assessing loans were: 
(a) project viability and profitability where the proposed business would have a positive 
net present value 
(b) The loan could be repaid without affecting the business 
(c) Committed management, which could be shown by the capital commitment already 
made by the owner 
(d) On past loans for similar business project, the SMEs did not have dismal records 
Only Bank Rakyat specified security as a criteria for assessing loans. The 
Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture however, reported that a good guarantor would 
be adequate as a collateral for the provision of loans. 
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HELP OFFERED TO L O A N APPLICANTS 
Advisory services were said to be rendered by loan officers in the respective 
institutions. With reference to Table 6.3, regarding help in filling up the application 
forms, the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture (MYSC) and MARA reported to give 
help in completing the application forms. Bank Rakyat only gave assistance where 
necessary and the Development Bank would give assistance only when approached to 
assist in doing so. The Agricultural Bank reported that officially loan applicants were 
not helped in completing their application forms. 
On the preparation of cash flow projections, only MYSC and MARA claimed to 
provide such assistance. MYSC claimed it also helped in the writing of the initial 
proposal project paper for certain cases. Bank Rakyat however, would give advice on 
important aspects of the inflows and outflows for the preparation of cash flow 
projection for its clients. 
Table 6.3 Some Of The Services Offered To Applicants 
Services Agric. Develop. Bank Ministry MARA 
Bank Bank Rakyat of Youth 
Filling Up 
Application 
Forms No*** Yes* Yes** Yes Yes 
Cash Flow 
Projections No*** No Advise Yes Yes 
Key: 
No*** = Officially No 
Yes* = Only When Approached 
Yes** = Assistance Offered 
The above may suggest that help and assistance were not readily offered to 
SMEs loanees but rather the loanees have to reach out for help and request for 
assistance. Perhaps it needed to be officially included as a duty or working ethic to 
offer all the necessary assistance and help to clients particularly to SMEs who are most 
likely to be inexperienced in loan application. 
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Table 6.4a; Proportion Of Number Of Loans Offered 
Purpose 
Of Loan 
Agric. 
Bank 
Develop. 
Bank 
Bank 
Rakyat 
Ministry 
of Youth 
MARA 
Working 
Capital 40% 25% 85% - 50% 
Start-up 
Capital 30% 50% 5% 100% 20% 
Expansion 30% 25% 10% - 30% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 6.4b: Average Amount C If Loan Applied (in M$ ' 000) 
Purpose 
Of Loan 
Agric. 
Bank 
Develop. 
Bank 
Bank 
Rakyat 
Ministry 
of Youth 
MARA 
Working 
Capital 10-15 * 30-300 - 50 
Start-up 
Capital 20-25 * 30-50 30 150 
Expansion 30-50 * 100-1000 - 100 
Key: 
* means Not specified due to "absence of proper data i i 
Table 6.4c: Proportion Of Loans To Bumiputeras 
Agric. 
Bank 
Develop. 
Bank 
Bank 
Rakyat 
Ministry 
of Youth 
MARA 
Total 80% 80% 70%-80% Majority 100% 
Regarding the number of loans that were extended to Bumiputeras, only Development 
Bank specified that it had provided approximately 250 loans to SMEs in a year. Other 
institutions gave the percentage proportion. 
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REPAYMENT PERIOD AND INTEREST CHARGED 
The repayment period and interest rates charged on loans from the Agricultural Bank 
are shown in Table 6.5 below: 
Table 6.5: Types And Purposes Of Agricultural Bank Loan 
Purpose Of 
Loan 
Types Of 
Loan 
Repayment 
Period 
Interest 
Per Annum 
Working Soft Less than 
Capital 5 years 4% 
Commercial Less than 10% 
5 years 
Start-up AJDF 10 years 6.5% 
Capital Commercial 10 years 10% 
Expansion AJDF 10 years 6.5% 
Commercial 10 years 10% 
Key: 
AJDF = Asean Japanese Development Fund 
Development Bank loans were said to have the repayment period and the 
interest charged vary according to types of loans given out. The average repayment 
period was 5 years and the average interest charged was 7.5% per annum. 
In the Bank Negara Report 1990, it was reported that the lending rates of the 
Development Bank ranged from 5.5% to 10.5% per annum but in 1989, its lending rate 
policy was changed to a two tier structure whereby the rates of loan not exceeding 
M$250,000 were to be charged between 3 to 12 per cent per annum; while for larger 
amount of loan, the interest rate chargeable would range from 4.25 to 12 per cent per 
annum. 
Al l Bank Rakyat loans repayment period for SMEs were reported to be between 
3 years to 5 years and the interest charged varied from 9 per cent to 11 per cent per 
annum. 
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The Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture only gave out loans for start-up 
capital. The repayment period were said to be between 6 months to 6 years and there 
was no interest charged. However, a service charge of 2 per cent was applied to these 
loans. 
Al l MARA loans repayment period were reported to be between 3 years to 7 
years and the interest charged for each loan was 7 per cent per annum. 
Different institutions had different rates and had different repayment periods. 
For example, the interest rate for a start up capital loan could be as low as only 2 per 
cent in one institution and could be as high as 11 per cent in another institution. Even 
under the same institution, for the same type of loan, different interest rate and 
different repayment period could be offered depending on which scheme the loan came 
under. For example that had been shown by the Agricultural Bank where loans for start 
up capital under AJDF would be charged at an interest rate of 6.5 per cent per annum, 
much lower than the interest charged on its commercial loan of 10 per cent per annum. 
This implied that SMEs loanees who had information regarding all loans available to 
them would likely to be in a better position to seek the financing that best meets their 
needs and advantage. Perhaps the special schemes for SME financing should be 
available in all financial institutions to give SMEs better accessibility to such financing 
or perhaps the special schemes should be offered by one institution that can reach out to 
most SMEs. This way perhaps information gathering regarding what loan is available 
would be less difficult for SMEs and perhaps SMEs would get better opportunity in 
seeking for the loan which matches their needs best. 
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SENSITIVITY TO THE EFFECT OF INTEREST RATES 
When asked whether SMEs are sensitive to the effect of interest rates, the 
answer given as in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.(5; SMEs' Sensitivity To Interest Rate As Perceived By The Institution 
Institutions Yes/No 
Agricultural Bank No 
Development Bank Yes 
Bank Rakyat Yes 
Ministry of Youth/Sports No 
MARA Yes 
FOLLOW UP SERVICES 
Al l providers of finance claimed to have follow up services on their loanees. 
Table 6.7; Follow Up Services - Time And Frequency 
Agric. Develop. Bank Ministry MARA 
Bank Bank Rakyat of Youth 
WHEN? Pre-Comm After During After Pre 
& Disb. & Disb. & 
After After Post 
Each Disb. Disb. 
HOW Varies At Monthly Monthly Month-
OFTEN? on least or ly 
project once quarter-
and ly where 
operator applicable 
Key: 
Pre-Comm = Pre-Commission 
Disb. = Disbursement 
The providers of finance perceived that the follow up services were generally 
useful to SMEs. However, beside perceiving that the follow up services were useful for 
some SMEs, the Agricultural Bank also perceived that the follow up services might not 
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be useful to some SMEs as the follow up visits were considered to be interfering in the 
affairs of SMEs businesses. 
Table 6.8a: Proportion Of Borrowers Having Difficulty I n Servicing Their Loan 
Purpose Agric. Develop. Bank Ministry MARA 
Of Loan Bank Bank Rakyat of Youth 
Working 
Capital 25% 30% 5% - 30% 
Start-up 
Capital 10% 30% 15% 25% 60% 
Expansion 5% 30% 5% - 30% 
Table 6.8bs Proportion Of Value Of Loan Never Repaid 
Purpose Agric. Develop. Bank Ministry MARA 
Of Loan Bank Bank Rakyat of Youth 
Working 
Capital 30% 30% 5% - 10% 
Start-up 
Capital 5% 30% 15% 20% 40% 
Expansion 5% 30% 5% - 10% 
Comparatively, loans for start up capital seem to have greater difficulty in 
getting repaid and also seem to have greater failure in repayment. This may support the 
incidence of high failure rates among SMEs. Perhaps i f loan repayment period is longer 
and i f repayment is to start only after SMEs had made profits, it would ease the 
financial constraint affecting the survival and growth of SMEs. Additionally, perhaps i f 
SMEs have access to joint-venture programmes the financial management of the 
venture could be better managed for its survival and growth. 
In summary, it can be said that although it appears that these providers of 
finance have the objective of financing SMEs, their organisation structure and staff did 
not appear to be ready in full gear for its mission. Some institutions had no special 
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section in the organisation, in the branches and even in the credit department to attend 
to SMEs. Additionally, some institutions had no special/specific people or specially 
trained staff to attend to SMEs. Additionally, even though some staff may perceive 
problems faced by SMEs are different from those of large enterprises, they seems to 
treat the SMEs as mini large enterprises. 
;1 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
The promotion of SMEs in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore is in due 
recognition of their potential role in achieving each country's development objectives. 
In view of this, Malaysia's promotion of SMEs is one of the major strategies to reduce 
and eventually eradicate poverty, and to restructure society so as to eliminate the 
identification of race with economic activity. The restructuring of society involves the 
creation of a Bumiputera commercial and industrial community by increasing the 
number of Bumiputera entrepreneurs and also by encouraging Bumiputera active 
participation in business venture. Indonesia aims to narrow down income disparities. A 
large number of viable SMEs is seen to lead to a better distribution of income than a 
small number of the larger enterprises. Singapore's development objective is to 
restructure its economy into one manufacturing high value products, using high 
technology and capital intensive activities in the attempt to be a viable exporter of 
manufactured goods to world markets. The restructuring involves the phasing out of 
low value, labour intensive manufacturing activities and the upgrading of technology 
and skills. As most of the local enterprises in Singapore are of small and medium size, 
the promotion of SMEs seems to be only natural. 
Since finance is known to be a major i f not the only constraint faced by SMEs, 
the promotion of SMEs involves the government of each country establishing policies 
and programmes to ease the constraint. In Malaysia and Indonesia, national 
development plans have led to the passage of specific laws and regulations favourable 
to SMEs. Singapore however, stresses the need to create an overall economic climate 
conducive to enterprise, and believes that the market can provide many services for 
SMEs more effectively than the Government. The financial constraint faced by SMEs 
could be due to external factors such as distorted incentives, rationing of resources, and 
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excessive government regulation, a weak support system and economic uncertainty all 
of which are beyond the control of the owner/managers; or it could be due to internal 
factors which are controllable by the management of SMEs. These internal factors are 
mainly due to lack of management skills in credit management. 
Policies for the financing of small firms are classified into those which improve 
the business environment or those which create or develop small firms directly. 
Singapore after much trial and error decided to pursue a policy that creates a supportive 
economic climate and appears to be successful in enhancing competition and growth. 
Singapore has a good support systems for enterprise development ranging from 
infrastructure to the financial system. Being a major international financial centre and 
having a broad network of banking offices in addition to its efficient communication 
system had contributed to the efficiency in its mobilisation and allocation of financial 
resources. Price distortion in Singapore is minimal and the government does not 
intervene in commercial banks' credit policy. To improve small firms' accessibility to 
capital, the financing of small firms in Singapore mainly takes the form of grants. 
Singapore has more competition and growth of enterprise than Malaysia and Indonesia. 
However there is little evidence to suggest SMEs success in achieving the nation's 
development objective. Whether it was the incentive programmes for SMEs or the 
general economic development that had caused the upgrading of technology, capital 
intensive activities and manufacturing high value products for exports, is difficult to 
deduce. To analyse the success of the programme, one needs to know the number of 
capital intensive and export oriented small firms created as a result of the incentive 
programmes. However, the numbers of firms granted incentives indicate an increasing 
trend and that a large number of firms have participated in the programmes. Since 
incentives for SMEs in Singapore are mainly in the form of grants, the financial 
constraints faced by them would be different from those faced by SMEs in Malaysia in 
the sense that with grants firms in Singapore would not have to face the problem of 
loan repayments. In Malaysia, incentives for small firms are mainly in the form of 
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loans which even with concessionary interest rates need to be repaid. In addition, 
although the number of small firms granted the incentives had increased tremendously 
over the years, it is difficult to determine whether these incentives really lead to high 
technology and capital intensive activities and exports; or whether the capital intensive 
activities involved in producing high value products for export are due to economic 
development itself. There is little evidence to suggest the success of the incentives in 
achieving Singapore's development objective. 
Malaysia and Indonesia had the additional complication that, for historical 
reasons, both poverty and lack of entrepreneurship were concentrated in the indigenous 
people. These two countries responded to this by policies which appear complicating 
and which were long and incomprehensible except to civil servants. Even then, the civil 
servants involved on the subject tend to lose track because the list at any one time was 
so long and complex. In addition, when policies appeared not to work, they were 
frequently changed. I f the complications of the package were the cause of the 
ineffectiveness of the programme, the frequent changes made this worse. Some changes 
which at the time seemed necessary to achieve a more effective and direct impact 
brought about some unnecessary and unintended consequences such as the Al i Baba 
effect. Nevertheless, the range of financial facilities and incentives provided and the 
number of organisations involved in administering them implies that the Government 
was highly favourable towards encouraging entrepreneurship and investment by SMEs 
particularly those of the Bumiputeras. Whether the incentives and organisations have 
really caused more entrepreneurship and investment is a difficult question to assess 
because the research would have to compare the effects on entrepreneurship and 
investment with and without the incentives. However, some of the specific incentives 
such as the guide-lines on the direction of loans to SSEs are shown to be very effective; 
others slightly effective; only a few had unintended effects such as the Al i Baba. 
Government regulations often indicate whether the business environment is 
conducive or restricting small firms. A financial burden could arise from government 
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regulations on licensing, tax, and contributions towards funds for employees' welfare. 
Often tax policy is complicated. Though government may provide some tax incentives, 
these may be too complicated for small firm owner/managers to understand; the list of 
incentives made available is often long and may not even be accessible to small firms. 
As such, small firms may not know how to take advantage of the incentives. To get 
advice on matters regarding tax, small firms need to consult tax consultants which can 
be very expensive. Regulations that affect profits, business viability and the ability to 
service loans are burdensome to firms particularly small firms. 
Indonesia's financial system and structure is not fully developed to provide an 
efficient mobilisation and allocation of financial resources. Many of the large private 
banks are owned by the Chinese (which totalled only about four per cent of the nation's 
population) who also owned most of Indonesia's largest conglomerates and accounted 
for two thirds of the private economic activity in the country. The deregulation of the 
financial system has not helped to improve small firms' accessibility to institutional 
finance because many small firms in Indonesia could not raise sufficient collateral. In 
addition, most financial institutions are located in urban areas which are not within easy 
reach of small firms, thus contributing to high transaction costs. Additionally, the 
process of loan application was also reported to be complex and bureaucratic. These 
problems have contributed to small firms preferring to seek external finance from the 
informal sector. The significant role of the informal sector especially the moneylenders 
in providing finance to small firms in Indonesia indicates that institutional finance is 
still a major constraint faced by small firms in that country. 
Malaysia's financial system and structure is mature with a wide range of 
intermediaries and instruments to meet the financial needs of investors. Its banking 
offices are widely spread around the country, even to the rural areas where most small 
firms and Bumiputeras are found. Even though banking institutions including the bank 
branches have an objective to help small firms, some of the banking organisations' 
structure is not fully ready to handle small firm financing. Al l banking institutions 
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under study claimed that their staff are trained to attend to SMEs. However, there are 
no specific people assigned to attend to SMEs. Some organisations do not even have a 
section in their organisation specially for SMEs. Loan appraisal for SMEs were treated 
much similar to any other credit appraisal. This indicates that the banking staff are 
treating small firms only as mini large firms. Banking staff were also found to render 
their help only when it was requested. In normal circumstances, no help is given in 
filling up forms. Advice is rarely given to help in the preparation of cash flow 
projections. This suggest that there is an advice gap where help and assistance were not 
readily offered to SMEs. Regarding methods of informing SMEs regarding loans and 
schemes that were available, there seems to be a lack of coverage. This indicates the 
presence of an information gap. However, on the whole, Malaysia has shown a 
considerable degree of success in improving the accessibility of small firms to capital 
through the lending guide-lines (which were intended to improve small firms and 
Bumiputera accessibility to institutional finance) made mandatory to commercial banks 
and finance companies. Although commercial banks and finance companies were 
required to provide a minimum percentage of loan outstanding to small firms and the 
Bumiputera community, interest rates on commercial loans to these groups were at 
market rates. 
To further improve the access of small scale enterprises (SSEs) to bank loans, a 
credit guarantee scheme was introduced to provide a guarantee cover to commercial 
bank loans extended to SSEs. Under the lending guide-lines, commercial banks were 
also required to provide a certain percentage of loans under the credit guarantee scheme 
to SSEs. However commercial banks do not seem to be very enthusiastic in 
participating in this scheme as claims made were often turned down. 
Other loans with concessionary rates were provided by the Government through 
specific schemes or programmes administered by government and non government 
agencies. Some banks were selected to participate and to administer these loans. From 
this study, it was found that one of the complexities of the present setting is that a 
187 
number of institutions are offering different interest rates for loans to SMEs. For 
example, the interest rate for a start up capital loan could be as low as only 2 per cent 
in one institution, and could be as high as 11 per cent in another institution. 
Additionally, for the same type of loan, an institution could be charging different rates 
depending on which scheme the loan came under. For example, the Agricultural Bank 
of Malaysia had shown that loans for start up capital under the AJDF would be charged 
at an interest rate of 6.5 per cent per annum, much lower than the interest rate charged 
on its commercial loan of 10 per cent per annum. This implied that small firm 
owner/managers who had information regarding all loans available to them under the 
different schemes would likely to be in a better position to seek the financing that best 
meet their needs and advantage. However, accessibility of SMEs to this information is 
found to be limited. 
On the whole total loan given out by commercial banks to SSEs have increased 
beyond the required minimum amount. The Government has found guide-lines on loan 
direction to SSEs are no longer necessary after March 31, 1991. Perhaps the experience 
in lending to SSEs has reduced the perceived risk. However, lending guide-lines on the 
direction of loans to Bumiputera community still applies. This could indicate that the 
activity of providing loans to Bumiputeras is still perceived to be a very risky affair. As 
long as such loans are perceived to be high risk, their availability is likely to be low. 
There are organisations that are involved in programmes that promote only Bumiputera 
activities to achieve the objective of creating the viable commercial and industrial 
community. MARA is an example of such organisations. However, results seems to 
show that many MARA loans were of small amounts, many were provided without 
collaterals and there were high loan failure rates. The defaults could arise from poor 
appraisal of loan applications and lack of monitoring by the officers involved; or they 
could be due to borrowers' lack of management skills. Management skills are related to 
training and experience. This therefore implies that staffs involved in administering 
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SSEs finance, and also Bumiputera firms' owner/manager who seek finance need more 
training to improve performance. 
In the government's effort to further improve the accessibility to institutional 
credit and to improve on the monitoring of small loans to small firms, it had introduced 
a credit programme through groups or associations. In this programme, the association 
or group is responsible for the collection of loan repayments from borrowers. The 
effectiveness of this programme is not yet known as it is still at the early stage of 
implementation. 
Entrepreneurship development is a long process and the creation of Bumiputera 
commercial and industrial community and the increase in the number of Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs cannot be made overnight. It needs internal drive and motivation for 
development towards self employment in small firms as a long term career. Providing 
finance is only one of the elements that help to facilitate the creation of small firms. It 
is however, not a sufficient element for entrepreneurship. Any government effort to 
create more small firms has to stress not only financing but also the development of 
motivation and career towards self employment in small firms as a long term process. 
There are many factors that influence the desirability of being self employed and 
working in small firms. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations are put forward based on the findings on this study. 
(a) Under the present arrangement, there seems to be no single ministry or 
organisation that can claim to be totally responsible for all the development 
programmes for SMEs. To improve the coordination of programmes, to simplify the 
process of information gathering regarding all programmes and incentives that are 
available and to supervise the implementation of programmes so as to improve the 
effective results, one ministry or one organisation could be made fully responsible for 
all programmes in the promotion of SMEs. This will not only simplify the planning of 
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all programmes regarding SMEs but also the implementation and review of all these 
programmes. SMEs will have less problems in seeking information and advice 
regarding all the current incentives that are available to them as they would only need 
to go to this one organisation. Time and cost in gathering any information related to 
SMEs would likely be reduced. 
(b) External finance is an important source of finance for small firms. As such, 
not only financial institutions or their branches or even their mobile banks should be 
within easy reach of small firms, the banking officers involved in the administering of 
loans should be able to understand the difference in problems faced by small and large 
firms. Application of bank loan procedures should be simple. For small loan appraisals 
bank officers need further special training and refresher courses to better understand the 
different current problems and constraints faced by small firms. In addition, these bank 
officers should be a source of advice regarding credit management of small firms. 
Monitoring of loans could be improved as bankers, when giving advice, would also be 
able to assess the performance and financial standing of the particular f irm. 
(c) Role models of successful entrepreneurs in society can influence potential 
entrepreneurs to venture into self employment and at the same time inspire those 
already in business to do better. As a motivation drive, successful and innovative small 
firms should be given national recognition. 
The mass media can stimulate potential entrepreneurs by providing a perception 
of desirability towards self employment as a long term career, and the positive role the 
entrepreneurs play in society. 
The education system can play a role in influencing students' career to self 
employment in small firms, through career guidance and offering subjects in 
entrepreneurship and small firms management. 
(d) In the effort to facilitate the creation of entrepreneurship, financial 
incentives and facilities are necessary but not sufficient. Financial incentives should be 
part of an incentive package which includes training in management skills especially in 
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credit management, production and marketing; and the training is done on the job to 
identify and solve real problems. However, entrepreneurs appear to require different 
types of training programmes at different stages of their enterprise development. 
At a pre-start stage, individuals who that believe they have the potential to 
become entrepreneurs need information regarding self employment as a career option. 
Skills and attitudes regarding entrepreneurship should be developed at this stage. 
Promotional institutions need to identify potential entrepreneurs to provide them with 
the entrepreneurship education and training programmes. 
At start-up stage, entrepreneurs would have made a total commitment to 
becoming self employed and beginning preparing business plans of their proposed 
enterprises. At this stage, information regarding credit sources and on technology 
options should be made available as these information can be extremely valuable. 
Promotional institutions need to provide training programmes on managerial and 
technical skills beside financial assistance. 
At the maintenance stage, the entrepreneurs need information on markets, 
competitive growth strategies and a knowledge of the enterprise's strength and 
weakness. Upgrading of skills is needed at this stage. Promotional institutions need to 
identify small firms training needs and to provide them short courses. Support services 
such as financial advice, management assistance should be included. 
At growth and maturity stage, entrepreneurs would seek new markets. 
Incentives for sub-contracting and export promotion could help to expand their 
enterprises. 
(e) There should be provision of a good support system including venture 
capital, technological and marketing supports for small enterprises to encourage 
competitiveness. 
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What a r e t h e main o b j e c t i v e s o f y o u r o r g a n i s a t i o n ? 
a. 
b. 
c . 
d. 
e. 
Which o f t h e above o b j e c t i v e s i s o f TOP PRIORITY t o y o u r 
o r g a n i s a t i o n ? ( P l e a s e s p e c i f y o n l y one) 
I s t h e r e any s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e o f h e l p i n g s m a l l and medium 
e n t e r p r i s e s (SMEs)? P l e a s e t i c k ( / ) . 
y e s no 
a. I f y e s , p l e a s e s t a t e them. 
The o b j e c t i v e / s o f t h i s bank i n h e l p i n g SMES 
i s / a r e : 
i ) • 
i i ) 
i i i ) 
i v ) 
b. I n s e r v i n g t h e SME s e c t o r , i s t h e r e any s e c t o r , 
g roup, r a c e p r e f e r e n c e ? 
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I f y e s , p l e a s e t i c k and s p e c i f y t h e s e c t o r , group, 
r a c e p r e f e r e n c e ? 
i ) s e c t o r y e s No 
i i ) group y e s No 
i i i ) r a c e y e s No 
4. How do SMEs g e t t o know about t h e l o a n s w h i c h a r e 
a v a i l a b l e ? 
5. How do t h e y know t h e scheme e x i s t s ? 
6. I s t h e r e an SME d i v i s i o n i n y o u r o r g a n i s a t i o n ? P l e a s e 
t i c k (/) t h e a p p r o p r i a t e . 
y e s No 
a. I f y e s , what a r e t h e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e SME d i v i s i o n ? 
7. Does t h e SME d i v i s i o n have i t s own k e y and a u x i l i a r y 
s t a f f ? P l e a s e t i c k (/) t h e a p p r o p r i a t e . 
y e s No 
a. I f y e s , a r e t h e y s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d ? 
y e s No 
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b. I f your answer i s y e s i n 7a., how a r e t h e y t r a i n e d ? 
i ) F ormal c o u r s e o f t r a i n i n g y e s no 
i i ) On t h e j o b t r a i n i n g y e s no 
i i i ) Through e x p e r i e n c e y e s no 
8. Are t h e more s e n i o r s t a f f i n t h e d i v i s i o n a l l o w e d t o t a k e 
d e c i s i o n s about l o a n ? 
y e s no 
a. I f y e s , what i s t h e maximum l i m i t o f l o a n w h i c h t h e 
s t a f f o f t h e s e c t i o n c a n d e c i d e on? 
9. How many b r a n c h e s do you have t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y ? 
10. Do you have a s p e c i a l s e c t i o n f o r SMEs: 
a. i n a l l t h e b r a n c h e s ? y e s no 
b. i n e a c h r e g i o n ? y e s no 
c . i n a l l t h e s t a t e s ? y e s no 
11. A r e t h e s t a f f s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d t o h a n d l e SMEs a t 
b r a n c h e s / r e g i o n / s t a t e ? 
y e s no 
a. I f y e s , how a r e t h e y t r a i n e d ? 
S t a t e 
B r a n c h e s 
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12. P l e a s e s t a t e t h e problems f a c e d by SMEs i n M a l a y s i a a s 
p e r c e i v e d by y o u r bank? 
a . 
b. 
c. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
d. 
e. 
13. How do you r a t e / r a n k t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e s e p roblems 
f a c e d by SMEs? ( P l e a s e r a t e 1 t o 5, 5 f o r most s e v e r e ) 
a. F i n a n c i a l problem 
b. Management problem 
c . M a r k e t i n g problem 
d. P r o d u c t i o n problem 
e. S t a f f p r o b l e m 
f . O t h e r p r o b l e m s 
( P l e a s e s p e c i f y t h e t y p e o f pr o b l e m ) 
14. I f f i n a n c e i s one o f t h e main problem, how do you f e e l 
t h i s p r o b l e m c a n be overcome? 
a. 
b. 
c . 
d. 
15. A r e t h e r e any d i f f e r e n c e s r e g a r d i n g p r o b l e m s f a c e d by 
SMEs a c r o s s e t h n i c g r o u p s ? 
y e s no 
a. I f y e s , p l e a s e s t a t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s . 
i ) . 
i i ) 
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16. I s t h e r e a s e c t i o n i n t h e c r e d i t d e p artment t h a t h a n d l e s 
SME l o a n s ? 
y e s no 
a. I f no, p l e a s e s t a t e t h e r e a s o n why? 
17. A r e t h e r e any s p e c i a l / s p e c i f i c p e o p l e t o h a n d l e SME 
l o a n s ? 
y e s no 
18. Do t h e y p e r c e i v e p roblems f a c e d by SMEs a r e d i f f e r e n t 
from t h o s e of l a r g e b u s i n e s s e s ( L B ) ? 
y e s no 
a. I f y e s , what a r e t h e y ? 
19. What a r e t h e c r i t e r i a i n a s s e s s i n g t h e v i a b i l i t y o f SME 
l o a n s ? 
20. A r e t h e r e any d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e p r o c e s s o f a s s e s s i n g 
t h e v i a b i l i t y o f SME l o a n s from LB l o a n s ? 
y e s no 
a. I f y e s , p l e a s e s t a t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s . 
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21. How are SME loan a p p l i c a n t s being helped with the 
procedure of a p p l i c a t i o n ? 
22. Does any person i n the bank help the SME loan 
a p p l i c a n t s i n f i l l i n g up the a p p l i c a t i o n forms? 
yes no 
23. Does any person i n the bank help the a p p l i c a n t to 
prepare cash flow p r o j e c t i o n f o r them? 
yes no 
24. What proportion of the number of loans a r e f o r : 
a) working c a p i t a l % 
b) s t a r t - u p c a p i t a l % 
c) expansion % 
25. What i s the average amount of loan a p p l i e d f o r ? 
a. working c a p i t a l M$ 
b. s t a r t - u p M$ 
c. expansion M$ 
26. What i s the p r o p o r t i o n of your t o t a l fund t h a t i s l e n t 
t o Bumiputeras? 
27. Roughly how many loans are extended t o Bumiputeras? 
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28. What i s the repayment period and i n t e r e s t r a t e charged 
for the d i f f e r e n t types of SME loans? 
Type Repayment I n t e r e s t 
p e r i o d Rate % 
a. Working c a p i t a l 
b. S t a r t - u p c a p i t a l 
c. Expansion i . 
i i . _ 
i i i 
d. Other purposes _ 
(P l e a s e s p e c i f y : 
29. Are SMEs s e n s i t i v e to the e f f e c t of i n t e r e s t r a t e s ? 
yes no 
30. Are t h e r e any loan follow-up s e r v i c e s ? 
yes no 
a. I f yes, when, how o f t e n and how long i s the f o l l o w -
up s e r v i c e s c a r r i e d out? 
When? 
How o f t e n ? 
How long? 
b. I f yes, a r e these s e r v i c e s being p e r c e i v e d as u s e f u l 
by SMEs? 
yes no 
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31. What i s the proportion of borrowers t h a t have 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n s e r v i c i n g t h e i r loan? 
a. Working c a p i t a l : % 
b. S t a r t - u p c a p i t a l : % 
c. Expansion: % 
32. What i s the proportion of the value of loans t h a t i s 
never repaid? 
a. Working c a p i t a l : % 
b. S t a r t - u p c a p i t a l : % 
c. Expansion: % 
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